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# OUT OF THEIR OWN MOUTHS

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








**OUT OF  
THEIR OWN MOUTHS**



= Smith, Munroe =  
"

# OUT OF THEIR OWN MOUTHS

UTTERANCES OF GERMAN RULERS,  
STATESMEN, SAVANTS, PUBLICISTS,  
JOURNALISTS, POETS, BUSINESS MEN,  
PARTY LEADERS AND SOLDIERS



*I begin by taking; later I shall find pedants  
to show that I was quite within my rights.*

FREDERIC II OF PRUSSIA.

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY  
NEW YORK LONDON

1917

\$1.00 net

II 515  
.S635  
1917

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SEP 26 1917

**Printed in the United States of America**

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*The war was begun by the military masters of Germany. . . . Their purpose has long been avowed. The statesmen of other nations, to whom that purpose was incredible, paid little attention; regarded what German professors expounded in their classrooms and German writers set forth to the world as the goal of German policy as rather the dream of minds detached from practical affairs, as preposterous private conceptions of German destiny, than as the actual plans of responsible rulers; but the rulers of Germany themselves knew all the while what concrete plans, what well advanced intrigues lay back of what the professors and the writers were saying, and were glad to go forward unmolested. . . .*

PRESIDENT WILSON, FLAG-DAY ADDRESS,  
*June 14, 1917.*





## PUBLISHERS' PREFACE

With few exceptions, the extracts included in this collection are taken directly from the German. Where standard English translations are cited, the passages selected have been compared with the original texts and, in some instances, the wording has been changed for the sake of greater fidelity.

The arrangement is based, in the main, on that of a similar but much smaller French compilation, "*Jugés par eux-mêmes*" (Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1916; xii, 102 pp.); and this has been found useful also in drawing attention to some of the less known German books and pamphlets published before the German World War. The scope of the present collection is, however, much broader. The French pamphlet, for example, has no such chapter headings as "Utterances of Captains of Industry and Commerce" (chapter vi), "Utterances of Party Leaders" (chapter vii), "Utterances Regarding America" (chapter x), or "Reactions and Protests" (chapter xi). Of the material presented in "*Jugés par eux-mêmes*" little direct use has been made. In a few cases in which the German texts cited are not at present accessible in New York, passages have been translated from the French text. In every such case the source is indicated.

Much valuable material has been drawn from a recent Swiss compilation by S. Grumbach, "*Das annexionistische Deutschland: Eine Sammlung von Dokumenten die seit dem 4 August 1914 in Deutschland öffentlich oder geheim verbreitet wurden*" (Payot & Co., Lausanne, 1917; x, 471 pp.). Of the annexationist utterances

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since the outbreak of the War that are cited in the present collection, nearly all are directly extracted from, or have been verified by comparison with, the texts given by Mr. Grumbach. This acknowledgment covers in particular the second section of chapter iii, the third section of chapter iv, and chapters vi and vii. Similar acknowledgment is due as regards the anti-annexationist utterances cited in chapter xi. This general statement must take the place of specific references to Mr. Grumbach's valuable compilation, except where use has been made of his explanatory notes. In such cases specific references are given.

Since the Russian Revolution, and in consequence of the peace program favored by Socialist groups in many countries—groups which seem to be especially influential in the new Russia—the question of “annexations and indemnities” (more properly the question of conquests and of spoliations) has assumed increasing prominence. Evidence of widespread German lust for loot, movable and immovable, and for monetary ransom, such as will be found abundantly in the present collection, is, therefore, particularly valuable and timely. The protests cited in chapter xi are also of interest, and for several reasons: first, because they give comforting assurance that even in the Germany of today there is a decent, sane and—let us hope—saving “remnant”; next, because nearly all the Germans who protest against German megalomania and greed emphasize the general prevalence of the notions and desires which they combat; last, because the governmental efforts to suppress these protests indicate more clearly than any direct utterances of rulers or of statesmen what is the real attitude of Imperial Germany.

A study of this annexationist and anti-annexationist literature will show also what value is to be attached to recent German official disclaimers of desire to make

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"annexations." The "guaranties and securities" which the German Imperial Government, supported by a dominant public opinion, still demands represent elastic claims concealed under a phrase that is equally attractive and vague. This phrase has been used from the beginning of the War as a euphemism for annexations. Rightly interpreted, it has satisfied even the Pan-Germanist. The reader of the present collection will find that the military and economic security of the German Empire requires German control of Belgium and of the northern coast of France as far as Boulogne. It requires also the annexation of a broad strip of eastern France, including the iron ore beds west of Metz, and the fortresses of Verdun and Belfort. According to some writers—and these no obscure fanatics—it requires the annexation of Toulon and the suppression of the French war navy. In the East military and economic security requires the annexation of even greater stretches of Russian territory. The military and economic security of Germany demands similar security for Austria and for Turkey, and an equally thorough reconstruction of the map of southeastern Europe and of southwestern Asia. The political security of Germany requires that the millions of Slavs, Belgians and Frenchmen who are to be forced under German rule shall have no influence upon the destinies of the German Empire. They are to be second-class Germans—subjects, not citizens of the Empire. Finally, economic security for Germany, in the judgment of captains of industry and commerce and of professors of political economy, demands not only political control of wide districts in the West and in the East, but also the expropriation and deportation of Belgian, French and Russian landholders, and particularly the transfer of mines and of industrial plants "from hostile to German hands." This, as is said in the sane and forcible protest of the German "New Fatherland Alliance" (see pages 228-233) is

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a program for which no European precedent can be found since the migrations of the nations in the fifth and following centuries, when the Teutonic hordes first overran the civilized world. These are the demands not of unknown paranoiacs but of some three hundred and fifty professors, supported by a thousand other "intellectuals" (see pp. 60-65) and of six of the most important industrial associations in the German Empire (see pp. 123-125).

These are the implications of the German Emperor's "guaranties and securities" (see p. 6).



# INTRODUCTION

## I

Those who are not with us are against us. Never before in human history has the choice of Man and Nation been as sharply defined as it is today. The future of mankind depends upon this choice. There have been earlier crises out of which human fate proceeded in new directions; but the contestants in those conflicts understood only obscurely, if at all, the ultimate stakes for which they were fighting. We can plead no such ignorance. We know the issue, and whither it leads.

Those who are not with us are against us. On which side do *we* stand? As Americans, we assume that we stand for Civilization. That is our inheritance. What do we mean by Civilization? Surely not mere comforts, astonishing improvements in invention, or even the great discoveries of science which affect only the body and not the soul of man. We mean the recognition of Justice, a keener sensitiveness to Mercy, an undying devotion to Liberty, a quickened conscience which makes us shrink from doing unto anyone that which we should not wish him to do to us. These are the ideals of Civilization and this is the spirit in which alone it can flourish. Erudition, though its books were piled higher than the Tower of Babel, does not constitute it; nor does ability to make great cannon, or chemicals, or military engines; much less is the proof of Civilization to be found in the power to convert millions of men into mere machines, unfree, shorn of humanizing emotions, abjectly obedient to the will, however wicked, of the despot who owns them.

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If at the beginning of the Atrocious War, Civilization and Barbarism had stood embodied in forms revealing the very nature of each, there can be no doubt as to which we would have chosen. But the majority of mankind lack imagination—that quality which penetrates to the heart and essence; the majority live only on the surface, a life of two dimensions, without depth. And in this case many influences worked deliberately to blur or hide the nature of the antagonists. The Prussian agents over here and our native apologists for Prussia were greatly helped by the fact that, as a people, we are not cruel and that we do not lie. The average American had never dreamed that creatures wearing the shape of men could conceive, much less commit, such horrors and bestialities as were devised in cold blood by the German General Staff. So our people heard with mingled shock and incredulity the first accounts of Hunnish atrocities. It took a long time and repeated abominations before we came to believe the truth.

Meanwhile the German propagandists increased doubt here by brazenly declaring that the stories of atrocities were concocted by their enemies; and when this impudence began to fail them they proclaimed that, "After all, war is war"; and they ransacked history for instances of cruelty perpetrated by other races, including ourselves, in earlier times. In mendacity, too, they found us as easy to deceive as children are by a juggler's tricks.

Little by little, however, the evidence that the German policy of atrocity was premeditated became too strong to be refuted even by their sly disavowals. We were forced to realize that the slaying of innocent civilians, the ravishing of women, the burning of towns, the bombard- ing of libraries and cathedrals, the wholesale massacres, the starving, enslaving and exile of entire populations were not due to such outbursts of bloody passions as sometimes blacken warfare in civilized countries, but were

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deliberately ordered and carried out with all the boasted thoroughness of the German General Staff. And as this awful revelation of fiendishness broke upon us, we began to perceive that it was only a part, the necessary product, of a system for conquering the world and reducing it to slavish submission to the House of Hohenzollern.

### II

The book which follows gives the best possible statement of the principles by which Prussian monarchs and ministers were governed, of the World Empire which they hoped to establish, and of the means by which they expected to destroy Civilization and to set up in its place the Dominion of the Hun. Observe that these statements do not come from me or from any other partisan of Civilization, but from the Germans themselves. Truth is revealed not only in wine, but in those expressions which we make unconsciously,—in grief, in anger, in exultation. So when you find, in the passages which follow, the writer exulting over a policy which seems to you to be damnable, you can be sure that he is wearing no mask. The same is true when he lays before you, and gloats over it, a scheme of perfidy; or when he exposes, quite naïvely, his unbounded self-conceit and the vast proportions of the national swelled head, for which not merely Germany but Europe was too small, and only the world could suffice.

Considering the mass of testimony which had been accumulating during the twenty-five years between the accession of William II and his launching of war in 1914, considering also how openly the Germans talked of their "Destiny," their superiority, their fitness to rule the world, it is surprising how blind other nations and we were. We wrapped ourselves in incredulity. We took complacent ease in the thought that the day of Napoleon

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and Cæsars had passed; that the world was too civilized to indulge in great wars of conquest; that commerce and banking and Socialist interactions, not to mention the unprecedented growth in humane standards had created an interdependence which would make war, not merely improbable, but unthinkable. We saw, indeed, that William II was neither a Napoleon nor a Cæsar; but we did not sufficiently allow for the effect of the inordinate ambition and monstrous vanity of even a neurotic monarch working upon a people like the German. The size of the fetish never measures the strength of the tribe that worships it.

The War for World Power was no sudden conception; but only after the victories of Prussia fifty years ago did it become the definite aim of the military Junker ring. Having beaten Austria, Prussia dominated the German States, whether they would or no; and by defeating France, she united Germany as an Empire in which she was dominant. During the next twenty years, Bismarck, the real ruler of Germany, dismissed the propagandists of Pan-Germanism as half-baked theorists. He declared that Germany was "a satisfied nation." He planned to keep Germany at the head of Europe, but not to destroy France, England or Italy, nor to cripple Russia. He took little interest in colonies, nor does he seem to have been humbugged by the plea that Germany must go to war in order to win a place in the sun. He knew that Germans had migrated to all parts of the earth, and that in each place they were prospering by their thrift and industry.

William II became Kaiser on June 15, 1888, and he soon let the world know that he regarded himself as a bigger man than Old Bismarck. Having dropped Bismarck, he chose as advisers mediocre men—bureaucrats, militarists, Junkers, who, with captains of industry, shaped the policy of the country and completed the

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Prussianization of the non-Prussian Germans. Spurred on one side by an unscrupulous and a merciless Militarist caste and on the other by an equally unscrupulous and merciless Capitalist class—there have been no modern money-hunters like the Germans—German international policy took the road desired by the Army and by the Capitalists. Both classes flattered the Kaiser into supposing that he originated their policies, and that these were essential to the welfare of Germany—an easy task, for he was a megalomaniac of colossal proportions.

About 1895 the dream of World Dominion solidified into something more than a dream. Officials of the Army, Navy and State Departments began to formulate the steps required to attain it. France and Russia—the competing Land Powers—could easily be smashed; but England, whose Empire stretched round the earth, could be reached and overcome only on the sea. So Germany started to build a great Navy, and the Naval officers at their mess drank regularly their toast "*Auf den Tag*"—"To the Day" when they should be strong enough to meet the hated English, but for whom the Germans pleasantly assumed they would already be supreme. Now Pan-Germanists, official and unofficial, raised their pæan to the superiority of the Germanic race. Historians expounded the manifest destiny reserved for them. Parsons bade them heed the word of God and slay the degenerate peoples. A mad philosopher glorified the Superman—a creature whom they at once assumed was German. Men of science found a warrant in biology for the destruction of the weak by the strong. The Kaiser himself spoke freely of his partnership with "*der alte Gott*"—a connection which of course sealed with sanctity the Imperial utterances and designs.

Everything being ready, and the enemies of Germany being reported by the Kaiser's spies as too unprepared to fight, the Prussian Military Ring forced the War.



# INTRODUCTION

## III

When you read the testimony which follows, therefore, you will understand that the War was the culmination of plans extending over a quarter of a century—more than that, that it sprang from the Prussian nature, which had proclaimed for a hundred years that war is the normal state of nations. You will see that the horrors, the hideous cruelties, the diabolical devastation, were not exceptional crimes, but carefully worked out parts of the Prussian military system in action.

There is a beast in every man. Prussian war experts long ago made it their duty to unchain this beast and to give it free play during war. They discovered how to excite its fury, and how to train that fury so that it should be damnably efficient. How well they have succeeded Belgium can tell, and Serbia and Poland and Armenia, whose two million and a half of dead were victims of massacre arranged by Prussians and carried out by Turks. The sinking of the *Lusitania*, and of hundreds of other merchant ships—not enemy ships only but also neutral ships—the execution of Edith Cavell and of Captain Fryatt, the slaughter of hostages, the outrages on women and girls of all ages, the deportations, the starving of foreign civilians in prison pens, the sinking of hospital ships, the poisoning of wells, the shooting of Red Cross ambulance drivers and nurses—these are all deliberate manifestations of the Satanic system of Cruelty which the Prussians long ago adopted as the guiding principle of their war-making.

Cruelty has been an attribute of the Germans since earliest times. The Goths and Vandals and their kindred barbarians practiced it as a matter of course. The Huns—the spiritual ancestors of the Prussians—raised it to such a bad eminence that for fourteen centuries they stood unchallenged as foremost in cruelty.

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The second pillar of the Prussian system is Mendacity. Frederick the Great gloried in his use of it; what he wrote about it might form a Manual of Treachery. Bismarck was an expert in it. What can be expected of a nation whose national heroes are Frederick, who held no oath sacred, and Bismarck, who doctored the Ems dispatch? Mendacity, as practiced by the Prussians, includes hypocrisy, downright lies, treachery, and the debasing spy-system which has been employed since 1914 to undermine the United States. Deceit belongs properly to the savage, and we need not wonder, therefore, that it has been made a specialty by the modern Barbarians. President Wilson, whose opportunities for knowing details have, of course, surpassed those of any other American individual, has carefully distinguished between the German people and the German Imperial Government. With that clue we can, in all this terrible affair, assign responsibility for the wicked plans and their carrying out.

What I may call official German collective mendacity has reached its climax since 1896, when the Germans began secretly to plant colonies abroad; taking care that the new immigrants should go to strengthen German influence in chosen countries, and that the earlier settlers should be won back by blandishments and bribes of allegiance to German Imperialism. This was Prince Bülow's way of "redeeming" German emigrants. No American, with our experience of the past three years before him, needs to be told the abominable methods employed or the results achieved.

Cruelty and Mendacity! These two words sum up military Prussianism. Humanity means the victory of human qualities and ideals over those of the beast. Prussianism, in exalting Cruelty, denies Humanity and voluntarily accepts the standards of the Beast. So Prussianism is an outlaw from Humanity. In like fashion, by practic-

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ing and glorifying Mendacity, Prussianism denies the primal trust of man in man, of tribe in tribe, which is the cornerstone of Civilization. Prussianism flouts the sanctity of treaties, and laughs at all other obligations which might check or hamper it; and thereby it denies international faith, and makes itself an outlaw from Civilization.

You who read this confession of such ideals, you who remember how ruthlessly they have been put into practice, cannot plead ignorance in making your decisions between Civilization and Prussianism. You are American; can you picture Washington or Lincoln as supporting any of these devilish doctrines? You are American, and in the light of what the Teutons have done and still hope to do, you cannot doubt that if they got a foothold here they would shoot down you and your friends as hostages, destroy your home and your town, outrage your wife and daughters, devastate the country, and try to terrorize it into submission. They would have no more respect for Americans than they have had for Belgians or for French. Like the wolves and the hyenas they do these things because it is their nature to do them. Do not allow any specious argument to lure you to the side of the wolf and the hyena.

Those who are not with us are against us.

WILLIAM ROSCOE THAYER.

*Cambridge,  
July 14, 1917.*

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Treaty of London, November 15, 1831. Treaty of London, May 11, 1867 (p. 249).

#### III. CONVENTIONS RESPECTING WAR ON LAND

The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 (p. 250). Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (p. 251).



**OUT OF  
THEIR OWN MOUTHS**



# OUT OF THEIR OWN MOUTHS

## CHAPTER I

### UTTERANCES OF RULERS

#### Political philosophy of Frederic II

If there is anything to be gained by it, we will be honest; if deception is necessary, let us be cheats.

Frederic II, Letter to Minister Radziwill.

Do not be ashamed to make alliances with a view to gaining advantage from them for yourself only.

Do not commit the gross blunder of not abandoning them when it suits your interest.

One takes when one can, and one is wrong only when obliged to give back.

I understand by the word "policy" that one must make it his study to deceive others; that is the way to get the better of them.

Works of Frederic II. Berlin edition (1848).

No ministers at home, but clerks. No ministers abroad, but spies.

Form alliances only in order to sow animosities. Kindle and prolong war between my neighbors. Always promise help and never send it.

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There is only one person in the kingdom, that is myself.

Marginal notes in a copy of Tacitus, written by the King and cited by Diderot.

### Justification of the Silesian War

The matter of right is the business of the ministers, it is your business. It is time to work it up in secret, for the troops have received their orders.

Frederic II, to Minister Radziwill, November 7, 1740.

### "Scraps of paper"

All written constitutions are only scraps of paper.

Frederic William IV, Speech from the Throne, April 11, 1847.

### The word of an Emperor

In October, 1911, Emperor Wilhelm II conversed with the Belgian General Heimburger and with M. Delvaux de Fenffe, the governor of the province of Liège, who came to greet him on behalf of the King of the Belgians. He said to M. Delvaux:

You are the governor of a province with which we have always maintained good neighborly relations. Recently, I understand, you have felt in your country serious apprehensions. Believe me, these apprehensions were unnecessary.

At the luncheon that followed, the Emperor, answering General Heimburger, said:

You were quite right to trust us.

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### Instruments of Providence

Providence has willed that we should be his instruments.

William I, Speech, March 3, 1871.

We shall conquer everywhere, even though we be surrounded by enemies on all sides; for there lives a powerful ally, the old good God in heaven, who . . . has always been on our side.

William II, Speech, March 28, 1901.

Here [in Königsberg] my grandfather again, by his own right, set the Prussian crown upon his head, once more distinctly emphasizing the fact that it was accorded him by the will of God alone . . . and that he looked upon himself as the chosen instrument of heaven. . . . Looking upon myself as the instrument of the Lord, without regard to the opinions and intentions of the day, I go my way. . . .

William II, Speech, August 25, 1910.

I welcome with all my heart those who wish to assist me in my work, no matter who they may be, but those who oppose me in this work I will crush.

William II, Speech at a Brandenburg banquet, 1890.

### The sole pillar of the realm

Just as at that time [in the reign of William I], so now, too, distrust and discord are rife among the people. The only pillar on which the realm rested was the army. So it is today!

William II, Speech, October 18, 1894.

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### Imperial menaces

You know very well that you are to fight against a cunning, brave, well-armed and terrible enemy. If you come to grips with him, be assured **quarter will not be given, no prisoners will be taken.** Use your weapons in such a way that for a thousand years no Chinese shall dare to look upon a German askance. Be as terrible as Attila's Huns.

William II, Speech to the Chinese Expeditionary force, July 27, 1900. The last sentence appeared in contemporary reports but not in the official version.

It is my imperial and royal command that you concentrate your energies for the present upon the attainment of one particular object, that you employ all your skill and all the bravery of my soldiers to exterminate the treacherous English, to shatter and annihilate General French's contemptible little army.

William II, Order issued August 19, 1914.

. . . Remember that you are the chosen people! The Spirit of the Lord has descended upon me because I am the Emperor of the Germans!

I am the instrument of the Almighty. I am his sword, his agent. Woe and death to all those who shall oppose my will! Woe and death to those who do not believe in my mission! Woe and death to the cowards!

Let them perish, all the enemies of the German people! God demands their destruction, God who, by my mouth, bids you to do His will!

William II, Proclamation to the Army of the East, 1914.

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### Germany's destiny as a World Power

Germany's greatness makes it impossible for her to do without the ocean; but the ocean also bears witness that, even in the distance and on its farther side, without Germany and the German Emperor no great decision dare be taken.

William II, Speech, July 3, 1900.

In spite of the fact that we have no such fleet as we should have, we have conquered for ourselves a place in the sun. It will be my task to see to it that this place in the sun shall remain our undisputed possession . . . for our future lies upon the water.

William II, Speech, June 18, 1901.

The Great Emperor (William I) with his great aides laid the basis, the cornerstone of the building; it is for us to build upon it. . . . A great future awaits us, if we are but determined to make it so.

William II, Speech, June 20, 1903.

God would never have taken such great pains with our German Fatherland and its people if He had not been preparing us for something still greater. We are the salt of the earth. . . .

William II, Speech, March 22, 1905.

The triumph of the greater Germany, which some day must dominate all Europe, is the single end for which we are fighting.

William II, Proclamation, June, 1915.



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Of the foregoing utterances of William II, the assurances to the Belgians, October, 1911, and the proclamations and orders issued in 1914 and 1915 are cited from "Jugés par eux-mêmes" (pp. 79-81). The other citations are to be found in the collection of the Emperor's speeches made by Christian Gauss, "The German Emperor" (Scribner's Sons, 1915). Grumbach, in "Das annexionistische Deutschland," p. 5, gives the following extract from the Emperor's "Proclamation to the German People," July 31, 1915:

In heroic deeds and sufferings we hold out unwavering, until peace comes—a peace that affords us for the future the necessary military, political and economic securities and establishes the conditions for the unimpeded development of our creative forces. . . .

### Demands for annexations

The declaration of war by Russia was followed by that of France (*sic!*), and when after this the Englishmen also assailed us, I said:

"I am glad of this, and I am glad because now we can have an accounting with our enemies, and because now, at last, we shall gain a direct outlet from the Rhine to the sea."

Since that time ten months have elapsed. Much precious blood has been shed. It shall not, however, have been shed in vain. **A strengthening of the German Empire and its extension over its present boundaries**, so far as this is necessary to secure us against future attacks—that must be the fruit of this war.

King Louis of Bavaria, Speech, June 7, 1915.

## UTTERANCES OF RULERS

The heavy sacrifices which the whole German people has made . . . call upon us not to make peace until the enemy is overthrown and we can secure a peace which, as far as we can see into the future, shall secure the free development of the whole people in every direction; until we shall have boundaries which will discourage our enemies from again attacking us.

King Louis of Bavaria, Speech delivered after the occupation of Warsaw.

I share with you the hope and the firm conviction that after this great war . . . a victorious and honorable peace will be won. In this peace I hope that we shall secure a great African colonial empire as well as a sufficient number of solid points of support over the surface of the globe for our navy and commerce. . . .

Duke John Albert of Mecklenburg, Telegram to the Colonial Society of Ruhrort; published in "Düsseldorfer General-Anzeiger," June 29, 1915.

## CHAPTER II

### I. UTTERANCES OF GERMAN MINISTERS AND CHANCELLORS

#### I. FROM BISMARCK TO BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

##### “Blood and iron”

Not by speeches and resolutions of majorities are the great questions of the time decided—that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by iron and blood.

Bismarck, in the Military Committee of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, 1862.

##### The “Editing” of the Ems Dispatch

About great events a wreath of legend is always twined, and this is often a very good thing. There are legends which ought not to be destroyed.

The King was at Ems, I was at Varzin, when the uproar on account of the candidacy of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern for the Spanish throne broke out in Paris. The French behaved most fatuously. Worst of all was the Government, with Emile Ollivier at its head. He was not in any way equal to the situation, and he had no idea how much harm he was doing in the French legislature with his imprudent blusterings.

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At the moment the situation was extremely favorable for us. We were actually the challenged party; and since it had long been clear to us all that a settlement with France was necessary, this moment seemed to us suitable for unsheathing the sword. Accordingly I left Varzin in order to discuss all important questions at Berlin with Moltke and Roon. On the way, I received by telegraph the news: Prince Charles Anthony of Hohenzollern, moved by his love of peace, has withdrawn the candidacy of his son Leopold. Everything is satisfactorily arranged.

I was quite taken aback by this unexpected solution, for I asked myself: Will an equally favorable occasion ever again present itself?

On reaching Berlin, I summoned Roland and told him to telegraph home that I would return in three days. At the same time, in a dispatch to Ems, I tendered to His Majesty my resignation as President of the Ministry and as Chancellor of the Confederation. In reply, I received a telegram in which the King summoned me to Ems. Long before this I had worked out a clear view of the situation, and I said to myself: If I go to Ems, the whole game is up; in the most favorable case we reach a rotten compromise; the only possible, the only honorable and great solution, is shut out; I must do whatever I can to bring His Majesty to Berlin, where he will feel the pulse of the nation better than he can in Ems. I therefore set forth, in the most respectful fashion, the reason why I was unable to come to Ems; my presence at Berlin was, at the moment, absolutely indispensable.

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Fortunately, in the meantime, the French, short-sighted and grown arrogant, did all they could to drive the wagon off the road again. They had the effrontery to suggest that the King sign a letter that amounted to a deep humiliation. The King asked my advice by telegraph. I answered with a clear conscience: To sign is impossible.

I had invited Moltke and Roon to dine with me on the evening of July 14, and we discussed all eventualities. We all shared the hope that the foolish step taken by France, the unheard-of suggestion addressed to our King, would dispel the danger of a weak and inglorious outcome. Then, while we were still at table, a dispatch arrived from Ems. It began as follows:

“The news of the withdrawal of the candidacy of the hereditary prince of Hohenzollern having been officially communicated by the Spanish Royal Government to the French Imperial Government, the French Ambassador at Ems has addressed to His Majesty a further demand, namely, to authorize him to telegraph to Paris that His Majesty the King pledges himself for all time never again to give his consent if the Hohenzollerns should again revert to their candidacy.”

A lengthy explanation followed. It was to the effect that the King had maintained the position taken in previous communications to Count Benedetti. The Ambassador had received this reply with thanks and had undertaken to communicate it to his Government. Subsequently Benedetti had asked for another audience with His Majesty, if only to receive once more direct oral confirmation

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of what His Majesty had told him on the promenade. Then the dispatch continued:

"His Majesty, however, refused to receive the French Ambassador again, and had him told by the adjutant on duty that His Majesty had no further communications to make to the Ambassador."

When I had finished reading this dispatch, Roon and Moltke simultaneously dropped their knives and forks on the table and pushed back their chairs. There was a long silence. We were all deeply depressed. We felt that the affair had come to nothing.\*

At this point I put to Moltke the question: "Is the instrument that we need for war, our army, really so good that we can accept war with the greatest likelihood of success?" Moltke was firm as a rock in his confidence. "We have never had a better machine than at this moment," he said. Roon, in whom I had, it must be confessed, less confidence, fully confirmed what Moltke said.

"Well, then, continue to eat quietly," I said to my two comrades. I seated myself at a small, round marble table that stood beside the dining table, re-read the dispatch carefully, took a pencil and crossed out all the middle sentences about Benedetti's request for a further audience, etc. I left only the head and the tail. Now the dispatch had quite a different aspect. I read it to Moltke and Roon in this new form. They both exclaimed: "Splendid! That cannot fail to work." We went on eating with the best of appetites.

\* Literally: "had run off into the sand."

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I immediately gave orders that the dispatch be sent through the telegraph office with the least possible delay to all the newspapers and all the legations. And we were still together when we received the news we hoped for concerning the effect which the dispatch had produced in Paris. It burst there like a bomb.

Although in truth an insulting proposal had been made to our King, the dispatch gave the French the impression that our King had affronted their representative. All the idlers on the boulevards were of the opinion that this was not to be borne. The cry: "To Berlin! To Berlin!" leaped from the howling masses. The right key had been struck.

And the effect here was the same as there. The King, who at my urgent entreaty had decided to break off his cure at Ems, returned to Berlin, and was absolutely astounded by the acclamations with which he was greeted at every stage of his journey. For the moment he wholly failed to grasp what had happened. The indescribable enthusiasm, the roar of cheers that met him in Berlin, seized and moved our old master profoundly. His eyes moistened. He recognized that this was truly a national war, a popular war, which the people longed for, which they needed.

Even before his arrival at Berlin, we had received the King's authorization to mobilize at least a part of the army. When the Crown Prince left the royal train he spoke in the station, and purposely in a loud voice, of the approaching mobilization, and there was another outburst of cheers, and again more cheers. By the time that we reached the cas-



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tle, His Majesty was already inclined to mobilize the whole army. . . .

I may add that I was formally entitled to make the erasures that appeared to me to be absolutely necessary. It was left to my discretion to publish the telegram in full or to make extracts from it. I have had no reason to regret that I made extracts.

This story was told by Bismarck to a number of deputies, at a social gathering in his house. One of his hearers, who had taken notes, published the story several years later in the "Neue Freie Presse," of Vienna, November 20, 1892. It was reprinted November 27 in the "Hamburger Nachrichten," which was Bismarck's organ, with an editorial statement that it was inexact in some details. It is given in Poschinger, "Bismarck und die Parlamentarier" (1894), vol. ii, pp. 128-131.

There are other versions. Two brief statements made by Bismarck are given by Busch in his "Tagebuchblätter" (1897), vol. i, pp. 546, 547; vol. ii, p. 485. In his posthumous memoirs Bismarck again tells the story. One significant passage follows:

After I had read to my two guests the condensed version, Moltke remarked: "Now it has a different ring; before it sounded like a parley; now it is like a flourish in reply to a challenge." I went on to explain: "If in carrying out His Majesty's instructions I at once communicate this text, which contains no alteration in or addition to the telegram, not only to the newspapers but also by telegraph to all our legations, it will be known in Paris before midnight; and there, not only on account of its

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contents but also on account of the manner of its distribution, it will have the effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull. Fight we must if we do not wish to act the part of the vanquished without a conflict. Success, however, depends essentially upon the impression which the origin of the war makes upon us and upon others; it is important that we be the party attacked; and this advantage Gallic arrogance and touchiness will give us if we make public announcement to all Europe, so far as we can without the speaking trumpet of the Reichstag, that we fearlessly meet the public threats of France."

"Gedanken und Erinnerungen," vol. ii, p. 91.

### Why Paris should not be destroyed

The question was raised whether Paris, despite its fortifications, could not be stormed. The military men said that it could. . . . Count Waldersee wished to see "Babylon laid in ruins." . . . Bismarck, however, replied:

"Yes, that would be very good, but for many reasons it would not be practicable. For one thing, German capitalists of Cologne and Frankfort have placed considerable funds there."

Busch, "Tagebuchblätter," vol. i, p. 103.

### Countess Bismarck's hatred of the French

Prince Albert inquired regarding the Countess's health. "She is very well now" (Bismarck replied), . . . "only she suffers still from her fierce hatred of the Gauls, all and each of whom she would like

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to see shot or stabbed dead, even to the very little children—who after all are not to blame for having such abominable parents.”

Busch, *ibid.*, vol. i, p. 332.

### Bismarck's regrets

He complained . . . to us that he had derived little joy or satisfaction from his political activity. For that, he said, no one loved him. Through that, he had made no one happy, neither himself nor his family nor others.

We protested; but he went on:

“But I have made many unhappy. But for me three big wars would not have been fought, 80,000 men would not have been slain, nor would their parents, brothers, sisters and widows have mourned their death. . . . That, however, I have settled with God. But from all that I have done I have derived little or no joy; on the other hand, much vexation, anxiety and trouble.”

Busch, *ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 468.

### A promise, a threat, and a prophecy

We shall not attack France, under any circumstances. . . . Should we be attacked again by France and be forced to the conviction that we should never under any circumstances enjoy repose . . . we should endeavor to make France incapable of attacking us for thirty years. . . . The war of 1870 would be child's play compared with that of 1890—I do not know when it may come—in its results for France. On one side as on the

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other there would be the same effort: **each** would seek to bleed the other white.

Bismarck, Speech in the Reichstag, January 11, 1887.

### Value to Germany of the neutralization of Luxemburg and of Belgium

In exchange for this right of maintaining a garrison in Luxemburg, in exchange for the fortress which, according to the conviction of our military authorities, offered us but slight strategic advantage, we have received compensation in the neutralizing of the territory under a European guaranty. **That this guaranty will be upheld, if occasion arises, I believe in spite of all quibbling; and this guaranty is for us from a military point of view a complete compensation for the surrender of the right of garrison.**

Bismarck, Speech in the North German Federal Diet, Sept. 24, 1867.

It is an indubitable fact that Count Moltke . . . was of the opinion that Germany, in possession of Metz and Strassburg, with Mayence, Cologne and Coblenz in the second line, could in case of a war on two fronts maintain the defensive against France for an indefinite time and meanwhile employ its chief force in the East. . . . We should regard it as a piece of presumption to attempt to support the views of the great strategist with our own opinion; but we should like to add that a defensive conduct of the war by Germany against France, so long as we are, in possession of Metz and Strassburg, and so long as **we remain covered**

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by the neutral Belgian and Luxemburg territory, would not deprive the left bank of the Rhine, but only a part of Alsace, of protection by the German forces.

Bismarck, cited in Hofmann, "Fürst Bismarck, 1890-1898," vol. ii, p. 194.

### Cutting off sea trade lawful warfare

The more a country depends on maritime commerce, the more necessary it becomes to cut off all its communications in case of sea warfare. Such a country might indeed need this commerce for its own nourishment and for the raw materials required in its industry. I am of the opinion that cutting off the enemy's navigation will remain an indispensable method of conflict. He who wages war wishes to gain its goal; and if he possesses the necessary energy, he succeeds by employing every means, including in the case of sea war that of stopping all the enemy's commerce. No one can reject this supreme weapon. Moreover, it is exactly what is done in land warfare. If during the siege of Paris anyone had sent a train of foodstuffs towards the French capital, it would have been stopped. The case is quite the same at sea.

Chancellor von Caprivi, Speech in the Reichstag, March 4, 1892; cited in "L'Homme Enchaîné" (February 27, 1915).

### Concerning the Polish expropriation laws

When recourse is had to special legislation, to a measure which I concede to be harsh, its complete

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success must be assured, and the measure must not be so weakened that its odium will remain while its useful effect will be lost.

Chancellor von Bülow, Speech in the Prussian Diet, 1907.

### The invasion of Belgium a "wrong"

Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity of self-preservation (*Notwehr*) and **necessity knows no law**. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory.

Gentlemen, that is **a breach of international law**. It is true that the French Government declared at Brussels that France would respect Belgian neutrality so long as her adversary respected it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could not. A French attack on our flank on the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. **The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained.**

He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest possessions can only consider how he is to hew his way through (*durchhauen*).

Speech of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag, August 4, 1914.

### Germany had no grievance against Belgium

I was received this morning [August 4] at 9 o'clock by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He

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said to me: "We have been obliged by absolute necessity to address to your Government the request of which you are aware. . . . It is only with the utmost anguish (*la mort dans l'âme*) that the Emperor and the Government have seen themselves obliged to come to this decision. For me it is the most painful one that I have ever had to make. . . . Germany has nothing with which to reproach Belgium, whose attitude has always been correct." . . .

On August 5 . . . I was received by the Under Secretary of State. Herr Zimmermann expressed to me, with much emotion, his profound regrets for the cause of my departure. . . . He sought no pretext to excuse the violation of our neutrality. He did not invoke the supposed French plan . . . of passing through Belgium in order to attack Germany on the lower Rhine. . . . [To all remonstrances he] simply replied that the Department for Foreign Affairs was powerless. Since the order for mobilization had been issued . . . all power now belonged to the military authorities. It was they who had considered the invasion of Belgium to be an indispensable operation of war. . . .

Reports of Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to the Belgian Foreign Minister; "Second Belgian Gray Book," docs. nos. 25, 51, 52.

### "Strategical reasons" versus "scraps of paper"

I found the Chancellor\* very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted

\* This interview occurred on the evening of August 4, 1914.



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for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for **strategical reasons** it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said: "But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences

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could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. . . .

Report of Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. "British Blue Book," doc. no. 160.

### A retraction retracted

When on August 4 I spoke of the wrong we were committing in invading Belgium . . . there were already many indications of guilt on the part of the Belgian Government. . . . Now that it is shown by documents found in Brussels . . . in what manner and to what extent Belgium had abandoned its neutrality as regards England, it is clear to all the world . . . that when our troops entered Belgian territory they were on the soil of a State which had itself long before worm-holed its own neutrality.

Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, Speech in the Reichstag, December 2, 1914.

Subsequent demonstration that the documents found in Brussels did not incriminate Belgium led to the following inspired declaration in the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," August 27, 1915:

On the part of Germany no attempt has ever been made to justify the German invasion of Belgium through subsequent allegations of guilty conduct on the part of the Belgian Government.

Cited in "Friedenswarte," Jahrgang 17, p. 341.

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### Threats of annexation

The greater the peril which we have to meet . . . the more firmly we must hold out, until we have conquered for ourselves **all possible real guaranties and securities** that none of our enemies, either singly or in union, shall again dare to appeal to arms against us. The more furiously, gentlemen, the storm rages about us, the more firmly must we build our own house.

Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, Speech in the Reichstag, May 28, 1915.

Of one thing our enemies must be assured: the longer and the more bitterly they conduct this war against us, the greater become the **guaranties which we shall be obliged to demand**. . . . Neither in the East nor in the West can our foes be permitted to control **sally-ports**, through which in the future they may threaten us anew and with greater violence.

Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, Speech in the Reichstag, December 9, 1915.

Russia cannot be permitted a second time to launch its armies against the unprotected frontiers of East and West Prussia. . . . And if anyone believes that we shall surrender the lands which we have occupied in the West, on which the blood of our people has flowed, without full security for our future—we will obtain for ourselves **real guaranties that Belgium shall not be built up as an Anglo-French vassal state nor as a military and economic bulwark against Germany**.

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In this case also there can be no *status quo ante*; in this case also Germany cannot sacrifice the Flemish people, so long oppressed, to a renewed process of Gallicization.

Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, Speech in the Reichstag, April 5, 1916.

Germany's political and economic situation makes it appear urgently necessary that, after the end of this war, our colonial possessions shall be maintained and increased, without prejudice to the possible acquisition of territory in Europe.

Dr. Solf, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in the "Kolonialkalender" for 1915.

As in the home country we are directing our attention to the securing of such future boundaries that no hostile attack shall in future be a matter of apprehension, so also we shall not be able to ignore a proper development of our colonial possessions.

All European politics have in the course of time become world politics. . . . Germany must follow this development, but the necessary condition for the independent economy of a Great Power is territorial possessions in every climatic zone.

Dr. Solf, Speech at Frankfort, May 29, 1916.

In reply to a declaration of Social Democratic deputies against annexations, Herr von Loebell, Prussian Minister of the Interior, said in the Prussian Diet, January 17, 1916:

This declaration is not in harmony with the true spirit of the people in this heroic time; least of all will it be intelligible to the men who are fighting for us. . . . **The German Empire must build with**

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blood and iron the road to the attainment of its political destiny in the world.

The outcome of this war cannot be negative, it must be positive. It is not a question of our being annihilated, of our not being diminished or torn to pieces or plundered; it is, on the contrary, a question of securing a *plus*, in the form of real securities and guaranties, in compensation for our unprecedented toil and suffering. . . . In view of the feeling against us which this war will leave behind it, the simple reestablishment of the *status quo ante bellum* would not be a gain for Germany but a loss. . . . Now that the cloth is cut between us and Russia, we need considerably increased security in the East, which . . . can consist only in a **correction of our unfavorable eastern frontiers**. . . .

It has always seemed to me a mark of weakness to cherish the hope of being able to attain a real, honest reconciliation with France, so long as we have no intention of restoring Alsace-Lorraine. . . . Perhaps in course of time the French people will submit to the provisions of the Peace of Frankfort, if they are obliged to recognize that these provisions cannot be changed. This is still more likely if we succeed in **developing further our strategic position as against France**—a position which is still unfavorable.

Prince von Bülow, former Chancellor, "Deutsche Politik" (1916), pp. xii, 85-86, 88-89.

I have followed your argument with increasing appreciation, and I am glad to be able to tell you that I share your view in every respect. It has

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given me particular satisfaction that you have shown up the meaningless phrase of the "right of peoples to determine their own destiny" in all its hollowness. . . .

Von Bissing, Governor General of Belgium, Letter to Dr. Müller-Meiningen, member of the Reichstag, regarding a pamphlet written by the latter advocating a German protectorate of Belgium. (See below, p. 145.) See Grumbach, "Des Annexionistische Deutschland," p. 295.

## II. BISMARCK'S UNHEEDED WARNINGS\*

### Against German Jingoism

No far-seeing reckoning with existing factors of European policy is to characterize German statecraft; its efforts are not to be directed to helping, as far as possible, to avoid wars of which the outcome would be incalculable; on the contrary, Germany is to assume in Europe an attitude of provocation and play the part of the man who, suddenly enriched and presuming on the dollars in his pocket, tries to trample over everybody. There is danger that such views may spread in Germany; and this increases the apprehension that, in spite of the best will, Germany may get running on a wrong track, on which there will be no turning back until we meet a catastrophe.

Hofmann, "Fürst Bismarck, 1890-1898," vol. i, p. 382.

\* Most of the citations in this section are drawn from Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy versus Diplomacy in Bismarck's Time and Afterwards," in *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1915.



## OUT OF THEIR OWN MOUTHS

A great power that attempts to exert pressure on the policy of other countries, outside of its own sphere, of interests, puts itself in peril. . . . It is following a policy of power, not one of interest; it is working for prestige.

Bismarck, Speech in the Reichstag, Feb. 6, 1888.

### Against supporting Austria's Eastern ambitions

Least of all is it Germany's affair to promote ambitious plans of Austria in the Balkans.

The (German-Austrian) alliance covered only the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, not also its eastern policy against Russia.

Hofmann, "Fürst Bismarck," vol. i, p. 256; vol. ii, p. 4.

Our relations to Austria . . . do not rest on the basis . . . that either of the two nations can be required to put itself and all its power . . . completely at the service of the other. . . . What interests Austria has in Constantinople is for Austria alone to determine. We have none there.

Bismarck, Speech in the Reichstag, Jan. 11, 1887.

It would be of advantage to Germany if in one way or another, physically or diplomatically, the Russians established themselves in Constantinople and had to defend it. We should then no longer be in the position to be used . . . as the dog to be set barking (*Hetzhund*) against Russian lustings for the Bosphorus; we could wait to see whether Austria were attacked.

Bismarck, "Gedanken und Erinnerungen," vol. ii, p. 263.

Bulgaria is assuredly not an object of sufficient

## UTTERANCES OF MINISTERS

magnitude that, on its account, Europe from Moscow to the Pyrenees and from the Baltic to Palermo should be hurried into a war of which no one can foresee the issue. **In the end, after the war, we should hardly know what we had been fighting about.**

Bismarck, Speech in the Reichstag, Feb. 6, 1888.

### Against war with Russia

The "Kreuzzeitung" speaks of preparation for the great decisive struggle between Slavs and Teutons. For such a struggle it is necessary to be prepared, but **it will never be decisive.** As little as the subjection of nearly all Europe under Napoleon I led to a definitive settlement between Latins and Teutons, so little will any finally decisive struggle take place between Slavs and Teutons; and we do not believe that Providence has set these two great nations side by side without design, or with the design that one should become subject to the other.

To prevent an unnecessary outbreak of war between Germany and Russia must remain the chief task of German statecraft.

Hofmann, "Fürst Bismarck," vol. ii, pp. 124, 125.

**With Russia we need never have war unless liberal stupidities or dynastic blunders falsify the situation.**

Bismarck, "Gedanken und Erinnerungen," vol. i, p. 224.

### Against attacking France

It is my opinion that the historical controversy which has been pending between us and France for



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three centuries is not ended. . . . At the moment we are in possession of the object in dispute, if I may so describe Alsace; we do not need to fight for it. . . . Even the outbreak of war would be a great calamity. Quite apart from its outcome, think what it would mean for us. Our whole trade on land and at sea, all our industrial undertakings would be crippled. . . . **And we must be prepared for the chance of defeat;** I am not so timid as to anticipate it, but the possibility is indisputable. . . . France is a great and powerful country, as powerful as we are; France has a warlike people, a brave people, and has always had able military leaders. **It is a chance, if they succumb to us.** . . . If we should be beaten, if the victorious enemy should stand in Berlin, as we stood in Paris, if we were forced to accept his conditions of peace—well, gentlemen, what would these conditions be?

Bismarck, Speech in the Reichstag, Jan. 11, 1887.

### Against making war in anticipation of war

In 1867, when Moltke urged war on the Luxemburg question, Bismarck said:

The personal conviction of a ruler or statesman, however well founded, that a war will break out at some future time, cannot justify starting such a war. Unforeseen occurrences may change the situation and avert what seems inevitable.

“Denkwürdigkeiten des Grafen von Moltke,” vol. v, pp. 297 *et seq.*

Referring to rumors that Germany contemplated an attack on France in 1875, Bismarck said in the Reichstag, February 9, 1876:

## UTTERANCES OF MINISTERS

Imagine for yourselves the situation if, a year ago, I had appeared here before you and had explained to you: We must wage war; I really cannot give you any special reason why we should do so; we have not been insulted, but there is a dangerous state of things; we have for neighbors a lot of powerful armies; the French army is organizing itself in a disturbing manner . . . would you not have felt a strong inclination to send for a physician, to have me investigated, to ascertain how I, after long experience in politics, could have perpetrated this colossal idiocy—to appear before you and say: It is possible that in a few years we may be attacked; in order to prevent this, let us fall rapidly upon our neighbors and hew them into heaps before they can pull themselves together—inviting you, in a way, to **commit suicide because of apprehension of death?**

Referring to the same episode.

The new Empire, in waging such a war, would have started on the road on which the first and second French Empires, in a continuous policy of war and prestige, went to meet destruction. **Europe would have seen in our action an abuse of the power we had acquired, and everyone's hand . . . would have been raised against Germany or would have been on the sword-hilt.**

“Gedanken und Erinnerungen,” vol. ii, pp. 175, 176.

Referring to strained relations with Russia.

If I were to come before you and say: We are seriously menaced by France and by Russia; it is to be foreseen that we shall be attacked; that is

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my conviction as a diplomatist; according to military information it is better for our defense to employ the anticipatory thrust of the attack and open hostilities at once; accordingly, I ask the Imperial Diet for a credit of a milliard of marks in order to start the war against both our neighbors—well, gentlemen, I do not know whether you have sufficient confidence in me to vote such a grant. I hope not. . . . It will be very hard to make it clear to the provinces, to the federated states and their people, that the war is inevitable, that it has to be. The question will be asked: Are you quite sure of this? Who knows? . . . If in the end we proceed to attack, the whole weight of the imponderables, which weigh much heavier than material weights, will be on the side of our enemies whom we have attacked. "Holy Russia" will be enraged by the attack. France will bristle to the Pyrenees with weapons. The same thing will happen everywhere. A war into which we are not carried by the will of the people . . . will not have behind it the same dash and fire as a war in which we are attacked. This advantage we must not permit to escape us, even if at the moment we are . . . superior to our future enemies. . . . Even if we are attacked at an unfavorable moment, we shall be strong enough for our defense. And we shall keep the chance of peace, leaving it to Divine Providence to determine whether in the meantime the necessity of war may not disappear.

Bismarck, Speech in the Reichstag, Feb. 6. 1888.

As regards the question whether it is advisable,

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in view of a war which we shall probably have to face sooner or later, to bring it on by anticipating the enemy before he secures a better armament, I have always . . . opposed the theory that answers in the affirmative. It is my conviction that even victorious wars are defensible only when they are forced upon us, and that no one can get any such look into the cards held by Providence as to reckon out in advance the movement of history.

“Gedanken und Erinnerungen,” vol. ii, p. 93.

### **Against military domination and personal autocracy**

The following utterances of Bismarck date from the reign of William II.

It is natural that, in the General Staff of the army, not only younger officers of ambition but also strategists of experience should feel the desire to turn to account and to make clear on the pages of history the efficiency of the troops they lead and their own capacity for leadership. It would be regrettable if the warlike spirit did not thus permeate the army. The duty of keeping the effects of this spirit within the limits which the need of the people for peace may justly demand, rests upon the political and not upon the military heads of the state. That the General Staff and its chiefs, . . . even down to the most recent period, have permitted themselves to be misled into imperiling peace, lies in the necessary spirit of the institution. . . . It becomes dangerous only under a monarch whose policy lacks sense of

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proportion and capacity of resisting one-sided and constitutionally unjustifiable influences. . . .

Former rulers had more regard for capacity than for obedience in their advisers. If obedience alone is the criterion, demands will be made on the all-round endowment of the monarch which even Frederick the Great could not meet, although in his time the conduct of the State in war and in peace was less difficult than it is today.

“Gedanken und Erinnerungen,” vol. ii, pp. 93, 265.

To find persons who, by virtue of their talents as well as their character, seem indicated for the position of Imperial Chancellor, but who represent no convictions of their own, is of course no easy matter.

Hofmann, “Fürst Bismarck,” vol. ii, p. 217.

## CHAPTER III

### UTTERANCES OF PHILOSOPHERS, HISTORIANS AND MEN OF SCIENCE

#### I. BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR

##### **Prevalent attitude of German professors towards the peace movement**

The German university professors have always been the most enthusiastic defenders of the [military] system. You hear nowhere in Germany more belittling of the peace and disarmament movements than among the university professors.

##### **Peace a means to war**

(Hugo Muensterberg, "The War and America," 1914, p. 120.)

Ye shall love peace as a means to new wars—and the short peace more than the long. . . .

Ye say it is the good cause which halloweth even war? I say unto you: it is the good war which halloweth every cause. War and courage have done more great things than charity. . . .

. . . Be not considerate of thy neighbor. . . . What thou doest can no one do to thee again. Lo, there is no requital. . . .

"Thou shalt not rob! Thou shalt not slay!"—such precepts were once called holy. . . . Is there not even in all life robbing and slaying? And for

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such precepts to be called holy, was not truth itself thereby slain? . . .

This new table, O my brethren, put I up over you: **Become hard.** . . .

Nietzsche, "Thus Spake Zarathustra," translated by Thomas Common, Macmillan (1911), pp. 52, 242, 243, 246, 262.

### German and French traits

It is wise for a people to pose, and let itself be regarded as profound, clumsy, good-natured, honest and foolish; it might even be profound to do so! Finally, we should do honor to our name—we are not called the "*tiusche Volk*" (deceptive people) for nothing.

The European *noblesse*—of sentiment, taste and manners, taking the word in every high sense—is the work and invention of France. . . .

Even at present France is still the seat of the most intellectual and refined culture of Europe, it is still the high school of taste.

Nietzsche, "Beyond Good and Evil," translated by Helen Zimmern, Macmillan (1914), pp. 200, 213.

I even feel it my duty to tell the Germans, for once in a way, all that they have on their conscience. Every great crime against culture for the last four centuries lies on their conscience. . . . And always for the same reason, always owing to their bottomless cowardice in the face of reality, which is also cowardice in the face of truth; always owing to the love of falsehood which has become almost instinctive in them. . . .

"German intellect" is my foul air: I breathe with



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difficulty in the neighborhood of this psychological uncleanliness that has now become instinctive—an uncleanliness which in every word and expression betrays a German. They have never undergone a seventeenth century of hard self-examination, as the French have—a La Rochefoucauld, a Descartes, are a thousand times more upright than the very first among Germans—the latter have not yet had any psychologists. But psychology is almost the standard of measurement for the cleanliness or uncleanliness of a race. . . . For if a man is not even clean, how can he be deep? That which is called "deep" in Germany is precisely this instinctive uncleanliness toward one's self, of which I have just spoken: people refuse to be clear in regard to their own natures.

Nietzsche, "Ecce Homo," translated by A. M. Ludovici, Macmillan (1911), pp. 124, 127.

### The philosophy of war

Were disputes between States to be determined by a court and by compulsion exercised by superior power, all the States subjected to such a court would cease to be States. The suppression of war would imply the suppression of all States and the remolding of civilized humanity into a single political system. . . . Separate States are therefore by nature in a state of war with each other. Conflict must be regarded as the essence of their relations and as the rule, friendship as accidental and exceptional.

In conflicts between individuals, as in conflicts



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between States . . . so long as men are endowed with free will, compulsion alone can secure justice. . . . If the adversary's power of resistance is exhausted, if actual possession of the object in dispute is obtained, or if one party is compelled to accept the will and pleasure of the other, the controversy is determined. The new state of things thereby established demands the same respect as the state of things that obtained before the conflict.

**In the intercourse of State with State there are no laws, and there can be none. . . .**

War is a fundamental institution of the State, and in the entire structure of the political organism military objects have an important place. **Everything in the State must be calculated for the possibility of war. . . .** A State without adequate preparation for war would no longer be a State, because it would have neglected the most important of its duties.

**A war may be waged for political interests, but never for an "idea."** This would mean the subversion of every solid principle on which the life of the State is based.

The poet seeking to express the character of an age or of a nation can find no better figure for his purpose than that of the warrior, who gives visible expression to his personal worth, whose every step threatens the ruin of a world, whose decisions are reflected in the complicated movements of armies, whose every thought sets cities aflame, hurls nations in the dust, devastates territories and routs hostile hosts.

In politics decisions may be postponed, but

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when the opportunity presents itself, let him who has the power and feels himself prepared cut the knot with the sword. For great historical questions this is the only rational and permanent solution.

Lasson, "Das Culturideal und der Krieg" (1868), pp. 11-13, 31-32, 61, 105, 130.

### "Dictates of prudence"

Between States there is but one sort of right—the right of the stronger . . . and therefore it is quite in accordance with reason that wars are waged between States. . . . It does not follow that their relations are purely unreasonable and arbitrary. As in the case of the individual . . . the will of the State is that of a rational being . . . which naturally desires the advantageous, the expedient, and only occasionally the opposite. Every individual seeks primarily . . . his own advantage, that which promotes his existence, even at the cost of another and of many others. He cannot be required to be considerate beyond the obligations imposed upon him by law, to spare his fellows, to display pity or good will. Here it is simply a dictate of prudence, consideration of his own permanent advantage, that bids him place any further limitations upon his actions. . . . The simple expression of the dictate of prudence is not to harm any one, even if you have the law on your side, unless the result is an overbalancing and permanent advantage for yourself.

If the State is to endure, its first task is to main-

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tain its power, for despite all treaties the weak is the prey of the strong, so soon as the latter has the will and the power. . . . If that which is suitable and reasonable in any given field of will and action is to be described as in the broader sense moral, then in the relations between States this right of the stronger may be said to be moral.

Lasson, *ibid.*, pp. 14, 17, 18.

### Intervention

An attempt has been made to remove many of the occasions that may give rise to war by setting up the general principle that no State is to interfere with the internal affairs of another State. Stated so broadly, the principle of non-intervention is absolutely senseless. . . . If in consequence of a change that occurs in the other State or of a condition of things that is maintained there . . . the life of our own State is essentially and injuriously affected . . . there is unquestionably cause of war, provided a favorable result can be attained by war. . . . If intervention . . . promises success, not only is it justified, but it may even become the duty of the State to itself.

Lasson, *ibid.*, p. 82.

### Treaties

There is no legal obligation upon a State to observe treaties, but there is a dictate of far-sighted prudence. . . . A State cannot commit a crime. The greatest fault with which it can be charged is a lack of far-sighted prudence. . . . Treaty rights are gov-

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erned wholly by considerations of advantage. . . . The State that breaks a treaty commits an act of war; it acts unwisely if it provokes the decision of arms without being assured of its superior power. If assured of this, the State may pursue its interest; for between States no law obtains but that of the stronger. . . .

Lasson, *ibid.*, pp. 15, 16.

### Little States and weak peoples

A so-called small State is not a State at all, but only a tolerated community, which absurdly pretends to be a State. . . . There may be greater and lesser States. The lesser States have rights only in so far as they possess a power of resistance that must be taken into account, in so far as they are desirable allies or respectable adversaries. The little State, however, that is obliged to base its hope of existence on the belief that it will not be attacked for fear that another State will intervene, is no State at all, but the vassal of the State to which it looks for protection, and by whose magnanimity it lives.

The right of living in political independence is not innate in a people; it must rather be acquired by strenuous labor. . . . A people of the highest culture, but of a culture that proves unfavorable to the State with its rigid concentration of effort, and consequently also to warlike action, must perforce and in all justice obey the barbarian who possesses a greater capacity for political and military organization. . . . An order of things in which physical

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strength, not spiritual value, wins the victory seems irrational. But a form of culture that is not able to found a State resting safely on itself and its power shows itself to be of doubtful moral value. . . . Culture exists for the purpose of making itself effective as power.

Nobody is forced to be a slave. He who cannot endure slavery finds a road of escape always open in the sacrifice of life. Let war decide.

The weak are prone to cherish a comforting belief in the inviolability of the treaties that assure them their miserable existence. But one of the functions of war is to prove to them that a treaty may be a bad one, that circumstances may have changed. There is only one guaranty: adequate military force.

[Citizens of certain non-military States think themselves "free" because they have no duties to fulfill.] These so-called States exist only by a fiction; they are animated by no higher sentiment than the jealous hatred which the smaller feels for his greater neighbor, whose place he would like to occupy.

[There are those who speak] of a so-called right of peoples to decide their own destiny. . . . To permit a people or, to be more correct, a fraction of a people, to settle international questions, such as their assignment to such and such a State, would be like permitting the children of a household to elect their father. . . . No shallower or falser notion was ever conceived by the Latin brain.

Lasson, *ibid.*, pp. 13, 14, 71, 72, 75, 98, 99, 100.

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### "Culture" versus civilization

The higher the development of culture, the more energetically a people insists upon the national State. In the creation of this State . . . other States that resist this ideal must be destroyed. This, of course, can be effected only through violence.

There is a great difference between the requirements of culture and those of civilization. Civilization almost always demands for its development peaceful rivalry and coöperation. . . . Civilization is everywhere the same: within it are quantitative differences only. . . . Between one culture and another there are always qualitative differences. . . . They may supplement, but they may also contradict one another. . . . Every nation believes in itself . . . each considers its way the best. . . . Intensive development of culture leads to national hatreds. . . . To demand of nations that have real cultures . . . that these shall develop in peace and without conflict is to demand the impossible, to subvert the order of nature, to set up a false idol in the place of real morality. This demand for the peaceful rivalry of States . . . is either an empty phrase in the mouth of simpletons, or a deliberate and hypocritical lie.

Lasson, *ibid.*, pp. 66, 79.

### The State is power

The State is, first of all, power to assert itself.

Treitschke "Politik," vol. i, p. 32.



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### Absurdity of little States

If we look at the matter more closely, it is clear that, if the State is power, only the State which is really powerful is true to type. Hence the obvious element of the ridiculous that attaches to the existence of small States.

Treitschke, *ibid.*, vol. i, p. 43.

Few persons reflect nowadays how ludicrous it is that Belgium should pride itself on being the center of the science of international law. . . . A State which is in an abnormal situation must give rise to an abnormal misconstruction of international law. **Belgium is neutral, it is mutilated by its very nature**; how should a sound law of nations take form in such a State?

Treitschke, *ibid.*, vol. ii, pp. 548-549.

### Destiny of little States

Times are changed. Empires rise and grow strong, and **little commonwealths and principalities cease to be States**. For no State deserves the name that has not in itself independence, that is not capable of forming its own purposes, asserting itself, and enforcing its own rights.

Niebuhr, cited by Treitschke, in "Zehn Jahre deutscher Kämpfe," p. 35.

In the sweeping away of little crowns we see accomplished an act of simple historical necessity. He who has not yet learned from the past of all



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European peoples that petty States have no place among nations of ripened culture, that the trend of history points to the conglomeration of great national masses—such an one must at last open his eyes in view of the experiences of these pregnant weeks [in 1866].

Treitschke, *ibid.*, p. 114.

### Prussia and Germany

Censure of Prussia . . . will not cease until Prussia's great future is realized, when all the German peoples are united under the Prussian crown. . . .

The most important practical progress that German unity has achieved . . . I find in the fact that Prussia has grown to be a great power and has persistently incorporated in its strong body little States that had lived out their lives.

Treitschke, *ibid.*, pp. 18, 29.

The Emperor William I said once to Bismarck, in a moment of irritation . . . "Why talk of the Empire? **The Empire is nothing but an expanded Prussia.**" That was said with soldierly roughness, but it is true.

Treitschke, "Politik," vol. i, p. 40.

### Political morality ✓

It is necessary to distinguish between public and private morality. Since the State is power, the relative importance of duties must be quite different for it and for the individual. In the case of the State, a great number of duties that rest upon the

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individual are unthinkable. For the State, self-assertion is the greatest of the commandments; for it, this is absolutely moral. And for this reason it must be declared that of all political sins the most abominable and the most contemptible is weakness; this is, in politics, the sin against the Holy Ghost.

Treitschke, *ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 100-101.

. . . In their intercourse with each other, States have frequently lived for decades in a condition of veiled hostility, and it is quite evident that this state of latent war justifies many diplomatic ruses. Take the negotiations between Bismarck and Benedetti. Bismarck hoped that a great war might perhaps after all be avoided; Benedetti came forward with shameless demands; was not Bismarck acting morally in the fullest sense when he put off Benedetti with half promises of possible German concessions? Under such conditions of latent war we may use the same arguments to defend recourse to bribery as against another State. It is absurd to bluster about morality in the face of such circumstances, or to expect a State to confront them with a catechism in its hand.

Treitschke, *ibid.*, vol. i, p. 107.

### Value of treaties

Every treaty is a voluntary limitation which the State imposes on itself; and all international treaties are written with the saving clause: *rebus sic stantibus* (the situation remaining unchanged). A

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State cannot bind its will for the future as against another State. The State has no superior judge over itself, and it will conclude all its treaties with this tacit reservation.

Treitschke, *ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 37-38.

### Necessity and sublimity of war

The establishment of an international court of arbitration as a permanent institution is irreconcilable with the nature of the State. . . . To the end of history weapons will maintain their right; and precisely herein lies the sanctity of war.

Treitschke, *ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 38-39.

The living God will take care that war shall always return as a terrible medicine for the human race.

Treitschke, *ibid.*, vol. i, p. 78.

All the peace-pipe smokers in the world will not bring it to pass that political Powers shall ever be of one mind, and if they are not the sword alone can decide between them. We have learned to recognize the moral majesty of war precisely in those of its characteristics which to superficial observers seem brutal and inhuman. That for the sake of the Fatherland the natural sentiment of humanity is to be suppressed . . . this at the first glance is the terrible side of war, but it is at the same time its grandeur. It is not his life alone that man is called upon to sacrifice but also the natural and most profoundly justified emotions of the human soul. He is to sacrifice his entire ego to a

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great patriotic idea. That is the morally sublime element in war.

Treitschke, *ibid.*, vol. ii, pp. 361-362.

. . . The bestial cruelties committed by the Bavarian troops [in 1866]. . . .

Treitschke, "Zehn Jahre deutscher Kämpfe," p. 161.

### Importance of an "irritable sense of honor"

Whoever attacks the honor of a State even in externals, thereby impugns the essential character of the State. To attribute to the State a too irritable sense of honor is to ignore the moral laws of politics. A State must have a very highly developed sense of honor if it is not to be false to its nature. It is not a violet that blooms in the shade; its power is to be displayed proudly and brilliantly; it cannot permit this power to be questioned even symbolically.

Treitschke, "Politik," vol. ii, p. 550.

### World power

The whole development of our society of States unmistakably tends to depress the States of second rank. Even for us, if we take into account the world outside of Europe, this tendency reveals extremely serious prospects. In the division of the non-European world among the European powers Germany has always hitherto failed to get its share; and the question whether we can become an oversea Power involves our existence as a Power of the first rank.

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If we cannot, we face the horrible prospect that England and Russia will divide the world between them. . . .

Treitschke, *ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 42-43.

The whole position of Germany depends on the question how many millions of men will in the future speak German. . . .

It is easily conceivable that a country that has no colonies will no longer be counted among the European Great Powers, however powerful it may be in other respects. For this reason we must not let ourselves drift into that condition of rigidity which results from a purely continental policy. The result of our next victorious war must, if possible, be the acquisition of something in the way of a colony.

Treitschke, *ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 123-124.

### Confessions

To German doctrinarianism nothing is impossible.

Treitschke, "Historische Aufsätze," vol. ii, p. 553.

We would give a great deal if in Berlin they did not understand the art of debasing the value of famous deeds of arms by boastful words.

Treitschke, "Zehn Jahre deutscher Kämpfe," p. 26.

In Prussia they have a fatal facility of giving offense to the people of newly annexed countries.

Treitschke, *ibid.*, p. 54.

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## Warnings?

In the inexorable justice of history, they who lusted to rule the world were cast under the feet of the stranger.

Treitschke (writing of the Thirty Years' War), "Deutsche Geschichte," vol i, p. 5.

An inscrutably wise Providence chastises nations through the very gifts they have sinfully misused.\*

Treitschke, *ibid.*, vol. i, p. 22.

## II. SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR

### A war of anticipation

Bernhardi's brave books pointed out, in correct anticipation of events, the necessity of grasping the sword before the conspiracy that menaced Germany came to the point of action.

Prof. Th. Schiemann, "Ein Verleumder: Glossen zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges" (1915), p. 6. This pamphlet is a reply to "J'accuse"; see below p. 240.

### Stepping-stones to world power

We cannot conduct world politics on an equal basis with other Powers so long as we are limited to our present geographical position. . . . England must no longer be permitted to cut us off from our dominions across the sea. The coasts in every

\* In 1914 Mr. Balfour said: "Germany has known how to organize power, but she has not known how to use it."

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part of the world, except where, as in America, they are able to protect themselves, must be brought under the guns of our ships, just as under those of England. . . . This means that the boundaries of the old, great and entire Germany, which are now again shining in the red dawn of war, must be permanently retained. Above all things, we must get to the Channel. . . . We have occupied Belgium against France, we need it against England. The Channel is the most decisively important trade route of Europe; one of its coasts (since the other cannot be wrested from England) must be ours. There the frontier against France is not to be drawn as it now runs, but further south, as it ran under Charles V. . . . The old frontiers of Lorraine and Burgundy apparently anticipated the extent of territory which our strategists will today deem it advisable to annex to the Empire at the cost of France. . . .

Prof. Martin Spahn, in "Hochland," Heft 1 (October, 1914), pp. 25, 26.

Let us confess openly that it is not simply the coercion of our needs in world trade that makes us England's rival. It lies in the nature of our nation to strive out of and beyond the boundaries of its present power. At bottom, it has never fitted into the cramped relations of the Continental West, as a State side by side with other States. . . . The German nation is stronger than the other nations of the West. Should it unfold all its forces, merely to gain political power in the West, it might well crush the other nations. It is only since the field



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of political activity open to western peoples has expanded beyond the boundaries of the West that room is given us to attain a political influence corresponding to our strength, without being obliged, for this purpose, to take from the other civilized peoples in our part of the earth light and air for breathing and for thriving. . . .

As one of the Great Powers we can and must have further growth: **we must grow into a World Power.** . . .

Is Belgium to remain an outpost of England . . . permitting England at any moment to set foot on the Continent, while on the other hand it hinders us from disturbing the English control of the Channel? . . . If we had coast against coast, we should be on even terms with England, as we are on even terms with the Great Powers of the Continent. . . .

. . . Timid, doubting voices . . . warn us against all thought of expansion of our frontiers, because the Empire might be obliged to add to the number of its subjects of foreign speech. . . . All great States rest on a basis of some nationality. But what is nationality? . . .

In any case the requirements of foreign policy take precedence over those of domestic policy. **All that a Great Power needs in extent of territory, in the way of favorable situation and strategic boundaries, all that a World Power needs besides, in order to gain free movement in the trade of the world and to secure its progress against rivals at sea—all this must be attained for our Empire.** . . .

Prof. Martin Spahn, "Im Kampf um unsere Zukunft" (1915), pp. 57-63.

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## A pax Germanica

Voices have recently been heard warning against exaggerated claims and exhorting us to moderation. We are to seek no acquisition of territory, no expansion; we are to be satisfied to maintain the balance of power on land and to establish a balance of power on the sea. It is assumed that we shall obtain this aim, if, after this war, we continue to exist as a Sea Power, against the will of England. According to this view we might conclude peace at any moment on the basis of the *status quo ante*.

It would be very lamentable if such views were diffused through the nation. If the maintenance of the balance of power should be the result of this war, we would have waged it in vain. . . .

. . . We hope . . . to become strong enough to give our Continent a *pax Germanica*, a German peace.

Prof. J. Halle, in the Tübingen War Essays, "Durch Kampf zum Frieden," Heft 1 (1914), pp. 23, 28.

The decision regarding the future of our colonies will not be reached in Africa or in southern waters, but in Europe. . . . When our Zeppelins shall fly over London, like eagles seeking their prey; when our submarines . . . shall drive, contemptuous of death, against the dreadnoughts, as if their aim was to breach the walls of Liége; when our cruisers, such as the *Emden*, like flying Dutchmen become the terror of the North Sea—then only will come the time of accounting. Then will dawn the day of a new great German colonial policy, and new colonial maps will be wanted.

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Prof. Carl Mirbt, "Der Kampf um unsere Kolonien" (1914), p. 20.

### Cultured correspondence

The following letters of Professor Lasson appeared in the "Amsterdammer," a Dutch weekly review. They were published anonymously in the issue of October 11, 1914 (no. 1946, page 7, col. 123), with a statement that their author was "a professor of philosophy and higher education, very well known in Germany." They were republished in the Paris *Temps* (November 24, 1914).

*Berlin, September 29, 1914.*

DEAR SIR AND FRIEND:

For months I have not written to a single foreigner; a foreigner is an enemy until he is proved to be a friend. It is impossible to remain neutral toward Germany and the German people. Either one looks upon Germany as the most perfect political creation known to history, or else one believes it should be destroyed, wiped out. No one but a German understands Germany. We are morally and intellectually superior to other nations; we are without equals. The same is true of our organization and our institutions.

William II, *deliciae generis humani*, has always protected peace, justice and honor, although his power would have enabled him to crush all opposition. The greater his successes, the more modest he becomes. His Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the most eminent of men now living, knows no higher cares than those of truth, loyalty and right. Our army is, so to speak, a smaller

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model of the intelligence and morality of the German people. We are forced to sacrifice our best and our noblest in a war against Russian brutes, English hirelings and Belgian fanatics. The French are still the nearest to us. We shall have no peace until those three European mischief-makers are crushed. . . .

England pursues a policy that recalls the policies of European States in the eighteenth century. Germany, on the contrary, has taught the world that politics may be conducted conscientiously and war waged with loyalty. England is on the road to ruin. France may still be saved. As for Russia, she must no longer be our neighbor. This time we shall wipe the slate clean. Our real enemy is England. Woe to thee, Albion! God is with us and defends our just cause!

*Berlin, September 30, 1914.*

DEAR SIR AND FRIEND:

Allow me to give you a few more hints that will help you to understand a cultured German's way of thinking. We Germans are powerfully armed, partly to protect Holland. Were we not so strong, Holland would long ago have been annexed. She is unable to protect herself. This little Kingdom leads a quiet life at our expense; it lives on its past glory and on money accumulated long ago. It is only an appendix to Germany. Its life is a comfortable one; it is a dressing-gown-and-slippers life that demands little trouble, few efforts and few thoughts. If this life satisfies you, so much the

better. As for the German, he has higher duties and higher aspirations.

Today, Holland may think what she pleases; but any hostile action against the German Empire would have the most serious consequences.

For the Holland of today we Germans have little respect or sympathy. Aside from the support we give them, we ought to thank God that the Hollanders are not our friends. We draw deep into our lungs the great breath of history. This miserable *bourgeois* existence is not for us.

I greet you most cordially, and wish most sincerely that you might live, as I do, in a "State of the Mighty."

### German plans and "atavistic instincts"

Professor Wilhelm Ostwald, one of the most active agents of German propaganda in Sweden, gave to the Stockholm "Dagen" an interview, from which the following extracts were published in the Paris "Temps" (November 26, 1914):

You ask me what Germany plans. Well, then, Germany plans to organize Europe, for until now Europe has not been organized. Germany plans to work along new lines in order to realize the idea of collective labor.

How does Germany propose to work out her plans of organization in the West? She will demand that the German and the Frenchman be welcomed, each in the other's country; that they be permitted to work and to acquire property under exactly the same conditions as the inhabitants of the country.

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In the East, Germany will create a confederation of States, a sort of Baltic confederation, which should embrace the Scandinavian States, Finland and the Baltic provinces. Finally, Poland will be torn away from Russia and made into a new independent State. I believe the time has come to rearrange the map of Europe.

Q. What do you think of the growing part played by the different churches in the countries which up till now have had to suffer from invasion?

A. This is a result which it has not been possible to avoid. In many fields the present situation necessarily rouses atavistic instincts. I will say, however, that in our country God the Father is reserved for the personal use of the Emperor. In one instance He was mentioned in a report of the General Staff, but it is to be noted that He has not appeared there a second time.

### Europe under German hegemony

In my view the following fruits of victory are highly desirable for the future of Germany, and at the same time for the future of federated Continental Europe: (1) Liberation from the tyranny of England. (2) As a necessary means to this end, invasion of the British Pirate State by the German navy and army, occupation of London. (3) Division of Belgium: the largest part, as far west as Antwerp and Ostend, a State in the German Empire; the northern part to Holland; the eastern part to Luxemburg—also, thus enlarged, a State in the German Empire. (4) Germany obtains



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a great part of the British colonies as well as the Congo State. (5) France must cede a portion of her neighboring northeastern provinces. (6) Russia is to be made powerless, by restoring the kingdom of Poland and connecting this with Austria-Hungary. (7) the German Baltic provinces revert to the German Empire. (8) Finland becomes an independent Kingdom and is to be connected with Sweden. . . .

Ernest Haeckel in "Das Monistische Jahrhundert," no. 31-32 (Nov. 16, 1914), p. 657.

This was Haeckel's reply to a circular sent out by the President of the "Monistenbund," inquiring: "What is your attitude towards Ostwald's views?" In one of his "Monistische Sonntagspredigten" (no. 11-12, Sept. 15, 1914), under the title "Europe under German Leadership," Prof. Ostwald had expressed the hope that a union of the States of Europe might be formed with the German Emperor at its head, Germany with its superior military organization guaranteeing protection against the East. The issues of "Das Monistische Jahrhundert" dealing with this proposal were subsequently placed under an embargo: they were not permitted to be sent out of Germany. See Grumbach, "Das Annexionistische Deutschland" (1917), p. 255.

### Aggressive Belgium

A nation that acts as Belgium has acted has no right to complain because it is treated according to the law of war. Belgium, like a coward, stabbed Germany in the back; it is not Germany that attacked Belgium without provocation.

Professor Daenell in the "Illustrierte Zeitung," Leipzig (November, 1914), no. 3726.



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### German historical claims in the Netherlands

Alsace and a part of Lorraine have again been drawn into the rejuvenated Germany. . . . Shall Luxemburg and Flanders be forced to follow the same path as Alsace-Lorraine? We are not willing to forget that the Netherlands, of which Belgium is the southern part, are old German imperial territory, and also, to a large extent, old possessions of the German people. . . . The present Holland was always Teutonic. The present Belgium . . . is Teutonic territory up to a line running from the Meuse, halfway between Liège and Maestricht, in a fairly straight course to the neighborhood of Dunkirk; of the famous cities that grew up in the following centuries it includes Maestricht, Louvain, Malines, Antwerp, Brussels, Ghent, Bruges, Courtrai, Ostend and Ypres. . . .

Prof. F. Rachfahl, "Belgien," in the "Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik" (March, 1915); reprinted in the "Preussische Kreuzzeitung" (March 17, 1915).

### A lawyer's brief for Germany against Belgium

The German General Staff, which always acts conscientiously, recognized that carrying the war through Belgium was necessary for the preservation of Germany. No right is so inviolable that it must not yield to necessity; and in action dictated by necessity there is no violation of right (law), because right must needs give way by force of right (law) itself, inasmuch as every right is only rela-

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tive.\* . . . Belgium and its royal house have richly deserved their disastrous fate. Whoever debases himself to act as a lackey for England, in order to fight Germany, deserves no better fate. Whoever fights against Germany, fights against culture; and whoever goes with people like Grey deserves destruction. . . . To the annexation of territory by reason of military success earlier relations oppose no barrier. . . . The irresistible force of military conquest extends over the country and its inhabitants; this is one of the first principles of international law. . . . If anyone wishes to shed a tear over old times, he is at liberty to do so; policy weeps no such tears.

Quite as little attention is to be paid to the exaggerated sentiment that calls for a plebiscite, that demands that the voice of the population shall be heard declaring whether they desire to belong to one State or to another. . . . Territory takes its population with it; the individual who is dissatisfied can leave the territory. . . .

Least of all are we to listen to those who emphasize the difficulties that accrue to the conquering State as a result of annexation, because it will have to deal with alien elements that perhaps may prove rebellious. Such anticipations may alarm a weak and timid nation; a nation of youthful power will simply brush such difficulties aside. . . .

Whether in annexed territory a united population may be developed, which after decades may

\* In German the same word, *Recht*, is used for a right and for the law—which often confuses legal thinking and sometimes disguises sophistry.

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be more or less completely incorporated, remains an open question. . . . As long as the hour to answer it has not yet struck, the population may receive local self-government, but it must always understand that the annexing State is master.

In the case of nations a rational appeal amounts to very little. The driving powers of the national soul lie for the most part beneath the sill of rational consideration. Unintelligible impulses, catch-words, phrases, customs and traditions are more effective than any intelligent consideration of the situation. . . . Accordingly power against power, inexorable domination, psychological force against psychological resistance. . . .

Prof. Joseph Kohler, in the "Tag" (March 30 and May 31, 1915). Kohler, a member of the Law Faculty of Berlin University, is one of the most prolific and best known of German legal writers. He lectures, among other topics, on international law.

### The duties of the chosen people

As the emblem of the Germans, the eagle, soars high above all the birds of the world, so the German should feel himself raised high above all the peoples who surround him and whom he sees at an immeasurable depth below him.

Here also it is true that nobility imposes obligations. **The idea that we are the chosen people imposes upon us very great duties—and only duties.** Above all things in the world we must maintain ourselves as a strong nation. . . . It is not our desire to conquer half-civilized or savage peoples, in order to fill them with the German spirit. . . . The

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Englishman of course is able to colonize in this sense and to fill foreign peoples with his spirit. He has none, except the spirit of the trader. I can turn any man I like into a trader, and to diffuse English civilization is no difficult art. The great "genius for colonization" for which the English are praised is only an expression of their spiritual poverty; but who would undertake to implant German culture in other nations? Heroism cannot be piped on like gas, wherever you like. We Germans will therefore always, and rightly, remain bad colonizers. . . .

We are determined to be and to remain a strong German nation and a strong German State; and . . . if it is necessary to extend our territorial possessions so that the increasing body of the nation shall have room to develop itself, we will take for ourselves as much territory as seems to us necessary. We shall also set our foot wherever it seems to us important, for strategic reasons, in order to preserve our unassailable strength. That is all! . . .

Prof. Werner Sombart, "Händler und Helden" (1915), pp. 143-144.

### Annexionist Petition of 352 professors

. . . The military results already gained in this war at the cost of so great sacrifices should be utilized to the extreme attainable limit. This is the fixed determination of the German people.

(1) France. . . . We must ruthlessly weaken this country politically and economically for the sake of our own existence, and we must improve

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against her our strategical position. For this purpose, according to our conviction, a thorough improvement of our whole west front from Belfort to the coast is necessary. We must conquer as great a part as possible of the North-French Channel coast, in order to obtain greater strategical security against England and a better outlet to the ocean. . . .

To avoid such conditions as exist in Alsace-Lorraine, the enterprises and possessions that give economic power are to be transferred from hostile to German hands, the previous owners being taken over and compensated by France. To the part of the population that we take over no influence whatever in the Empire is to be conceded. . . .

We must also remember that this country has disproportionately large colonial possessions, and that England can indemnify herself in these possessions if we do not anticipate her.

(2) **Belgium.** . . . We must keep Belgium firmly in our hands as regards political and military matters and as regards economic interests. In no matter is the German nation more united in its opinion: to it the retention of Belgium is an undubitable matter of honor.

. . . Belgium will bring us an immense increase of economic power. As regards population, she may also give us an important increase, particularly if the Flemish element, which in its culture is so closely related to us, can in course of time be freed from the artificial Latinizing influences that surround it and be brought back to its Teutonic character.

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. . . To the inhabitants of Belgium no political influence in the Empire is to be conceded; and, as in the districts to be ceded by France, the most important enterprises and landed estates are to be transferred from hostile to German hands.

(3) Russia. On our eastern frontier the population of the Russian Empire is increasing at a monstrous rate—at a rate of something like two and one-half millions a year. Within a generation the population will amount to 250,000,000. Against this overwhelming preponderance on our eastern flank . . . Germany can assert herself only if she sets up a strong barrier . . . and if on the other hand the healthy growth of our own population is furthered by all possible means. Such a barrier and also a basis for safeguarding the growth of our own population are to be found in the territory that Russia must cede to us. This must be agricultural land, adapted to settlement. Land, that gives us a healthy peasantry, this fresh fountain of all national and political power. Land, that can take over a part of our increase of population and offer to returning Germans, who desire to turn their backs upon the hostile foreign world, a new home in the old home. . . . Such land, required for our physical, moral and spiritual health, is to be found first of all in the East. . . .

This land will also serve to defray the Russian war indemnity. . . Russia is over-rich in land, and the land of which she is to cede us political control we shall demand . . . freed for the most part from private titles. . . . The Russian population is not so strongly rooted in the land as is that of western



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and central Europe. Russia itself has repeatedly transplanted large parts of its population to remote districts. . . .

(4) **England, the East, Colonies and the World across the Seas.** . . . We admit that the blockade by which England has transformed Germany during the period of the war into a closed commercial State has taught us something. It has taught us above all that, as has been explained in the earlier sections of this memorial, we must make ourselves as independent as possible in all political, military and economic matters, on the basis of an expanded and better secured home territory in Europe. Similarly we must organize upon the Continent, in immediate connection with our land frontiers . . . the broadest possible continental economic domain. . . . For this purpose it is important permanently to secure Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey and Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf against Russian and English ambitions. . . .

In the next place it is important to secure, in despite of England, our reëntury into the economic world beyond the seas. . . . **In Africa we must rebuild our Colonial Empire more solidly and more strongly than before.** . . . Here again the importance of a permanent connection with the world of Islam makes itself felt, and also the necessity of secure passage over the seas . . . independent of the good or ill will of England. . . .

It has already been pointed out that we must keep Belgium firmly under our control and must also obtain as much as possible of the North French Channel coast. **It is important, besides,**



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to break up the chain of maritime bases which England has thrown about the world or to enfeeble it by a corresponding acquisition of German bases. Egypt, which connects English Africa with English Asia and, with Australia as a further barrier, converts the Indian Ocean into an English lake—Egypt, which maintains the connection between the mother country and all its oriental colonies, is, as Bismarck expressed it, the neck of the English World Empire. . . . There England may be struck in its most vital nerve. . . .

(5) **War indemnity.** . . . It is probably France that comes into consideration, primarily if not exclusively, as regards any financial indemnification for the costs of the war. We should not hesitate, from any false humanity, to burden France as heavily as possible. To ease the burden imposed upon her she may call upon her ally across the Channel. If the latter refuses to fulfill her duties as an ally financially, a secondary political result might be attained with which we could well be content. . . .

(6) **No policy of culture without a policy of power.** If the undersigned, and particularly the men of science, of art and of the church among them, should be reproached for setting up only political, economic and perhaps social demands and forgetting the purely spiritual problems of the German future, our answer is a three-fold one.

The care of the German spirit is not one of the aims of war nor one of the conditions of peace.

If, however, we are to say anything concerning the German spirit . . . first of all, Germany must

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be able to live in political and economic security before it can pursue its spiritual vocation in freedom.

Finally . . . we do not desire a German spirit that is in danger of suffering decomposition and of working also as a decomposing agency—a national spirit that, lacking root, is forced to seek a home in all countries, and to seek it in vain; that must everywhere adapt itself and falsify its own nature as well as the nature of the nations that grant it hospitality. . . . In our demands we are seeking to gain for the German spirit a healthy body. . . .

We are conscious of setting up goals that can be reached only through a resolute spirit of sacrifice and through most energetic diplomacy. But we invoke a saying of Bismarck's:

"More than in any other domain it is true in politics that faith tangibly removes mountains, that courage and victory are not causally connected but identical."

Petition to the Imperial Chancellor, voted June 20, 1915, at a meeting of professors, diplomatists and higher officials in active service, held in the Künstlerhaus at Berlin. It was handed in with the signatures of 352 professors of universities and of special schools of the same rank, 158 school teachers and clergymen, 145 superior administrative officers, mayors and city councilmen, 148 judges and advocates, 40 members of the Reichstag and of the Prussian Landtag, 18 retired admirals and generals, 182 representatives of industry, commerce and banking, 52 landed proprietors, and 252 artists, writers and publishers. It was circulated only as a "strictly confidential manuscript." The full text is given in Grum-

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bach, "Das annexionistische Deutschland" (1917), pp. 132-140.

### A "decent form of death" for Belgium

"Weighed in the balance and found wanting." This was the sentence of condemnation for Belgium's immediate future. Threatened simultaneously by social revolt and national disintegration, the Belgian State would sooner or later have perished by internal decomposition. The German conquest gave Belgium all that it could hope for—a decent form of death among the Powers of the world, although it never belonged to them. . . .

Prof. Conrad Bornhak, in the "Grenzboten," no. 26 (June 30, 1915), p. 405.

### Land wanted for 200,000,000 Germans

Only 200,000,000 Germans will be strong enough to protect German freedom in the year 2000! . . . We need an increase of medium and small agricultural estates, and of positions for agricultural laborers and for artisans, on the largest scale. . . . New land for settlement within the future boundaries of the Empire is a demand that must become for all Germans a word of deliverance!

Prof. Max von Gruber, in "Süddeutsche Monatshefte," special number, "Deutschlands Zukunft" (October, 1915), pp. 55, 56.

### What Germans need "belongs" to them

Africa is a continent in the making. Its future is rich and full of prospects. . . . A nation that

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has won for itself through its own efficiency so important a place in commerce and industry as the Germans have secured cannot possibly stand aside, as it used to do, while other nations, by nature much less industrious, try to secure for themselves in the coming redivision of Africa the lion's share. We mean at last to get what belongs to us, because we need it, because we cannot do without it in the vital interest of ourselves and our children. And therefore we shall obtain it, thanks to the bravery of our armies and the justice of our claims.

Prof. Karl Dove, in "Weltwirtschaft," no. 8 (Nov., 1915).

**"No annexations, no indemnities" means Germany's defeat**

In reply to suggestions made in the British House of Lords, November 8, 1915, by Lord Loreburn and Lord Courtney concerning terms of peace, viz.: evacuation of Belgium and of Northern France, waiver of any war indemnity, freedom of the seas:

For us these suggestions do not even furnish a basis for discussion, because the conditions which the two lords have suggested for peace negotiations presuppose the victory of England and the defeat of Germany.

Prof. Otto Hoetzsch, in the "Preussische Kreuzzeitung," Nov. 17, 1915.

### **Government of new "outer territories"**

May our boundaries be pushed as far forward as our own future security requires and as our power to defend them permits; but as regards the

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inner structure of our State these outer territories must not be permitted to exercise any influence, until they have themselves to some extent grown into German ways and have thus become capable of being members of a German national State.

Prof. E. Brandenburg, "Die Reichsgründung" (1916), Introduction.

### A pastor on the sinking of the "Lusitania"

Anyone who cannot bring himself to approve from the bottom of his heart the sinking of the *Lusitania*, who cannot conquer his sense of the monstrous cruelty to countless perfectly innocent victims . . . and give himself up to honest joy at this victorious exploit of German defensive power—such an one we deem no true German.

Pastor D. Baumgarten, "Deutsche Reden in schwerer Zeit," no. 25, p. 7.

### Professional frightfulness

[Neutral ships should be intimidated into remaining in their home ports, so that the British would be compelled to risk their own ships.] Such a reaction against British tonnage would be more quickly enforced if fewer crews of torpedoed neutral ships were saved. If neutrals were destroyed so that they disappeared without leaving any trace, terror would soon keep seamen and travelers away from the danger zones and thus save many lives.

Prof. Oswald Flamm, in the Berlin "Woche"; cited in the New York "Times" (May 15, 1917).

## CHAPTER IV

### UTTERANCES OF PUBLICISTS, MEN OF LETTERS AND JOURNALISTS

#### I. BEFORE THE WORLD WAR

##### **Superiority and mission of the Teutons**

After all, it is obviously the meaning of history that the white race under the leadership of the Teutons should attain a real and definitive domination of the world.

The "Zukunft" (Sept. 7, 1901); cited in "Jugés par eux-mêmes," p. 32.

The most distinguished men in modern spiritual history were for the most part Teutons of the full blood, such as Dürer, Leonardo da Vinci, Galileo, Rembrandt, Rubens, Van Dyck, Voltaire, Kant, Wagner. Others show an intermixture of the brunette race . . . as in the case of Dante, Raphael, Michael Angelo, Shakespeare, Luther, Goethe, Beethoven. . . . Dante, Raphael, Luther and the others were geniuses not because of but in spite of their mixed blood. Their endowment was an inheritance from the Teutonic race.

The numerous busts of Julius Caesar show a thoroughly Teutonic type of skull and of face. Alex-



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ander the Great was of the general Macedonian type: very white skin with rosy lights, Teutonic type of skull and face, reddish hair and dark blue eyes.

The entire European civilization, even in Slav and Latin countries, is the work of the Teutonic race. . . . The Papacy, the Renaissance, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire were achievements of the Teutonic spirit.

Napoleon was probably a descendant of the Vandals, who long ago overran Corsica.

Papacy and Empire are both Teutonic organizations for domination, meant to subjugate the world. The Teutonic race is called to circle the earth with its rule, to exploit the treasures of nature and of human labor power, and to make the passive races servient elements in its cultural development.

Ludwig Woltmann, "Politische Anthropologie" (1903), pp. 255, 290, 293, 294, 298.

The dominating Teuton has a fresh and clear complexion, blond hair, an imposing stature and a long cranium.

The Teutons are the aristocracy of humanity; the Latins, on the contrary, belong to the degenerate mob.

Racine, with his medium height, his pleasant features, his clear look, his gentle and lively face—Racine was unquestionably of the Teutonic race. Lesueur, full of dignity and grace, with an open countenance testifying to a soul above the common level, certainly belonged to this same race. Voltaire was of the Teutonic race; moreover, is



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not his family name, Arouet, a corruption of the German name, Arwid? The name of Diderot was a corruption of the name Tictroh. As for Gounod, his name alone testifies to his Teutonic origin, for it is simply a derivative of Gundiwald.

Ludwig Woltmann, "Die Germanen in Frankreich," cited in "Jugés par eux-mêmes," p. 35.

Montaigne had a rosy complexion and blond hair. Voltaire also had blond hair and blue eyes; besides, he was tall. Lafayette also was tall and had blond hair and blue eyes. . . . Danton was blond and had blue eyes; so had the giant Mirabeau. . . .

All the great Frenchmen are in their cranial formation and in their pigment of the Teutonic type. . . .

Whosoever has the characteristics of the Teutonic race is superior. . . . All the dark people are mentally inferior, because they belong to the passive races. . . . The cultural value of a nation is measured by the quantity of Teutonism it contains. ✓

Ludwig Woltmann, "Politische Anthropologie," cited in "Jugés par eux-mêmes," pp. 35-36.

### Especial superiority of the Germans

We are beyond all doubt the first of all the nations of the world as warriors. For two centuries, German power upheld the decaying Roman Empire; for only by Germans could the primal German vigor be broken. In seven great battles of the nations, in the Teutoburg forest, on the Catalonian plain, at Tours, and at Poitiers, on the banks of the

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Lech, before Vienna against the Turks, and at Waterloo, we rescued European civilization.

We are the most capable nation in every field of science and in every branch of the fine arts. We are the best colonists, the best mariners and even the best merchants.

And yet we do not enter into our share of the heritage of the world. . . .

That the German Empire is not the close but the beginning of our national development is an obvious truth that as yet is by no means a common treasure of all Germans, but only of a small body of cultured men . . . men of heart and of understanding.

Fritz Bley, "Die Weltstellung des Deutschtums" (1897), pp. 21, 22.

### Plans of expansion in Europe

It is not to be denied that thoughts of aggression cannot be kept out of pan-Germanism. If Germany is to be hammer, there must be hitting.\*

To live, to lead a healthy and happy life, we need great tracts of new arable land. With these Imperialism can and must provide us. . . . Germany will be able to harvest the fruits of Russian policy, provided her courage does not fail her. . . . Of what use to us is Germanism in Brazil or South Africa, however successfully it may develop? It will greatly help the expansion of the German race;

\* An allusion to the phrase in Prince von Bülow's speech, Dec. 11, 1899: "In the twentieth century Germany will be anvil or hammer." Bülow, "Reden," vol. i, p. 96.

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it will do little for the power of the German Empire. On the other hand, increase of German continental territory and of the number of German peasants, whose industry and efficiency are incomparably superior to the indolent dullness of the *moujik*, will form a protective barrier against the flood of our enemies and will give a firm foundation to our growing power.

Albrecht Wirth, "Volkstum und Weltmacht in der Geschichte" (1906), pp. 176, 235.

**There is no other rôle for Austria than to become Germany's colonial State.** All the peoples in this broad empire, except the Germans and the South Slavs, are politically equally worthless: they are only material for German reconstruction. . . . Hungary is a bundle of impossibilities. . . . The necessity imposed upon the Austrian of speaking and writing four or five languages is quite enough to retard his development. . . . The task of Austrian policy is simply this: to draw to itself all emigrants from Germany and to settle them in compact groups, first of all upon the remotest boundaries of the Empire. . . . The Jablunka is to hear no speech but the German; and from there the wave must roll south, until of all the pitiful, petty nationalities of the Empire not one is left.

Paul de Lagarde, "Deutsche Schriften" (1891), pp. 111, 112.

Austria, that political abortion, that mummified survivor from the confusion of tongues at Babel, will perish if our schemes materialize.

Friedrich Lange, "Reines Deutschtum," p. 208.

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Should this old Austria perish, we would not shed a single tear over the corpse of the monster.

Daszinski, Speech delivered in 1903, cited in "Jugés par eux-mêmes," p. 35.

The time will come, undoubtedly, when Germany will be able to lay hands upon the ruins of the State of the Hapsburgs; and we must be prepared for this.

Ernst Hasse, "Deutsche Grenzpolitik," p. 164.

From a military point of view, the German frontiers on the East as on the West do not meet the demands of the best possible protection against attack. From a political and national point of view it is even more serious that Germany has weak neighbors, who are exposed to pressure from other powers and to anti-German influences. Above all, from the point of view of economics and of economic geography, it is monstrous that the mouths of two of Germany's greatest rivers, the Danube and the Rhine—the latter the main artery of the country's commerce—and a number of the ports most important for her international trade should be in alien hands.

Ernst von Halle, "Volks- und See-Wirtschaft" (1902), vol. ii, pp. 3-4.

### Philosophy of expansion

A nation's field of labor, its land, must satisfy its people as to character, quality and extent. If it is not satisfactory, the nation must stretch itself, extend itself over the territory of others and gain new land in the selective struggle.

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The native race, if in a low stage of development, generally soon dies out. . . . Highly developed peoples, who are unwilling to amalgamate with the victors, can be forced into reservations; or the victors will leave to the subjugated peoples a portion of their territory to which they can all retire. . . . The Latin countries are retrograding, if slowly, yet steadily. . . . It requires no supernatural gift of prophecy to perceive that in course of time the Latin peoples will be weeded out.

Increase of population is not to be restricted. A nation should push hard on its limits of land and sustenance through its increasing numbers. Only when men and nations jostle and push in bitter competition over the surface of the earth, can selection prevail between men and nations. . . . This is the deep meaning of a rapid increase of population: it drives the courageous, joyous, powerful nation forward and forces it into a great future. The incapable, indolent nation is crushed.

It would be unjust and immoral if a noble nation were to restrict its increase of population because of lack of room . . . while lower races have room to spare. That would be race-suicide.

Klaus Wagner, "Krieg" (1906), pp. 47, 69, 70, 81, 86, 108.

### Christ and Darwin

The old churchmen preached of war as a just judgment of God. The modern natural scientists see in war a propitious mode of selection. They use different phrases, but they mean the same

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thing. A saying of the much misunderstood Jesus, himself supreme in the comprehension of life—a saying whose profound wisdom Darwin has again enabled us to grasp—is the concise expression of all development: “Many are called, but few are chosen.”

Wagner, *ibid.*, pp. 145, 146.

### “Precautionary war”

It often happens that States, that for the moment are self-sufficient and have no immediate need of expansion . . . must nevertheless start a war. This becomes a necessity if a foreign power is gaining extensive expansion and is menacing other nations. To check an over-powerful and dangerous rival State, that is grasping too much territory, and to despoil it of a part of its booty, which the attacking nation may need later, is a struggle for the national future, for unity, independence and free soil. It is a precautionary war.

Wagner, *ibid.*, pp. 116, 117.

### Forecasts of the German World War

It is quite possible that German regiments may march over the Indus to the Ganges; that German troops and Turkish divisions under German general-staff officers may block the Suez Canal and, passing through English Egypt, join hands with the Khedive, now an English protégé, for a general revolt of Islam. It is quite possible that in South Africa probabilities may become facts. It is quite possible that the black, white and red flag may



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wave on the towers of Rotterdam and of Calais, and that German war taxes and forced loans will be levied from Paris—a world war such as the sun has never shone upon.

Wagner, *ibid.*, pp. 115, 116.

If it must come to a breach [with France] we will defy fate and secure for ourselves all of the advantages of the attack. Moral right is on our side. . . . The victorious German people will be entitled to demand that the French menace shall cease finally and forever. That means: **France must be crushed.** . . . Few indeed will be the Germans who will not regret the overthrow of the French nation; but they will be able to do little more than say compassionately: "*Tu l'as voulu, Georges Dandin!*"

The fratricidal war of 1866 was necessary for the establishment of the German Empire; why should recognition of our world position be assured to us without fighting our English cousin?

As regards Belgium and Holland . . . it may be said openly that such little States have lost any absolute right to exist; for today **only those States can assert a right to independence that can secure it sword in hand.**

The monarchy of the Hapsburgs will be friendly to Germany or it will cease to exist.

Daniel Frymann, "Wenn ich Kaiser wär" (1912), pp. 151, 152, 153, 167.

Even a coalition of France and Russia can be defeated by our forces alone, if **without hesitation**



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and without scruples we rise in war to a greater use of violence.

"Deutschland bei Beginn des Zwauzigsten Jahrhunderts" (1900), p. 212.

### Schemes of World Empire

It would be the beginning of a World Empire, our first Empire of the sort, if to East Africa, Cameroon and Southeast Africa we should add Angola and the Belgian and French Congo. . . . In the way of this first World Empire stand Portugal, France and England. Portugal and France will be the mourners. England will not be able to hinder it. This will not be accomplished today nor tomorrow; but a day will come when Europe will settle her accounts. On that day the reservists of Nîmes will go on strike, if the sons of the German heroes of Metz and of Sedan attack them in rainy weather. On that day the English Channel will be paved with French submarines of the successful *Pluvios* type, if the German dreadnoughts bombard the French ports of the North Sea.

. . . Our fathers have left us much to do. In compensation, the German nation holds a position among the European Powers that permits it at once to reach its goal by a single rapid rush. At the present time, the German nation finds itself in a position similar to that of Prussia at the beginning of the reign of Frederick the Great. He raised his country to the rank of a great European Power. It is Germany's task today to pass from the posi-

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tion of an European Power to that of a World Power.

The German people must take possession of Central Africa, from the mouth of the Orange River to Lake Tchad, and from the Cameroon Mountains to the mouth of the River Rovuna. They must take possession of Asia Minor; of the Malayan Archipelago in southeastern Asia; and finally of the southern half of South America. Only then will Germany possess a colonial empire that will correspond to her actual power.

A policy of sentiment is folly. Enthusiasm for humanity is idiocy. Charity should begin among one's compatriots. Politics is business. Right and wrong are notions needed in civil life only.

The German people is always right, because it is the German people and because it numbers 87,000,000. Our fathers have left us much to do.

Otto Richard von Tannenberg, "Grossdeutschland: Die Aufgabe des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts" (1911), pp. 219, 220, 230, 231.

## II. WHEN WAR WAS IN SIGHT

### "A golden Teutonic opportunity"

Written in 1913, when Austria was threatening Serbia and, according to revelations made in 1914 by Signor Giolitti, had sounded the Italian Foreign Office as to the attitude which Italy would assume if the Dual Monarchy should make war on Serbia.

Hasten, drowsy guardians of the State, to conclude a treaty assuring to Austria the road to the Ægean. The fate of Europe rests with you. . . .

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Has Berlin, like Vienna, lost the courage of decision? . . . It must be said, even more energetically than in 1909, that if it comes to a fight it will be for a German interest and not for a caprice of Vienna. . . . Austria would be only too glad to settle her differences in a peaceful manner, but to urge her to compromise is to throw away a golden Teutonic opportunity. . . . Today Prussia is responsible for the destiny of all Germany, and we are constrained to fear that we have already let slip an occasion that will never return. . . . In southeastern Europe the rôle of Austria is simply to promote the German cause. . . .

The nation is unanimous in its complaints. Bismarck would have never made the mistake of asking for his country a military equipment sufficiently powerful to fight England, France and the Slav masses, only to keep it unemployed during long years of peace. . . .

It is by their own force that the descendants of the ancient Cimbri will come out of the war victorious, and not with the help of God, as William II has just declared in a speech delivered in the University of Berlin, on Divine intervention in history. It is not true that God withholds victory from the irreligious. Frederic II was frankly an atheist; he said that religion is a tool that has always been employed to make men submissive, and he swore that God is always with the strongest battalions.

Maximilian Harden, in the "Zukunft"; cited in "Jugés par eux-mêmes," pp. 41-42.

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### A war of expansion

If we are prevented from expanding with our needs, we shall have to draw the sword; and then . . . woe to the vanquished!

The Munich "Post," cited in the New York "Nation," July 9, 1914.

### Who willed the war?

. . . Germany endeavored to act as mediator in the Austro-Russian conflict. In this effort she was supported by England, France and Italy, because all these Powers, as is clearly shown by the attitude of their Governments and also by the expressions of public opinion, wished to avoid a great European war. But it appears that the localization of the Austro-Serbian conflict cannot be secured and that we are at the beginning of that great European war of which there has been so much talk, but in which no one seriously believed until today.

The "Frankfurter Zeitung" (July 31, 1914). It was on this day that the German Imperial Government sent its ultimatum to the Russian Imperial Government.

### The anticipated fruits of victory

France must pay the greater part of the bill. . . . Besides Belfort, France must cede to us that part of Lorraine that is bounded by the Moselle and, in case of obstinate resistance, also the part bounded by the Meuse. If we make the Moselle and the Meuse German boundary rivers, the French will perhaps some day get rid of the desire of making

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the Rhine a French boundary river. . . . If **Belgium** takes part in the war, it is to be wiped off the map. . . . If the **Netherlands** come into Germany as a federated State, perhaps with a few more reserved rights than Bavaria possesses—after a victory of Germany the Dutch could do nothing wiser—there might be occasion to consider the entire or partial incorporation of Flemish Belgium in the Netherlands. **The Belgian Congo** would fall to Germany; and thus the idea of a German Middle Africa would be realized. . . .

. . . To bring to our German brethren in **Austria**, whose eyes have so long been turned toward us, the redemption for which they have so earnestly yearned, is a goal fully worthy of the greatest effort, a goal that we must in any case attain, a goal that we can attain even in the event of a war completely lost. Thus the parts of Austria that were formerly pure German districts (old Austria) must from now on be exclusively reserved for Germanism; and in addition a broad strip of territory, from Carinthia down to Istria, which will give Germany an immediate outlet on the Adriatic, must be declared to be a district reserved for German settlement. . . . **Norway** and **Sweden** (to which **Finland** might be added) and **Switzerland** (possibly enlarged by portions of Savoy) will necessarily seek the protection of Germany and enter into a confederate relation similar to that of Austria. **Denmark** can have the strip of North Schleswig for which it yearns if, like the Netherlands, it becomes a State in the German Empire. Then, as the lead-

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ing power in a great Teutonia, Germany, after this war, will enter upon the rule of the world. . . .

Rudolf Theuden, "Was muss uns der Krieg bringen" (1914), pp. 9-10, 12-13.

### III. SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

#### **Germany's right and Germany's aims**

Germany has the right to extend the area of her dominion according to her needs, and the power to obtain this right against all contradiction. . . .

The English, Belgians, French, North and South Slavs and Japanese are praising each other as possessors and guardians of the most refined human civilization and abusing us as barbarians. We should be fools to contradict. To Rome, at the point of death, the Germans who were digging her grave were barbarians. Your civilization, gossips, wafts to us no sweet savor. Get used, as soon as you can, to recognize that on German soil barbarians and warriors are living. They have now no time to waste on small talk. They must thrash your armies, capture your general staffs, strew your cuttle-fish arms over the ocean. When Tangiers and Toulon, Antwerp and Calais are subject to their barbaric power, then they will often be glad to have a friendly chat with you. . . .

Krupp has given us the hope not only of getting at England in her floating castles, but also of camping widely, before her face, wry with envy, on two seas, on the coasts of Belgium, France and



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Morocco. That Germans do not fit into the bustle of peaceable nations is the proudest ornament of the German character. Their manhood does not feminize itself in long peace. **War has always been their chief business.** . . . Germany means to grow, to coin the achievements of its men and its States into rights of sovereignty before which every head must bow in reverent greeting. Germany is striking. Who gave her leave? **Her right is in her might.** Therefore she is waging a good war. . . . For the English things are already going badly. . . . From Calais to Dover is not far. Do you doubt our being able to reach them? With such an army anything can be done. And before they receive their punishment there will be no peace. . . .

We are not waging war to punish countries, nor to free enslaved peoples and then warm ourselves in the consciousness of our unselfish nobility. **We are waging war because of our solid conviction that Germany, in view of her achievements, has the right to demand and must obtain more room on the earth and a broader sphere of action.** . . . Spain and the Netherlands, Rome and Hapsburg, France and England seized, ruled, settled great expanses of the most fertile soil. **Now the hour has struck for German supremacy.** A peace that does not secure this will leave our efforts unrewarded. . . . We shall stay in the Belgian lowlands, to which we shall add the narrow coast strip to and beyond Calais. . . . From Calais to Antwerp, Flanders, Limburg and Brabant, up to and including the chain of forts on the Meuse, are to be



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Prussian. . . . The southern triangle, with Alsace-Lorraine (and Luxemburg, if it likes), is to be shaped into an independent State of the Empire, intrusted to a Catholic princely house—a new Lotharingia. Then Germany would know for what purpose she has shed her blood.

Maximilian Harden, in the "Zukunft" (August 29; September 5; October 17, 1914). Cited by Grumbach, "Das annexionistische Deutschland" (1917), pp. 239-241.

### Germany willed the war

One principle only is to be reckoned with—one which sums up and includes all others—force! Boast of that and scorn all twaddle. Force! that is what rings loud and clear; that is what has distinction and fascination. Force, the fist—that is everything. . . . Let us drop our pitiable efforts to excuse Germany's action; let us cease heaping contemptible insults upon the enemy. Not against our will were we thrown into this gigantic adventure. It was not imposed on us by surprise. We willed it; we were bound to will it. We do not appear before the tribunal of Europe; we do not recognize any such jurisdiction.

Our force will create a new law in Europe. It is Germany that strikes. When it shall have conquered new fields for its genius, then the priests of all the gods will exalt the war as blessed.

Harden in the "Zukunft" (August-October, 1914); cited in "Jugés par eux-mêmes," pp. 46-47. See also extracts in the New York "Times" (Dec. 6, 1914).

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### Germans "no persecuted innocents"

The course of events in the last decades and the way in which our policy has been conducted have made it absolutely clear that the just claims of Germany cannot be satisfied in a peaceable manner.

. . . The war . . . forces each of us . . . to become conscious of the purpose for which it is being waged: the entrance of Germany into the company of great imperialistic nations and the enforcement of the demands which it is entitled to make as a World Power. . . . This war is being carried on to make Germany greater and more powerful than it was before. The only alternative is to attain this result or to fall back into the position of a second-rate Power. . . . The clarity of this thought, the justice of this demand are not to be obscured by discussions of the question, who is to blame for the origin of this war. Whoever depicts Germany as a country assailed and placed in a state of necessity, is apt to overlook the fact that we had a just demand to assert and put through, and that we must necessarily appear, to those who would deny us a place among the Great Powers, as the assailants. History will show that our enemies refused to recognize these claims and so conjured up the war; it will also show that the war was an internal necessity. It does not become us to play the part of persecuted innocents. We must confess our demands freely and manfully, and we must carry on the fight until they are satisfied. . . .

"Darius" in "Grenzboten," no. 6 (Feb. 10, 1915), pp. 161 *et seq.*

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### "The will to power"

History has found it easier to forgive any cruelties than to pardon a failure of the will to power. Not "Live and let live" but "Live and direct the lives of others"—that is power. To bring others under our reasonable influence, in order to put international relations on a better basis—that is purified power.

Karl Peters, "Not und Weg" (1915), pp. 13-14.

### "A Holy German Empire"

More and more there must be developed quiet determination to establish a Holy German Empire. A nation that fans again into flame the old breath of God in the spirit of the present time, that is holy in itself and carries holiness to other nations—that, my German people, you must become. If you do not, then your aspirations are bubbles and your great period lies behind you.

. . . Is a mighty Germany to give laws to Europe, is it to make a growing holiness of life the law of peace for its neighbors? Will it in union with them offer defiance to the rest of the world?

If that is our chosen course, then we must not be timid as regards the will to power. It is foolish to talk of the rights of others; it is foolish to speak of a justice that should hinder us from doing to others what we ourselves do not wish to suffer from them. . . .

We are still constantly hearing of moderation, of the right of nations to determine their own des-

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tiny, but all this is of no consequence. We understand what is necessary. We must grow stronger.  
Peters, *ibid.*, pp. 64-68.

### "Kultur"

Culture is a spiritual organization of the world, which does not exclude bloody savagery. It raises the dæmonic to sublimity. **It is above morality, reason, science.**

Thomas Mann, in the "Neue Rundschau" (Nov., 1914); cited in "Jugés par eux-mêmes," p. 22.

### Retaliatory lying

Under the constraining necessity of present conditions, we are often obliged to stray from the right path; but when the arms of our soldiers shall have overthrown those who are likewise lying, we will gladly go back to our habits of veracity.

"Kölnische Zeitung" (Dec. 28, 1914); cited in "Jugés par eux-mêmes," pp. 88-89.

### Spirit and form of German Imperialism

. . . If we conquer, the map of the world will be redrawn. This change is quite certain, and all writing against it is empty and of no effect. . . .

. . . We must joyfully accustom ourselves to a transition from the old, solidly closed National State, with a few foreign nationalities in its border districts, to an Imperialist State with a greater mixture of nationalities. In this, the one element of union remains the German Idea. . . . In this

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State the German people are to tower high above the other nationalities; it is to be a German State, no washed-out universality. . . .

Today nothing is more urgent than this—that the will to conquer the world should take possession of the whole German people. Then first shall we arise from the stage of a semi-unconscious World Power to the stage of a conscious Imperialist Power. Then first can we hold our own against England. . . .

The final inference is that, cost what it may, we must widen our continental territory in this war. . . . It is not enough to bring new territories into a customs union, we must be masters of these new territories also in military and diplomatic affairs.

. . . The only legal form of connection that is appropriate to a World State is the confederation. Formal annexation of districts which, for strategic or cultural reasons, must absolutely be brought into the closest connection with the dominant State is of course not excluded. Take, for example, Belgium. Were this country simply annexed, we should have a second Poland in the West. . . . If, however, only the line Liège-Namur were held as a strategic line, with the addition of Antwerp, and if the rest of Belgium were left to administer itself and brought into a federative relation only to the German Empire, then we should have full security for the good behavior of the country, and we should also have the Belgian coast for all time as a military base and a bridgehead against England, but we should avoid making Belgium feel

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itself a subjugated country. . . . If we keep Antwerp, it would be a good plan to arrange with Holland an exchange, by which we should receive the mouth of the Scheldt, while Holland would receive the Belgian part of Limburg. . . .

If we are asked whether we wish to establish a World Power towering so far above the other World Powers that it is in reality the only real World Power, then the answer is that the will to World Power is in its nature immeasurable. Less even than a Great Power can a World Power ever be satisfied. . . . The will to World Power must in its nature be insatiable; satiety would mean senility.

Whoever opposes Germany's efforts toward World Power is on the wrong side. Such a view is in direct contradiction with the development in which we are engaged.

Adolf Grabowsky, in "Das neue Deutschland," *Kriegsnummer* 3 (Sept. 30, 1914); 4 (Oct. 28, 1914); 6 (Dec. 22, 1914); 24 (March 18, 1916).

### Germany's peculiar qualification for World Power

Dominion may be based on livid power or on prudent calculation. Leadership demands more: in addition to cultural and moral superiority, in addition to respect for variation, it demands also the capacity of grasping and intelligently penetrating foreign character. To the nation that combines these qualities the World Power of the future must fall; and this nation is the German. . . .

So our gaze sweeps wider, from the North Cape



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to the Indian Ocean, embracing an Empire that, from the geographical, economic and political points of view, possesses boundless possibilities.

Albert Gottlieb, in "Grenzboten," no. 52 (Dec. 30, 1914).

### The French and the English

If the French had not gone mad, if they had not permitted themselves to be misused as servants of England and of Russia, I do not see what occasion could have arisen for our fighting them. At present they are mad, and consequently they must be treated as madmen. . . . The power is here; it must be used; the diplomatist is not to be permitted to contradict the General Staff, as in 1870. . . .

It is not easy for the Germans to understand England. The ignorance of the English is comparable with that of the Russians; and in particular the pseudo-culture of the "cultured" classes defies description. On the other hand . . . the English character is developed to an extraordinary degree: daring self-confidence, joy in independent action, the gift of enforcing obedience by sheer power of will. The Englishman possesses the marvelous art of drawing power from his own limitations. . . . There is but one way to check this power: another power of will must be set up against it, a mighty power which the English will encounter at every turn and on which they will break their bones. . . .

Houston Stewart Chamberlain, "Deutschlands Kriegsziel" (1916), pp. 9-11.



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### **German must become the language of the world**

I have no stronger or more sacred conviction than this: that the higher culture of humanity depends upon the diffusion of the German language. . . . For the diffusion of this language it is necessary that the German Empire should become the leading State in the world. . . . **People must learn that anyone who cannot speak German is a pariah.**

Chamberlain, "Kriegsaufsätze," pp. 9, 35.

### **How new territories may be Germanized**

Every expansion of frontiers must result, first of all, in a numerical strengthening of the alien element. . . . In certain cases the conquered State will itself have the greatest interest in not losing both the territories it cedes and their population, if **it can take over the population** and gain strength thereby, as is the case, for example, with France, decadent already and diminished in its population by the war. . . . As regards any part of the population that decides to remain on the hereditary soil even under the new rule, it will be necessary to demand full security that **they shall interpose no resistance, in principle, to their denationalization,** and that they shall agree to the introduction, at least in a gradual way, of instruction exclusively in the language of the conqueror and the exclusive use of this language. If entire States are annexed, the difficulties are of course greater, but by no means insuperable. . . .

Franz Köhler, "Der neue Dreibund" (1915), p. 108.

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### Moral and immoral policies of power

Nothing is more foolish than the opinion that what is called culture wins its way by quiet, peaceful labor. The cultures of the nations struggle one with the other in a life and death contest. The culture of a nation cannot dispense with the means of power, if it has the will to establish and assert itself. . . . Herein is found the moral justification for a national policy of power. Immoral, of course, is a policy of power if it is employed, as among our enemies, to supplant the higher German culture and morality by the much lower English, French or Russian culture (or lack of culture).

It is not true that all nations have the same right of existence. . . . There are decadent nations, falling into moral decay; these in the tribunal of history have forfeited the right to their own national existence and must make room for the higher morality of another nation destined to dominion. . . .

In this matter things must be regarded as they are, without sentimentality. May our statesmen approach the future questions of peace in this spirit!

Wolfgang Eisenhart, in the "Preussische Kreuzzeitung" (May 30, 1916).

### Imperialism and Socialism

The last decades have witnessed the formation of a limited number of great economic domains with a political organization as centralized as possible. This is what is called Imperialism. Al-

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though this goal is attained by capitalistic means, it is, for all that, a goal beyond which humanity is bound to move toward Socialism. For the great Empires render much more effective service to the preservation of peace than the numerous politically independent States that stand side by side, particularly in western Europe. . . . Where then is it written that every nation, no matter how petty, has the right of political independence? What sort of church-parish politics is this?

Richard Calwer, "Sozialismus und Gebietserweiterungen," in the "Tag" (June 5, 1916). Calwer is a Socialist who, some years before the war, severed his connection with the Social Democratic party. During the war he has made systematic propaganda to convince German Socialists of the necessity of annexations. See Grumbach, "Das annexionistische Deutschland," p. 163.

### Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg interpreted

Ears were pricked up in the Reichstag when the Imperial Chancellor spoke of "real guaranties and securities"; for until this moment no similar assurance regarding the aims of peace had been given by the Administration. . . . **Real guaranties and securities, so that no enemy shall longer dare to attack us! That conclusively sums up all the desires of the German people as regards the aims of peace, provided always that this utterance is correctly understood and consistently championed.**

Leading article on the Chancellor's speech of May 28, (see above, p. 22), in the "Kölnische Volkszeitung" (May 29, 1915).

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Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, in his last speech in the Reichstag, expressed, amid the applause of his hearers and probably with the assent of the overwhelming majority of Germans, the hope that the experiences of this fearful war would at least bring the German people to unlearn all sentimentality. It would be a piece of sentimentality if we did not stake everything on beating France down by the might of our weapons so completely that she shall lose for all time any desire of creating further disturbance. . . . Until France has sunk into the position of a State of the third or fourth rank, she will always be on the side of Germany's enemies. . . .

Russia cannot be left in its former boundaries. It must be limited to its proper, Great Russian core and its face must be turned to the East. . . . We must press forward inexorably to the realization of our purpose of creating a greater Germany that shall offer us new land for our surplus of spiritual and economic power. . . .

Albert Bovenschen, "Deutschland an der Zeitenwende" (1916), pp. 21-22, 36, 217-218.

### Dr. Dernburg disavowed

During his visit to the United States, former Colonial Secretary Dernburg stated that Germany would annex no territory in Europe.

If Herr Dernburg really offered to our enemies the voluntary evacuation of Belgium, this was a most surprising utterance, against which we must enter an unmistakable protest. If he really said

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that Germany could not think of any increase of territory in Europe, this was an extraordinary assumption of authority.

Article in the "Tägliche Rundschau" (May 1, 1915).

Herr Dernburg undoubtedly has merits. He is passing a period of war across the ocean, but he is not resting his weary head on Uncle Sam's lap; he is wandering day by day from meeting to meeting, is writing articles, is giving interviews, is generally active, as a patriot is bound to be. Is he acting more or less under official commission? Or perhaps in that semi-official form, which Bismarck found so desirable, in order to put out feelers and, in case of necessity, thunder out a denial? . . .

Herr Dernburg is said to have stated: "Germany cannot think of increasing her possessions in Europe, because for this purpose she would be obliged to subjugate people who would not voluntarily accept her rule." Of course Herr Dernburg cannot have said this. His historical knowledge must tell him that Empires have never been established by "voluntary acceptance" of a foreign rule. . . .

"Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten" (May 17, 1915).

### Frederic's "pedants" at work\*

. . . On the basis of philological investigations, the speaker further explained that the German eagle formerly ruled from Boonen (Boulogne-sur-Mer) in French Flanders to Reval in Esthonia. He expressed, with the general applause of the meet-

\* See title page.

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ing, the hope that the war would fulfill the desires aroused in the German people by their recollection of this glorious past.

Address delivered before the "German Union of Defense" (Deutscher Wehrverein), reported in the "Wehr" (June, 1915). The Union has about 100,000 members. The "Wehr" is its organ. See Grumbach, p. 154.

Today our battle-trying regiments stand victorious in Flanders. Almost in our grasp lies the old Frankish royal city of Soissons—all this old historic Frankish soil in the great period of German history. This most terrible of wars is, we hope, the grand *finale* of the millennial struggle for the kingdom of Lothair. . . . The decision . . . will not be reached in the Balkans, nor in the East—there, in addition to German interests, Austro-Hungarian desires are in play—it will be reached, as far as Germany is concerned, primarily in the West; it must bring us the end of that ancient struggle for Lotharingia; for France will not renounce her policy of *revanche* until it is made fully clear to her that the scales of the destiny of nations have finally tipped in favor of the German Empire.

"Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung" (Feb. 9, 1916).

### Germany's "needs" in Europe summarized

Our need in the West is to make Belgium innocuous and to strengthen our base on the North Sea. Our need in the East is to push Russia back and gain new land for German peasant settlements. . . . Our military situation entitles us to hope that



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both needs will be satisfied by the peace that we shall conclude.

Friedrich Meinecke, "Präliminarien der Kriegsziele," no. 31 (July 31, 1915), p. 1014.

Germany knows that it is responsible to future generations for making its frontiers permanently safe. This can be attained only by making Belgium permanently innocuous and by taking possession of the line of the Vistula, the Niemen and the Dvina, together with all the fortresses. . . . There is need also of a new regulation of the French frontier.

Karl Bleibtreu, in "Neue Züricher Nachrichten" (January 15, 1916).

### **Either ransom or loot**

Whatever one may think of questions of annexation, the financial gain of our occupation of territory is certain. For either the territories will be restored later, and then not only shall we be entitled to demand as ransom the repayment of the costs of the war that was forced upon us, but our enemies will also be ready to make any sacrifice in order to recover their former possessions at the earliest possible moment; or else these occupied territories will remain, in whole or in part, in the possession of the Central Powers. . . .

"Kölnische Zeitung" (August 22, 1915).

### **Loot already under cover**

The quantity of merchandise of various kinds seized in the hostile countries is so great that the



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difficulty of storing it increases every day. By request of the Prussian Minister of War, all the chambers of commerce have been asked to give all possible information regarding warehouses, sheds, etc. . . . in which these spoils may be temporarily sheltered. It is proposed to divide the merchandise among all the countries of the Empire.\*

"Frankfurter Zeitung," cited in the Paris "Temps" (Jan. 5, 1915).

### The tender mercies of terrorism

We all accept the principle that, for the guilt of one, the whole community to which he belongs must atone. The village from which the inhabitants have fired upon our troops is to be burned. If the guilty party is not discovered, a few representatives are to be chosen among the population and put to death in pursuance of the rules of martial law. . . . The innocent must atone together with the guilty, and if the latter cannot be discovered, the innocent must suffer in their stead, not because a crime has been committed, but in order that crimes shall not be committed in the future.† Every time a village is set on fire, hostages put to death, and the inhabitants of a town in which armed resistance has been offered to our invading troops are decimated, warning is given to non-occupied territory. There can be no doubt that the burning of Battice, Herve, Louvain and Dinant have served as warnings. The burning

\* See Appendix, pp. 253, 254, arts. 46, 47.

† See Appendix, p. 254, art. 50.

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and the bloodshed in the first days of the war prevented the larger Belgian towns from making any attack upon the weak contingents with which we have been able to hold them. . . .

War is not a society game. War is hell-fire. He who, without being called upon, puts his finger in it, burns his hand, his soul, his life. This is the lot that has fallen to this poor, blinded, misled Belgian nation.

Walter Bloem, in the "Kölnische Zeitung" (Feb. 10, 1915), cited in "Jugés par eux-mêmes," p. 48.

### "Belgium does not exist"

In my view it would be unsuitable for the German Empire to conduct any sort of negotiation with the State of Belgium. For us the State of Belgium does not exist. As regards the Belgian population, the situation may, of course, be different; the demands of the Flemings for a free development of their nationality seems particularly justified. . . .

Count Reventlow, in the "Deutsche Tageszeitung" (March 1, 1916).

### Germany must keep her soldiers' graves

The blush of shame rises to one's face, when one thinks of the many thousands of German soldiers' graves which have had to be dug in Flemish soil and which some Germans would surrender needlessly, because of an unintelligible self-restraint, of an imaginary German moderation—which, however, in this case would mean suicide. . . .

"Kölnische Volkszeitung" (March 5, 1916).

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### Germany needs Russian soil

For the Government and the governed the fixed goal is from today: No peace that does not guarantee us our frontiers in the East and in the West, the weakening of Russia by annexation of territory, control of Belgium so that it cannot be used as a French-English military base and as a sally-port. We regard a weakening of Russia as absolutely necessary for our future, among other reasons **because we need land for settlement.** We do not believe that a cession of land must needs produce permanently bad relations with our eastern neighbor; but whatever land we take from Russia, we are taking for our own sake . . . not in order to liberate Letts, Lithuanians or other peoples. **And it is quite immaterial, as far as we are concerned, whether we take our war indemnity in land from a reactionary or a liberal Russia. . . .**

“Tägliche Rundschau” (April 6, 1916).

Our comrade, Ebert . . . quite rightly emphasized that we are opposed to the forcible conquest of other nations. The Imperial Chancellor also refused, in December, to support any such plans; but he did not express any opposition to the annexation of land in the East for German colonization. Like all the world, we are subject to the power of facts, which are stronger than men or parties. And it is no characteristic of Socialism to place itself in conflict with new developments.

The Social-Democratic “Frankfurter Volksstimme” (April 7, 1916).

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### German military colonies

We hope that this gigantic struggle will bring such an increase of Germany's power that our Fatherland shall no longer have to fear any foe in Europe. It is important, above all, to win better and more defensible frontiers in the East and in the West and to occupy the border districts which we are to conquer with German settlers. In this matter the system of military colonies, as it was employed by the ancient Romans in their conquests, is especially to be recommended. The hostile population would be partially expropriated at the cost of our present foes, and would be replaced especially by German soldiers who had completed their service and by those invalided in war. . . .

Wolfgang Eisenhart, "Was lehrt der Krieg für unsere nationale Zukunft"; Address delivered March 1, 1915; p. 19.

### Proposed frontiers of "Middle Europe"

Russia is by far the most dangerous enemy, not only of Middle Europe, but of all Europe and of the whole civilized world. . . . The object of any treaty of peace must therefore be to preserve Russia's Asiatic character and, so far as possible, to weaken her position as a European Great Power. This can be done only by taking from her those western territories which are most valuable from the cultural and the economic points of view and by keeping her away at the same time from all European seas (except the White Sea). . . . The boundary that should be drawn would . . . run

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from Kronstadt by way of Brest-Litovsk and Taganrog to Baku, Finland of course being included. Besides the razing of all Russia's western fortresses, especially the fortresses on the sea, it would be necessary to take from her Finland, Estonia, Livonia, Kurland, Poland, Volhynia, Podolia, Bessarabia, portions of Little Russia and of South Russia, Taurida (Krim) and the Caucasus. . . . In the Balkans, if these are freed from Russian assistance and intrigues, two kingdoms, Serbia and Montenegro, should be wiped completely off the map. . . .

There can be no united and powerful Middle Europe so long as France retains her present size and power. To deprive her of these must be the object of any treaty of peace. Of course it is not a question solely of acquisition of territory, for nations can be ruined by war indemnities or by commercial treaties, but of these we are not talking at present. We are asking only: What cessions of territory are necessary in order to lessen by two the number of Great Powers in Europe? What is necessary for this purpose?

Whether the cession of northern seaports will come into question is a matter that had better not be discussed at present. Possibly the Middle States may even need a port on the Mediterranean like Toulon, which would necessarily involve the annexation of Nice. . . . That France must lose all the north coast of Africa that belongs to her is the more certain, because she would not be sufficiently crippled by war indemnities alone. Nor would it be enough to insist on the transfer of her fleet, but

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among her **fortresses** those that protect harbors must first be razed; and one of the most important conditions of peace that we should strive to obtain would be that she should maintain only a commercial fleet. **France should be forced into a position similar to that now held by Spain. . . .**

. . . The punishment that **England** would find most severe would perhaps be her **complete exclusion from the Mediterranean. . . .** She would be shut off from Malta and the other islands if Gibraltar were taken from her and if Tangiers ceased to be neutral. . . .

. . . If any part of these protecting walls is defectively constructed, our culture will be permanently injured or perhaps annihilated before another generation. Then the great sacrifice of life would have been made not for life, but only for death.

A. Oelzelt-Newin, "Welche Strafe soll die treffen, die Schuld am Weltkrieg tragen" (1915), pp. 12-16.

Middle Europe must consider strategic necessities in fixing her eastern boundaries. . . . **East Prussia needs stronger protection on the North and on the East. . . .** In the West military considerations demand a greater extension of the geographic boundary. . . . If the military object of gaining permanent security against France and also the freedom of the seas is to be really attained, the northeastern part of France, as a number of leading statesmen have already indicated, must be brought within the German northwestern frontier, as far as the mouth of the Somme, somewhere along



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the line Vignacourt-Bapaume-Verdun-St. Mihiel-Pont à Mousson. . . . The establishment of this frontier, together with the taking of Belfort and its environs, which are necessary for the protection of South Germany, seems thoroughly justified. . . . As regards the **annexation of Belgium** to Middle Europe, to which the majority of its inhabitants belong as regards language, no further words need be wasted; it is a matter of course.

In the southwest the geographical frontier must in like manner be pushed forward, in order that Triest, one of the most important points for Middle Europe, may be removed from hostile attack. . . . **The northern part of Venetia**, the districts of Friuli and Treviso, up to a line running from the south end of Lake Garda to the mouth of the Piave, must be taken as a glacis at the foot of the Alps in order to ward off from Austria's Adriatic coast all future menace. On national grounds, however, this necessary line of security may and will be pushed forward a few kilometers. . . .

Albert Ritter, "Der Organische Aufbau Europas" (1916), pp. 27-28.

### Organization of Middle Europe

The extent of the Middle European Federation, the series of States that are to be included, has already repeatedly been indicated: **Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Switzerland, Rumania and Bulgaria** are gradually to enter the union primarily formed by the two Empires and, with **Turkey**, they will fill out the framework of that "North Cape-



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Bagdad" Federal Empire of which so much has been said. . . .

Treaties of political alliance form the basis of the Federation; closer economic connections, the establishment of common standards of value, customs unions, military conventions will follow, until within a few decades a union will be created that will defy all storms. . . .

Ritter, *ibid.*, pp. 49, 53.

### Outlines of the German World Empire

. . . There are those who think they are obliged to oppose any extension of our frontiers, although this is open treason against the heroic courage of our warriors in the field. . . . If moderation is everything, we might have obtained the same results with smaller sacrifices, perhaps even without a war. . . .

Our relation to our neighbors in the West is relatively easy to determine. . . . Completely exhausted financially and called upon to pay a very heavy war indemnity, France would regard the loss of a great part of her African colonial possessions as a liberation from a burden which then more than ever would exhaust her powers. . . .

If England owed her former superiority to her insular position and to the impossibility of attacking her by land, it must be our aim to establish such boundaries that we can reach England, that is, English possessions, by the land route. . . .

The distance from Berlin to Bombay . . . corresponds roughly to that between Petrograd and

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Vladivostok, and to surmount this presented no insuperable difficulties even to a State like Russia during its war with Japan. . . .

Here then is to be found the true and the single solution of the problem of getting rid of the yoke that England has thrown upon the world. We must cut off her connection with her richest colonies, South Africa and India, and against these colonies we must establish strong frontiers which . . . shall be connected with our own railway system and that of our Allies. . . .

From such points of view, the idea of establishing a Federation which carries us over the Balkans and through Turkey to the gates of India and of Cape Colony becomes of new significance; and we see that this solution will be attained because it must be attained. . . .

Franz Köhler, "Der neue Dreibund" (1915), pp. 2, 33, 82-83.

### Germany's African Empire

The World War has welded Central Europe together and has done much to give tangible shape to the Berlin-Bagdad idea, which before the war was very much a matter of theory. The problem of Egypt also has been brought into the World War; and through Egypt the way leads up the Nile into the heart of Africa, into those regions that lie between the German colonies in eastern and western Africa. Egypt and its hinterland again in possession of Germany's ally, Turkey; in the heart of Africa the possibilities of German territorial connections, so much discussed before the war,

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converted into realities—on the political horizon we see the “Cape to Cairo to Singapore” vision of the future grow pale and the vision “**Hamburg to Damascus to Luderitz Bay**” arising again!

Arthur Dix, in the “Tag” (June 4, 1915).

We must proclaim it as our national task to become a real colonial power in Africa. . . . Gains of territory in Europe, which are necessary to improve our frontiers and our continental position, but also colonies in Africa must be the prize of victory!

The establishment of such an Empire at the cost of the French would deprive France of a recruiting ground, of which in future it could and necessarily would make far greater use than now, were it to remain in possession of its African territories. In losing them France would be sensibly weakened.

To those who guide our destinies we must say: **“Continental power and colonial power!** In following one of these guiding stars do not forget the other!”

Kuno Waltemath in “*Preussische Jahrbücher*” (January, 1916), pp. 42, 48.

I agree fully and gladly with those who advocate an increase of our territory outside of Europe. I think, too, that we can relieve certain States which possess African colonies of the task of administering them. If Portugal is really bound by treaty to send her fleet and her army to the aid of England, we might make it very easy for that country to get rid of Angola at a very low price! **We had intended to buy this West African colony; but it would be better to pay nothing for it and to take the**

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Azores, the Cape Verde Islands and Madeira, to boot. . . .

Alfred Ruhemann, in "Die Vernichtung der englischen Weltmacht" (1915), p. 145.

Assuming that at the end of this war the Belgian Congo will form part of the booty that falls to us, we need not burst into great jubilation over its acquisition. Of course we shall take all the territory that we can get, for territory always has value. . . . The question of Angola is quite different. . . . There in the future there may some time be a really extensive German settlement—that is, what is called in Africa "extensive settlement," in which the negro must be and remain the real tiller of the soil. . . .

Central Africa alone would give us extensive territory, but no proportional internal colonial values. We need, therefore, a really sufficient acquisition in another direction; but at present we prefer not to reveal this aim. . . .

Paul Rohrbach, "Unsere koloniale Zukunft" (1915), pp. 14-17.

### German aims in China

The Japanese have taken Tsing-tao, but to leave Japan at work in China is not to be thought of. . . . This would be a crime against the future of China, of Germany and of the civilization of the world. If England paid the Japanese to go to Tsing-tao, she may also pay them to go away. . . . Our base of support in China we must and shall recover. Whatever nation is intrusted with the task of

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bringing China into connection with the civilization of the world, of combining the spirit of the Far East with that of the Occident, will be doing work that will be decisive for a greater stretch of the future of our race than we can now foresee. . . . **The German World Idea will forever remain patchwork, unless it secures a decisive external and internal part in the mighty process of change in which the Chinese world is now involved.**

Paul Rohrbach, "Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt" (1914), p. 21.

Which of the great European civilized nations is to serve as architect for the external and internal reconstruction of China? Surely not the Japanese; they are Asiatics. . . . The most obvious question is whether it will be the English. We may hope today that, after this war, they probably will not be able to discharge this task. Whether we shall assume it will depend upon our position after the war. **If we are victorious we shall probably play a great rôle in eastern Asia.**

Paul Rohrbach, "Unsere koloniale Zukunftsarbeit" (1915), pp. 68-69.

### The Achilles' heel of the British Empire

The same people who . . . asserted that a war between World Powers at the present time could not possibly last longer than a few months, are now saying with the same assurance: "Of course it is impossible to overthrow England's power in a single war." This is by no means impossible; it is, on the contrary, quite possible, if we start with

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**Egypt.** England's fatality was the building of the Suez Canal. . . . If the English military forces in Egypt, all the Australians, Canadians, Hindus and real English regiments, surrender to the Turks or are forced to take to their ships in Alexandria, a blow will be struck that will be heard from Gibraltar to Singapore; and under this blow the entire dome of British world dominion will crash down with the broken keystone. . . .

The day when England shall clearly see its destiny . . . will be the birthday of the new Germany beyond the seas. On that day we shall pay to our brave men in Southwest Africa, in East Africa, in Cameroon, in Togo, in Tsing-tao and in the South Sea, our thanks for the way in which they have discharged their duty; and we shall write these thanks in bold lines, not on paper or bronze or stone, but on the map of the world. . . .

Paul Rohrbach, "Unser Kolonialbesitz," no. 37 (Sept. 11, 1915).

Calais is on the circumference, Suez is at the center of the English World Empire. . . . Calais menaces one of the many routes to and from England. Suez cuts off the single direct connection between European England and her African, Asiatic and Australian possessions; it strikes what is really the vital nerve. Calais is a blow of the fist that stuns . . . Suez is a stab in the heart that kills . . . and therefore an object most fervently to be desired. . . .

Ernst Jäckh, "Calais oder Suez," no. 26 (June 26, 1915), pp. 841, 846.



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Never before has the saying of Bismarck been so true as now: "England needs Egypt like her daily bread, on account of the Suez Canal, the most direct line of connection between the eastern and western halves of the Empire. It is like the nerve in the neck that connects the spine with the brain." . . . Neither now nor at any time in the future can we allow England, by timely diplomatic artifices, to wrest from our hands the Egyptian whip. The *ceterum censeo* of this war must continue to be: The Suez Canal must be conquered!

Carl Anton Schäfer, "Bismarck's Aegypten- und Indienpolitik, no. 45 (Nov. 6, 1915.)

### The taking of London

. . . In general, the problem of making England . . . innocuous and her overthrow as useful as possible for us may best be solved if we make ourselves masters (from a military point of view) of the European center of the British Empire. The road from Gravelotte and Verdun to Dunkirk and Boulogne might be continued by the occupation of a bridgehead at Dover—a castle on English soil. This proposal may seem fantastic, but it is quite as easy to carry it through as a landing on British soil, and without this the war must last for years. Only the taking of London, which we shall live to see, will make peace possible, and after the taking of London one treaty provision may just as well be exacted as another. . . .

Albert Ritter ("Konrad von Winterstetten"), "Nordkap-Bagdad" (1915), pp. 33, 34.



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### How Germany will negotiate peace

A rough time calls for a ready fist. We saw how it came clenched out of the pocket to meet duplicity and falsehood and what a clean sweep it made. In the coming diplomatic discussions, in which the slippery adroitness of the foreign negotiators will once more bring out and dish up, as bright as new, mendacious complaints of our aggression, we look to see it drive down, in Bismarckian style, on the green table and set the ink-bottles dancing, unless we get what belongs to us, what we regard as necessary for an enduring peace.

Alfred Ruhemann, in "Die Vernichtung der englischen Weltmacht" (1915), p. 146.

### The severest of Germany's terms

[Our enemies] must also pay, and must pay a very high price, for the injuries they have inflicted upon our interests and upon our good name by the lies they have spread over the whole world. Germany must insist that, in the treaty of peace to be signed by our enemies, they themselves shall confess that they forced the war upon us and that they have lied to the whole civilized world. So only can we stand justified before the tribunal of history.

"Wann wird der Krieg beendet sein?" by "Diplomaticus" (October, 1914), p. 16.

## CHAPTER V

### UTTERANCES OF POETS

#### The Germans

I have often been deeply pained to think of this German nation, so worthy in its individuals and so pitiable as a whole. The comparison of the German people with other peoples rouses painful feelings that I have tried by every possible means to avoid.

Goethe, conversation with Luden, November, 1813; Works (Biedermann's ed.), "Gespräche," vol. iii, p. 103.

The Germans are much more revengeful than the Romance peoples; this is because they are idealists, even in hatred. We Germans hate long and hate deeply, to our last breath. . . .

Heinrich Heine.

#### The Prussians

The Prussians are cruel by nature; civilization will make them ferocious.

Goethe.

The Prussians . . . nature has made them stupid, science has made them wicked.

Heinrich Heine.

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### A prophecy fulfilled

. . . Christianity has to a certain extent softened this brutal belligerent ardor of the Teutons, but it has not been able to destroy it; and when the Cross—the talisman that fetters it—shall be broken, then the ferocity of the old-time fighters, the frenzied exaltation of the Berserkers, whose praises are still sung by the poets of the North, will again burst forth. Then—and alas! this day will surely come—the old war gods will arise from their legendary tombs and wipe the dust of ages from their eyes; Thor will arise with his gigantic hammer and demolish the Gothic cathedrals. . . .

Heinrich Heine, "De l'Allemagne" (1855), vol. i, p. 181.

### A prophecy not yet fulfilled

Not only Alsace and Lorraine, but all France and Europe as well as the whole world will belong to us. Yes, the whole world will be German. Often, walking the woods of my Fatherland, have I dreamed of this German supremacy.

Heinrich Heine.

### Vierordt's song of hate

GERMANY, HATE!

There was a time when the hordes of a Mongolian chieftain overran us with a great clashing of swords; and a dais was built for the chieftain's throne by piling up the skulls of Teutonic warriors.

There was a time when the bands of the French

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Revolution pressed on from the West to attack us; with them came the mocking Gallic spirit, and the hand of pillage waved the torch of arson in the name of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.

There was a time when the armies of the Northmen overran us, spreading over all the land death, flames and horror. They ascended the rivers at night, by the light of the moon, to throw themselves into battle like dragons come out of the sea.

And now they all attack at once, like vultures seeking their prey; like bandits all three assail thee, my poor Germany, so tranquil under thy great spruce trees—the Gallic coiner of phrases, the English robber, the Russian barbarian.

O my Germany, into thy soul thou must etch a deep and indelible hate; this hate thou hast lacked for a long, long time. Retribution, vengeance, fury are demanded; stifle in thy heart all human feeling and hasten to the fight.

O Germany, hate! Slaughter thy foes by the millions and of their reeking corpses build a monument that shall reach the clouds.

O Germany, hate now! Arm thyself in steel and pierce with thy bayonet the heart of every foe; no prisoners! Lock all their lips in silence; turn our neighbors' lands into deserts.

O Germany, hate! Salvation will come of thy wrath. Beat in their skulls with rifle-butts and with axes. These bandits are beasts of the chase, they are not men. Let your clenched fist enforce the judgment of God.

O Germany, the time to hate has come. Strike and thrust, true and hard. Battalions, batteries,

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squadrons, all to the front! Afterwards thou wilt stand erect on the ruins of the world, healed forever of thine ancient madness, of thy love for the alien.

### The poet's reply to a Swiss critic

The Swiss daily "Basler Nachrichten" reproduced a part of this poem and expressed the opinion that its author had lost all human feeling.

Herr Vierordt, in reply, wrote an open letter to the "Basler Nachrichten" which it published October 15, 1914 (no. 493). Extracts from this letter are appended.

#### GENTLEMEN:

Not long ago I published a poem entitled, "Germany, Hate!" This poem made something of a stir in Germany and abroad. In a friendly and generous spirit I appended the statement: "Reproduction authorized." I naturally assumed that those who might avail themselves of this permission would have enough literary and artistic tact to reproduce the whole poem. But you, gentlemen, and after you a whole series of newspapers, have picked out two stanzas and have reproduced them with comments. I am sorry to be obliged to use a very impolite expression: you have acted like thieves who pry drawers open and take out what suits their purposes, scattering the rest on the floor.

If you suppress certain parts of my poem, you run the risk of completely falsifying its meaning. You act exactly like a vandal who should needlessly break off the arms and the legs of a statuette, or

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destroy a cathedral with artillery. This comparison may seem to you ridiculous; but whether a work of architecture or a piece of literature is concerned, the principle is the same. A poem perfect in form is a work of architectural art, and only the unskilled fingers of an amateur would venture to disfigure it.

Certain stanzas separated from my entire work make a somewhat brutal impression; it is so in the case of the two stanzas cited by you. . . . All the same, in writing my poem I have not by any means lost—as you politely remark—"all human feeling." Quite the contrary. If the treasury of the German language contained expressions of hatred and of anger a thousand times stronger, I would have hurled them in the world's face. Were there anything a thousand times worse than death, I should wish it for the accursed enemies of my Fatherland!

You, honorable sir, belong to a neutral country, and you will never be able to think yourself into the soul of a German, aroused to the last degree by the treacherous attack of Europe upon Germany. . . . My concluding lines:

Afterwards thou wilt stand erect on the ruins of  
the world,  
Healed forever of thine ancient madness,  
Of thy love for the alien—

answer a desire long felt by every true German. The worst means may well be used to attain this end. This is the quintessence of my poem, the

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deeper meaning of this poetic work based upon history. . . .

To those who think me too violent, I make this simple answer: It is God who urged me, who enjoined me to write this work with words of power. There is still a God of force, of pride, who takes pleasure in seeing the German Michael at last aroused; but, Michael, you still need spurring. . . . This God has chosen his German people to be wrought into an engine of destruction, to be hurled against another people who are always on edge, who will not let us live and labor in peace, and whose mad ambition proves its barbarism by leading barbarian peoples against us. When it comes to fighting these enemies, these Kabyles, these Moroccans, these Hindus, these Cossacks, then there are no longer any laws of war. There is but one way: kill, kill, kill them all!

Our great poet, Heinrich von Kleist, wrote long ago: "Kill them; the tribunal of the world will not question your motives."

Yes! There is a God who loves the savage onslaught, and who, as the creator of the universe, also loves words that hit hard. To this God the shouts of the strong are sweeter than the moaning of old women. . . .

Heinrich Vierordt.

### Lissauer's song of hate

This poem, entitled "Hate against England," was composed by Ernst Lissauer, a soldier in the 10th Bavarian infantry regiment. By order of the commander-in-chief it was distributed among all the Bavarian troops in the



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field—with the omission, however, of the second stanza. The author was decorated by the German Emperor.

What do we care for the Russians and French?  
Shot against shot and thrust for thrust!  
We love them not, we hate them not;  
We guard the Vistula and the passes of the Vosges.  
We have but one single hate;  
We love as one, we hate as one;  
We have but one single foe,  
Whom you all know, whom you all know.  
He sits crouched behind the gray flood,  
Full of envy, full of fury, full of craft, full of guile,  
Set apart by waters that are thicker than blood.  
We wish to go before a seat of judgment  
To swear an oath, face to face,  
An oath of metal no wind can blow away,  
An oath for children and children's children.  
Hearken to the word, repeat the word,  
It rolls on through all Germany:  
We will not forbear from our hate;  
We have all but one hate;  
We love as one, we hate as one;  
We have all but one foe—  
England!

In the quarter-deck cabin, the banqueting room,  
Ship's officers sat at their friendly feast.  
Like a saber blow, like the swing of a sail,  
One jerked his glass aloft for a toast.  
Curt and sharp as the catch of an oar,  
Three words he uttered: "To the Day!"  
On whose score was the glass?

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They had all but one hate.  
Whom had they in mind?  
They had all but one foe—  
England!

Take the peoples of the earth in your pay;  
Build walls of bars of gold;  
Cover the ocean with bow beside-bow;  
You reckoned shrewdly, yet not shrewdly enough.  
What do we care for the Russians and French?  
Shot against shot, and thrust for thrust!  
We fight the fight with bronze and steel,  
And some day or other we make our peace.  
You we shall hate with enduring hate;  
We shall not forbear from our hate.  
Hate on water and hate on land,  
Hate of the head and hate of the hand,  
Hate of the hammers and hate of the crowns,  
Throttling hate of seventy millions.  
They love as one, they hate as one;  
They all have but one foe—  
England!

### Song of the German sword

The following poem was sent by a Bern correspondent to the "Pall Mall Gazette," and was printed in that journal October 7, 1915. The correspondent stated that "the composition appeared in Leipzig a week or so ago and has already run into half a dozen editions." It was reprinted by the Rev. Dr. L. P. Jacks, president of Manchester College, Oxford, in the "Hibbert Journal," April, 1916, with the statement: "Further inquiries have confirmed its genuineness."

## OUT OF THEIR OWN MOUTHS

It is no duty of mine to be either just or compassionate; it suffices that I am sanctified by my exalted mission, and that I blind the eyes of my enemies with such streams of tears as shall make the proudest of them cringe in terror under the vault of heaven.

I have slaughtered the old and the sorrowful; I have struck off the breasts of women; and I have run through the bodies of children, who gazed at me with the eyes of the wounded lion.

Day after day I ride aloft on the shadowy horse in the valley of cypresses; and as I ride I draw forth the life blood from every enemy's son that dares to dispute my path.

It is meet and right that I should cry aloud my pride, for am I not the flaming messenger of the Lord Almighty?

Germany is so far above and beyond all the other nations that all the rest of the earth, be they who they may, should feel themselves well cared for when they are allowed to fight with the dogs for the crumbs that fall from her table.

When Germany the divine is happy, then the rest of the world basks in smiles; but when Germany suffers, God in person is rent with anguish, and, wrathful and avenging, He turns all the waters into rivers of blood.

## CHAPTER VI

### UTTERANCES OF CAPTAINS OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE AND OF ECONOMISTS

#### **Annexionist memorial of six great industrial associations**

. . . In addition to the demand for a Colonial Empire that shall fully satisfy the many-sided economic interests of Germany, in addition to securing our future in the matter of customs and trade policy and the attainment of a sufficient . . . war indemnity, [the undersigned associations] find the chief aim of the conflict that has been forced upon us in the securing and improvement of the German Empire's basis of existence in Europe, and particularly in the following directions.

**Belgium** . . . as regards military and customs policy, and also as regards monetary, banking and postal systems, must be subjected to German imperial legislation. Railroads and canals are to be made portions of our transportation system. For the rest, after separating the country into a Walloon district and a preponderantly Flemish district, and after transferring to Germans the economic undertakings and possessions that are important for the domination of the country, its gov-

## OUT OF THEIR OWN MOUTHS

ernment and administration must be so conducted that the inhabitants shall obtain no influence upon the political destinies of the German Empire.

As regards France . . . the possession of the coast beyond the Belgian frontier, perhaps to the Somme, and therewith an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean, must be regarded as vital to our future importance on the sea. The hinterland that is to be acquired with this coast strip must be sufficient to secure complete strategic control and economic exploitation of the ports that we acquire on the Channel. Apart from the necessary acquisition of the ore fields of Briey, any further annexation of French territory is to be made exclusively on considerations of military strategy. It may be assumed as self-evident, after the experiences of this war, that we . . . cannot leave in the hands of the enemy the fortified positions which threaten us, particularly Verdun and Belfort, nor the western slope of the Vosges that lies between them. The acquisition of the line of the Meuse and the French coast on the Channel involves, in addition to the above-mentioned ore fields of Briey, also the possession of the coal fields in the Departments of the North and of Pas-de-Calais. After our experiences in Alsace-Lorraine, it is probably self-evident that, in these acquisitions also, the people of the annexed districts are not to be put in a position to obtain any political influence upon the destinies of the German Empire, and that the economic resources to be found in these districts, including medium and large land holdings, are to be put into German hands,

## UTTERANCES OF CAPTAINS OF INDUSTRY

with an arrangement that France shall indemnify and take care of the former proprietors. . . .

The need for strengthening also the sound agricultural basis of our national economy . . . demands a considerable extension of the Imperial and Prussian frontiers toward the East, by annexing parts at least of the Baltic provinces and the districts lying south of the same, taking into consideration at the same time the object of making our East-German frontier defensible from a military point of view. . . .

As regards the extension of political rights to the inhabitants of these new territories and the safeguarding of the German economic influence therein, what has been said as regards France is valid here also. The war indemnity to be paid by Russia must consist largely in the transfer of private titles to land. . . .

This memorial, dated May 20, 1915, was addressed to the Imperial Chancellor by six of the most important agricultural and industrial associations of Germany; "Bund der Landwirte," "Deutscher Bauernbund," "Vorort der christlichen deutschen Bauernvereine," "Centralverband deutscher Industrieller," "Bund der Industriellen," and "Reichsdeutscher Mittelstandsverband." It was transmitted to the Governments of the several German States, and was extensively circulated in print as a "confidential" communication. Its publication in German newspapers was not permitted. The entire text was first published in the Paris "Humanité," August 11, 1915. The complete German text is given in Grumbach, "Das annexionistische Deutschland," pp. 123-132.

Compare the Professors' Memorial, above, pp. 60-65.



## OUT OF THEIR OWN MOUTHS

### Chambers of Commerce for annexations

The Union of Chambers of Commerce of the industrial district of the lower Rhine and of Westphalia . . . held not long ago a session in Essen. . . . Agreement was . . . particularly complete on the point that Germany must hold out in the war to the last extremity, in order that our German Fatherland shall come out of the conflict . . . externally stronger, with secure boundaries on the West and on the East, with greater sea power **and with such additions of territory as are needed** in order to guarantee our increased power from a military, a naval and an economic point of view.

Report in Berlin newspapers (April 21, 1915).

### Annexionist desires of iron and steel manufacturers

The iron and steel manufacturers, who have come in large numbers from all districts of Germany to the General Assembly of the Union of Iron and Steel Manufacturers . . . are convinced that, on the basis of our military successes, we shall be able to obtain a position which, in connection with **the extension of our frontiers necessary for the purpose**, will assure to the German people . . . peaceful and energetic development in industry, commerce, agriculture and the trades. . . .

Telegram sent to the Imperial Chancellor, Dec. 10, 1915, by the "Hauptversammlung des Vereins deutscher Eisen- und Stahlindustrieller."



# UTTERANCES OF CAPTAINS OF INDUSTRY

## **Rhenish manufacturers and landowners want Belgium**

The Provincial Diet of the Province of the Rhine met this week in Düsseldorf. It occupied itself, among other things, with the question of erecting a branch of the Provincial Fire and Life Insurance Institute in Belgium. . . . In connection with the discussion of this matter, the annexationist desires of the leading industrials and great landowners, who are dominant in the Provincial Diet, were very clearly expressed. Commercial Councilor Hagen (Cologne) expressed the earnest hope that the extension of the insurance business would not be a transitory but a permanent measure. . . . Councilor of Justice Kehren . . . suggested that . . . the expectation be expressed that the Belgian territory at present occupied should be permanently retained. Both of these utterances were received by the Diet with loud applause. . . . The Superior President of the Province, Baron von Rheinbaben, took part in the meeting. . . .

“Volksblatt” of Halle (February 7, 1916).

## **Chemnitz Unions demand annexations**

We cannot take our hands off Belgium altogether, nor can we abandon the Russian Baltic provinces.

Annual Report of the Chemnitz Unions, issued early in 1916; cited in the Reichstag and in a report of the Reichstag proceedings in the “Deutsche Tageszeitung” (May 26, 1916). Chemnitz is an important industrial center.

## OUT OF THEIR OWN MOUTHS

### World plans of a Saxon manufacturer

Belgium, whose population is mainly of German origin, should . . . remain a permanent part of our Empire. If we succeed in gaining a part of the neighboring Atlantic coast of France, the prospect will be opened of breaking the supremacy of England in European waters. If we can force France and Russia to make peace, must not then the defeat of England follow? Through a new continental embargo and similar means we can impose our will upon this apparently unassailable country. . . . The sacrifices of this war will be so monstrous that we must endeavor to realize the highest aim: customs union and military union of the Triple Alliance, including as many other states as possible, to be brought in after the war by friendly negotiation, gentle intimidation or force. . . .

Manufacture on a large scale, which makes the economic life of the nation extraordinarily fruitful, is possible only in a great economic area. Germany by itself is today such an area. With the inclusion of all its friends, however, an economic area would be established of such extent that there would be nothing like it except in the United States of North America. With the United States we might reach a friendly understanding, and then we could dictate laws to the world.

Max Schubert, "Deutschland am Schicksalswege" (1914), pp. 10, 11. The writer is a manufacturer in Saxony, and was formerly a member of the Saxon Diet. See Grumbach, p. 290.

## UTTERANCES OF CAPTAINS OF INDUSTRY

### Calais as a center of the German lace industry

It would be the best solution—and after our successes up to the present time we may hope that it will be realized—if Calais should remain for all time in German hands and if then in Calais we could establish a second center for the German lace industry.

“Der Konfektionär,” no. 84 (Oct. 18, 1914). This is the official organ of the German “Konfektions-Unternehmer-Verband.” See Grumbach, p. 30.

### Exploitation of the new “Duchy of Belgium”

The question that is still much debated, how we may meet the doubts that stand in the way of annexation of territory containing foreign and hostile peoples, leads us to consider in a general way the securing of the necessary treasures of the soil, so far as concerns land for purposes of agriculture and of colonization. The notion of a so-called “evacuation” has already appeared. In this connection I desire to reproduce **proposals proceeding from eminent and recognized leaders of the German colonial movement and of the German economic life.** With special reference to Belgium, the following points of view were submitted to the author by one of these leaders:

In every place where the population has been guilty of offenses against our army by brigandage and armed resistance, **the inhabitants are to be expropriated.** . . . Compensation to families is to be set off against military contributions. They must,

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moreover, take up their residence outside of the German Empire.

The land thus set free is to be divided among the members of those German regiments that have had to suffer from the treachery of the former population, and among the widows and children of the slain and the wounded. . . .

**Factories and industrial plants**, whose owners or managers have taken part in resistance to our army, **are to be confiscated** and turned over, in corporate ownership, to suitable workmen who belong to the German Army and are ready to take up work in such establishments.

**All mines are to become public property of the new German Duchy of Belgium**, except where they are already in private German ownership.

Every former Belgian who does not declare, within four weeks after the official incorporation of the former kingdom, that he intends to become a German national, must leave the territory of the German Empire with his family.

Similarly, for a period of ten years, every former Belgian who commits any offense against the Empire and its laws is to be expelled from the Imperial territory.

In accordance with these principles, and in order to form a sharply marked national boundary, a broad strip of land is to be set off on our entire present and Belgian frontier, in which pure German settlements shall be established, consisting of men who were drawn into service during the war. . . . In the new German territories compensation can be given to those Germans who, in the course of the war,

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were expelled by our enemies and thus lost their homes and occupations.

The proposals above quoted are notably supplemented from another side in somewhat the following form:

If we are to remain a strong nation and if we are to extend our world power upon a secure basis, we need . . . German colonization in the districts that fall into our hands. . . . For this purpose it is not sufficient that new strips of land in the East and in the West come under German imperial sovereignty; it is further necessary that landed property be acquired directly by the State. This is the great goal: not merely a war indemnity in cash, but preferably and principally a war indemnity in real estate. . . .

Arthur Dix, "Der Weltwirtschaftskrieg," in the series "Zwischen Krieg und Frieden," Heft 3 (1914), pp. 33-40.

### **"Raw materials for war industry"**

Our whole western frontier from South to North must be improved, as far as conditions permit . . . . Our boundary must if possible be so drawn—this has not previously been the case—that our great iron and steel works in Lorraine . . . shall be out of the range of the most powerful modern artillery in French fortresses. Above all we must secure for ourselves, as far as possible, the necessary raw materials for war industry, and at the same time take them away from our enemies.

Of the greatest importance are the iron ore beds. . . . Without the ores of Lorraine, we should

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today be unable to maintain our iron and steel production on the scale which this war demands. Fortunately we were already able to congratulate ourselves on possessing the greatest natural wealth in iron ores to be found in any European country. This advantage we owed to the victorious war of 1870-71. The Peace of Frankfort was to have given us all the ore in Lorraine. This we did not obtain, because the geologists whom Bismarck consulted in drawing the frontier were in error as to the extent of the iron fields. Since the 80's we know that—contrary to Bismarck's view—the broader and more important deposits of ore in the plateau of Briey . . . were left in the hands of France. Today we can make good this serious mistake, since we fortunately conquered these districts at the beginning of the war and hold them firmly in our grasp.

The next most important raw material for our war industry is, of course, coal, and especially coke coal, from which particularly we gain explosives. Just as we should have been unable to carry on the war successfully if we could not have satisfied our needs for ore in Lorraine, so again we should have lacked an indispensable means of success if nature had not endowed Germany, particularly the Rheinish-Westphalian district, and the neighboring districts in Belgium and North France which we have occupied, with a supply of coke coal unequalled elsewhere in Europe in quantity and in excellence. Now that we have learned what the question of munitions signifies for the result of the war, now that we have already been obliged to use Bel-



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gian coal for our own purposes, we can and we must declare that the vital needs of our nation in war and in peace exclude any thought of restoring to the enemy these sources of military and economic power. . . .

If we wish to secure for ourselves these treasures of the soil, mere political cession is not sufficient. . . . An increase of territory brings with it today a real increase of power, particularly when it is a question of war industry, only in case full ownership makes free production and disposal possible.

As regards the acquisition of such control in territory that has been French, the necessary expenditures will be charged up against the French war indemnity. France, that has so often boasted of being a money lender to the world, must be held primarily liable with her financial power for our economic damages. . . . For relief from the burden thrust upon her, France may appeal to her ally across the Channel, whose rich treasures we shall hardly be able to reach directly. . . .

Prof. Hermann Schumacher, Address delivered June 20, 1915, in Berlin, printed as "manuscript, strictly confidential." Schumacher is one of the leading German economists. He occupies a chair in Bonn University, and was one of the instructors of the Crown Prince.

If the war ends with a German victory, it is our good right . . . to annex such districts as are necessary for supplementing our supply of raw material, such as the ore beds in the neighborhood of Metz.

Prof. Sieveking, "Unsere Aufgaben" (1915), p. 30.



## OUT OF THEIR OWN MOUTHS

### The cure for "land shortage"

Because our territory was not increased, we have been transformed from a country people into a city people, from an agricultural into an industrial people. . . . The disturbance of the proper balance which has resulted, and which is an evil thing, can be remedied permanently and thoroughly only by a sufficient increase of territory. Shortage of land can be cured only by the taking of land. . . .

Leopold von Vietinghoff, "Die Sicherheiten der deutschen Zukunft" (1915), pp. 10, 12.

### "Pressure to the Ocean." Naval bases

We must seek beyond the waters of the North Sea a naval base which in future shall give us, in this part of the world at least, the same chances that England possesses. . . .

We need bases at the entrance and at the exit of the Channel; we need strong bases over sea. . . .

Albert Ballin, General Director of the Hamburg-American Line, in the "Frankfurter Zeitung" (Jan. 4, 1915), and in the "Magdeburgische Zeitung" (Oct. 21, 1915).

The whole history of Brandenburg, of Prussia and of Germany, including its continuation in the history of the Triple Alliance, may be regarded as a manifestation through the centuries of pressure to the ocean. . . . Now it is a question of completing the work . . . of consolidating more thoroughly the German-Austrian alliance and of pushing the German coast to the Channel, to the gate of the open Atlantic.

## UTTERANCES OF ECONOMISTS

This is what England avowedly most dreads. Just for this reason we can neither let Belgium escape from our control nor renounce our aim to keep the coast—from Ostend to the mouth of the Somme, if possible—from falling again into the hands of any State that can become a vassal of England. . . .

Dix, "Der Weltwirtschaftskrieg," in the series, "Zwischen Krieg und Frieden," Heft 3 (1914), p. 32.

Not alone for the protection of our native soil but also for the protection of our world trade and our colonies **Belgium is indispensable to us.** We cannot deprive England of the geographical advantage of her insular position. It will always be difficult for us to attack her in land warfare, so long as she stays on her islands. But at sea we can make England more assailable. . . .

Even more than upon her great colonial possessions, England's position in world commerce rests upon her control of the greatest highway of trade on our planet, that which reaches from the English coast through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to India, Australia and Eastern Asia. On this highway England early and adroitly established points of control. We shall hardly be able to drive her out of these positions, but we should follow her prudent example. . . . I think, for instance, of **French Somaliland with Djibuti** at the southern entrance of the Red Sea opposite Aden, of a harbor in **North Morocco** opposite Gibraltar, and of a Turkish base in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean as near as possible to the Suez Canal. . . .

Schumacher, Address (cited above, p. 133).

## OUT OF THEIR OWN MOUTHS

In England the notion that we could be starved out by cutting off our sea communications has assuredly played a decisive rôle. The English have been constantly renewing their belief that our power of resistance could be broken by want of copper, benzine, petroleum, rubber, cotton, wool, etc. It is therefore quite clear that the existence of all these supplies within our future economic domain would be one of the firmest guaranties of peace. . . .

Marvelous are the ways of the Lord! England believed that she could strike us a mortal and annihilating blow; instead of that, she is giving us a rapid course of training to complete our education in world politics. She lit up the situation as with a flash of lightning; she wrote indelibly in characters of fire on every German heart: You need cables that stretch around the world, wireless stations that bridge over lands and seas. You must have firm bases, harbors, wharves and docks on every sea. . . . You must break the English castles that guard the gates of the Ocean. . . .

Hans Sonnenschmidt, "Deutschland am Wendepunkt zum Aufstieg" (1915), pp. 153 *et seq.*

### A German settlement in South China

In spite of the defeats they have suffered, our enemies are arming themselves for the coming competition in trade. For this reason we must recognize the demands of the future as commands of the present. . . .

Very promising are the iron ore beds in China.

## UTTERANCES OF ECONOMISTS

China is an iron land of the first class. . . . As in the matter of railroad concessions, so also in the matter of mining opportunities, we must act promptly and secure the business. . . .

Hong Kong can no longer remain a central station of German trade in South China. We intend to have our own trade center, and for this purpose we need a German settlement on the south Chinese coast. . . .

The Germans in China should form a great organization, working in the service of German aims, and rendering obedience to common requirements.

Wolf von Dewall, "Deutschland und China nach dem Kriege" (1916), pp. 59, 76, 80, 102, 104.

## CHAPTER VII

### UTTERANCES OF PARTY LEADERS

#### I. PARTY DECLARATIONS

##### **Annexationist utterances of party committees**

In the West especially, the territory necessary to secure and strengthen our power on sea and land, from political, military and economic points of view, is to be added to the German Empire. In the East, we must acquire not only frontiers that are strategically better, but also new soil for settlement. Finally, our possessions oversea are to be developed in extent and in character. . . .

Resolution of the Central Committee of the National Liberal Party, June, 1915.

The Committee knows itself to be at one with the whole Conservative Party and with the whole German people in the determination to shrink from no further sacrifice that is necessary to carry on the war until a peace is concluded that shall be lasting and honorable and that shall secure the bases of the German future. We shall, of course, support all demands for such territorial gains as seem necessary for this purpose.

Resolution of the Executive Committee of the German Conservative Party, Oct. 9, 1915.

## UTTERANCES OF PARTY LEADERS

The fearful sacrifices which the war is imposing on our nation call for a stronger protection of our territory in the East and in the West, such as shall discourage our enemies from again attacking us and shall assure permanent economic provision for our growing population. To this increased security for our Empire must be added similar security for the States in alliance with us.

Resolution adopted by the General Committee of the Center Party for the Empire, at a meeting held in Frankfurt, Oct. 24-25, 1915.

The Central Committee of the Progressive People's Party . . . is convinced that the terms of peace will bring to the German Empire—not, as our enemies are still today declaring, at best the reestablishment of the status before the war—but rather a durable protection against foreign attacks and a permanent increase of its power, its prosperity and, so far as its security seems to require, of its territory also.

Resolution adopted Dec. 4, 1915.

The German people . . . are firmly and unanimously convinced that their heavy sacrifices in wealth and in blood . . . must not have been made in vain. They demand as the goal of peace a Germany strengthened in its entire position of power, considerably expanded beyond its former boundaries by the retention, as far as possible, of the districts now occupied, and indemnified for its financial expenditures.

Resolution adopted at a meeting of the Free Conservative Party, held in Berlin, December 5-6, 1915.

## OUT OF THEIR OWN MOUTHS

### Joint declaration favoring annexations

In full unity, with quiet determination—and, permit me to add, with trust in God—we await the hour when a peace can be made that shall secure permanently the military, economic, financial and political interests of Germany in their whole extent and by all means, including such acquisitions of territory as are necessary for this purpose.

Declaration read in the Reichstag, December 9, 1915, by Deputy Spahn, President of the Center Party, in the name of all the parties except the Social Democrats. Excluding these, and also the Poles, the Alsace-Lorrainers and the Danish member from North Schleswig, Spahn's declaration was supported by 254 members, representing two-thirds of the total electorate of the Empire. See Grumbach, "Das annexionistische Deutschland," p. 33.

## II. UTTERANCES OF SINGLE LEADERS

### "Mistakes need not be repeated"

Moderation in our demands may be carried too far; once already we have carried it too far. Under the present circumstances I cannot speak, I am sorry to say, of the form which the map of our country is to assume in the future. As regards the past I will say only one thing: that our failure either to take or to raze Belfort in 1870 was a mistake, and mistakes need not be repeated.

Dr. Pachnicke, Progressive member of the Reichstag, Speech at Frankfort, Nov. 23, 1914.



## UTTERANCES OF PARTY LEADERS

### **"German blood manure" not to be wasted**

We are sure that the German eagle will spread its wings victoriously and soar to greater heights than ever before. And we shall know how to hold firmly for all time the territories that have been manured (*gedüngt*) with German blood.

Bassermann, National Liberal member of the Reichstag, Speech reported in the Berlin papers (Dec. 5, 1914).

### **Why Belgians should desire German protection**

The Belgian question is not an affair of the Belgians only. . . . One thing, however, may be said: Were I a Belgian deputy, I should say: One thing above all others! We must get out of our present unsafe position of neutrality! That is only self-deception. It leads only to making Belgium the arena of war for the three Powers, Germany, England and France. We must establish a connection, at least a military connection, with one of these three Powers, so that in case of war we may have protection in advance against any peril that threatens us. . . . From the economic point of view I would then add: Our connection must be with our economic hinterland—connection with Germany.

Peus-Dessau, Social Democratic member of the Reichstag, in the Lausanne "*Menschheit*," no. 15 (January 2, 1915).

### **Territorial indemnities. No plebiscites**

The financial condition of our enemies certainly excludes any complete indemnity in money for our

## OUT OF THEIR OWN MOUTHS

costs and losses in this war. Since, however, we have not the slightest reason to abandon full indemnity, another form must be chosen. . . . Favorable commercial treaties, mining and railroad concessions and the like may be taken into consideration, but also acquisitions of territory. The ore fields of French Lorraine and of Russian Poland form the natural and, to a certain extent, the absolutely necessary complement of our own ore fields.

We have also to think of the acquisition of European and colonial territory that is important for our export trade. . . .

If our aim be a peace that promises to be durable, it must include everything in the way of acquisition of territory which the General Staff considers necessary to avert the peril of future wars, and no consideration for enemy countries or peoples should restrain us in the fulfillment of these demands. **In particular no regard should be paid to the imaginary right of the inhabitants of districts that are to be annexed to determine their own destiny.**

Von Zedlitz-Neukirch, Free Conservative member of the Prussian Diet, in the "Tag" (Jan. 24 and 31, 1915).

### **What territories Russia must cede**

It is decidedly a moral duty of the German Empire not to leave the German element on the Baltic nor the Letts and Lithuanians any longer under the . . . Government of Russia.

That in case of defeat in a war with Germany Russia would be obliged to count on loss of territory, particularly on the loss of all Russian Poland

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and even of the territory to the North as far as the Dvina, General Kuropatkin openly admitted in his "Reminiscences of the Russian-Japanese War." . .

What has thus far been Russian Lithuania . . . is thoroughly satisfied . . . to constitute a wedge or buffer set between the Teuton and the Slav world. . . . It is, however, of the greatest importance that this new State shall be brought into a close relation with Germany, its army being placed under supreme German command and its territory included in the German customs frontier. . . .

Dr. Gaigalat, member of the Prussian Diet, in "Grenzboten," no. 8 (Feb. 24, 1915), pp. 336, 337, 339.

### Channel ports required

Of what advantage to us are the greatest and fairest colonial dominions, if a ruthless foe is able at any moment to cut us off from the world? . . . Free access to the ocean, freer and more assured than ever before, is the object for which the whole nation is resolved to fight . . . to its last mark and its last man. . . .

Count von Westarp, Free Conservative member of the Reichstag, Speech in Hamburg, April 3, 1915.

### Annexations West and East

We are not to speak at present of the aims of peace, but it must be declared that the heart of every German is animated by the desire not to surrender the hostile territory that has been won with so much German blood. We must get a footing on

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the English Channel, even if we have to start all over again and conquer a second time the old fortresses that block our way. The German people demand also that we shall safeguard ourselves in the East against new incursions of the Russian hordes. The pen must not again be permitted to sacrifice what the sword has obtained.

Paasche, National Liberal member and Vice-President of the Reichstag, Speech in Kreuznach, April 18, 1915.

Peace negotiations are possible only on the basis of the actual situation. Belgium has violated its neutrality and destroyed itself, and what concerns us is that it shall not remain a vassal of England. Against Russia we must build a wall of defense on which the Slav wave will be broken. As regards France, what is to be considered is the gate of the nations between the Jura and the Vosges, and the crest of the Vosges.

Dr. Pachnicke, Progressive member of the Reichstag, Speech delivered in May, 1915, in various German cities.

### A misinterpreted imperial utterance

These sentences [of the Chancellor, regarding "real guaranties and securities"] will undoubtedly find energetic assent in the widest circles of the nation. They repeat the thoughts previously expressed by the Chancellor, in his great war speech of December 2, 1914, in more definite and tangible form, and they are therefore adapted, perhaps directly intended, to counteract the misconceptions that have been occasioned in many quarters by the

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declaration in the Speech from the Throne, August 4, 1914, that we are waging no war of conquest.

Von Zedlitz-Neukirch, Free Conservative member of the Prussian Diet, in the "Post," May 29, 1915. The Chancellor's remarks, May 28, 1915, will be found above, p. 22.

### A German protectorate of Belgium

A complete reestablishment of the old political relations in Belgium must, in my opinion, be regarded as an impossibility. . . . After this war Belgium would be neither more nor less than a French or English settlement, without any independent political significance. . . .

The neutrality, which for a long time has existed only on paper . . . was actually . . . a misfortune for Belgium. . . . Protection can be given to Belgium only by a single neighboring and greatly superior Continental Power, that guarantees to the country peace and security, undisturbed development and the necessary degree of internal liberty, and which gives this guaranty not on paper, but through its actual power.

Ernst Müller-Meiningen, Progressive leader and member of the Reichstag, "Belgische Eindrücke und Ausblicke" (1916), pp. 29-32. This pamphlet elicited a letter of indorsement from von Bissing, Governor General of Belgium. See above, pp. 24-25.

### The correct idea of "a lasting peace"

The expression, "a lasting peace," was coined in certain German circles before a single battle was

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fought or a single German victory won. It . . . meant: You must not take anything at all away from the enemy, for otherwise he will be obliged to revenge himself upon you. A lasting peace in this sense we do not desire. We wish a lasting peace in which the borders of the German garden are pushed so far out toward the East and the West, that outsiders shall find it difficult to throw stones again into our garden.

Pastor Traub, Progressive member of the Prussian Diet, Speech delivered in Duisburg, May 22, 1916.

### A peace "made in Germany"

Let us conclude no peace except one that gives Germany greater power on the sea, new coaling stations, new points of support for its fleet and new areas for settlement—a peace "made in Germany."

Dr. Beumer, National Liberal member of the Prussian Diet, Address to the Chamber of Commerce of Bremen, October 3, 1915.

### "The line of the Naref"

If for the better defense of Germany in the East the annexation of the line of the Naref is actually required, can any German voice a protest?

Dr. Landsberg, Social Democratic member of the Reichstag, remarks made in a party caucus. These remarks were reported by Ledebour, a member of the dissenting Socialist group, in the "Frankfurter Volksstimme" (January 6, 1916). Ledebour pointed out that the frontier proposed by Landsberg would include Maso-



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vian, Polish and Lithuanian territory with something like 5,000,000 non-German inhabitants. See Grumbach, p. 113.

### **The German nation's divinely appointed goal**

The expression, "real guaranties," is no mere phrase. . . . Is it dangerous to the State to declare openly that our frontiers must be advanced in the West and in the East? . . . **Are we to forbid our mouths to say what is in fact on every lip and in every heart?** Are we to suppress the fact that the surrender of Kurland would be completely unintelligible to German sentiment? . . . The object of this war is not alone the securing of an honorable peace, not alone the freedom of the seas and of our economic life, not alone a greater Germany even, but our final aim in the war is the attainment of the world-historic goal which a Higher Power has set up particularly for the German nation.

Dr. Oertel, Conservative member of the Reichstag, Speech in the Reichstag, January 18, 1916.

### **Strategic demands**

Arrangements must, of course, be made for stopping up the hole in the Vosges and for making it impossible that Thorn shall be reached by guns of even the greatest range in Russian fortresses.

Oskar Geck, Social Democratic member of the Reichstag, Speech delivered at Karlsruhe, February 2, 1916.

### **"Ideals kindle no enthusiasm"**

From above, we have keynote phrases such as "protection of small nations," and "freedom of the



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seas." These are ideal, not real things. They kindle no enthusiasm. For this purpose we need the announcement of great aims. . . . If we do not overthrow our enemies in this war, there is risk of our becoming a second-class nation.

Bacmeister, National Liberal member of the Prussian Diet, Speech in the Diet, February 23, 1916.

### Practical uses of history

Students of history should make use of our newspapers more than they do, and should speak of the past of the Flemish territory, of the past of Kurland, of the Low German character of the Flemish population and of the historic Order of the Teutonic Knights. At times it may be annoying to keep the last sentence of such articles back in one's pen. But is it always necessary to dot all one's i's? Anyone who knows how to read articles of the historical sort will know how to "put the dot on the i" for himself.

Pastor Munn, Christian Socialist member of the Reichstag, in the "Berliner Neueste Nachrichten" (March 29, 1916).

### Bethmann-Hollweg's implications

The aims of peace must be aims of power. . . . In the East the Imperial Chancellor has indicated the tangible outcome with some precision. As regards the West he has expressed himself with greater caution. As regards Belgium he has told us that precautions must be taken that this country shall no longer be a bulwark of England but

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must be—that is undoubtedly the necessary implication of what he has said—under our political, military and economic control.

Spahn, member of the Reichstag, leader of the Center Party, Speech in the Reichstag, April 5, 1916.

### Landmarks must be removed

If in the treaty of peace we succeed in securing for the Flemings the chance to develop their own culture on the basis of their own language, is that forcible subjugation? Against any subjugation that might be proposed in this matter we [Social Democrats] should be compelled to take a position of decided opposition. The Imperial Chancellor has said: "The Europe that will emerge from this war will in many of its parts be unlike the old Europe. History knows no *status quo ante* after monstrous events." One must be a political infant to persuade himself that a whole continent can be set on fire, millions of men killed and bleeding, without the removal of a single landmark placed by some musty old diplomatist.

Philipp Scheidemann, Speech on behalf of the majority of the Social Democratic Party in the Reichstag, April 6, 1916.

## CHAPTER VIII

### UTTERANCES OF MILITARY WRITERS

#### I. GLORIFICATION OF WAR

##### **"A radiant crown"**

Some great sentiment must stimulate great abilities in the General, either ambition, as in Caesar, hatred of the enemy, as in Hannibal, or the pride of falling gloriously, as in Frederick the Great.

Open your heart to a feeling of this kind. Be bold and astute in your designs, firm and persevering in executing them, determined to find a glorious end, and destiny will press on your youthful brow a radiant crown—fit emblem of a Prince, the rays of which will carry your image into the bosom of your latest descendants.

Gen. Carl von Clausewitz, "On War" (1832); translated by Col. F. N. Maude (1911), vol. iii, p. 229. The passage cited will be found in the author's "Instructions to the Prussian Crown Prince" (1812).

##### **The army the basis of civilization**

The army takes the first place among the institutions of every country. It alone makes possible the existence of all the other institutions. All

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political and civil liberty, all the creations of civilization, the finances, the State itself, stand and fall with the army.

Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke, Speech in the Reichstag, Jan. 11, 1887.

### War instituted by God

Perpetual peace is a dream, and it is not even a beautiful dream. War is part of the eternal order instituted by God. . . .

Moltke, Letter to Bluntschli, Dec. 11, 1880.

### Biology, civilization, idealism and Christianity demand war

. . . War is not merely a necessary element in the life of nations, but an indispensable factor of culture, in which a truly civilized nation finds the highest expression of strength and vitality. . . .

War gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on the very nature of things. . . . It is not only a biological law, but a moral obligation, and, as such, an indispensable factor in civilization. . . .

As human life is now constituted, it is political idealism which calls for war, while materialism—in theory, at least—repudiates it. . . .

The brutal incidents inseparable from every war vanish completely before the idealism of the main result.

Christ Himself said: "I am not come to send peace on earth, but a sword." His teaching can

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never be adduced as an argument against the universal law of struggle. **There never was a religion that was more combative than Christianity. Combat, moral combat, is its very essence.**

Gen. Friedrich von Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War"; translated by A. H. Powles (Longmans, Green & Co., 1912), pp. 6, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22.

### The diffusion of "culture" by war

It lies in the nature of a fully developed State—the history of all ages confirms it—to feel the need of forcing the greatest possible number of the inhabitants of the earth into the domain of its culture. The greater the pride felt by each single citizen in belonging to just *this* State, his own and no other; the fuller his consciousness that the cultural elements that live in him place him morally above his neighbors—the stronger becomes his impulse to be a political teacher and educator. Highly developed cultural nations conquer to educate, to extend their culture to others.

So the haughty Romans strode over the world as teachers of a majestic political and cultural thought; and in their footsteps trod the Teutons, under the leadership of the Carolingian, Saxon, Franconian and Hohenstaufen Emperors. . . . For the French world there arose in Napoleon I the great herald and teacher of culture promoted by the policy of force. . . . May a like Titan be vouchsafed to us, that the world may be healed by the German nature.

And the graves that line the roads of glory, the

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stench of robbery, pillage and theft that hangs about these millions of graves? Must culture build its cathedrals on hills of corpses, seas of tears, and the death-rattle of the vanquished? Yes, it must. These accompaniments of the expansion of culture may be regarded, if one will, as the *pudenda* of glory; but without these organs there would be no victory, no multiplication, no conquest and no fertilization. . . .

Either it must be denied that culture is a blessing to humanity, and dreams of Arcadian simplicity must be accepted, or the right to rule must be accorded to one's nation. In the latter case, the power of the conqueror becomes the supreme moral law to which the vanquished must submit. *Vae victis!*

Lt. Karl A. Kuhn, Instructor in Military History, Charlottenburg, "Die wahren Ursachen des Weltkrieges" (1914), pp. 10, 11.

## II. WAR, LAW AND HUMANITY

### Laws of war "hardly worth mentioning"

War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will. Violence arms itself with the inventions of art and science in order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power. . . .

Clausewitz, "On War," vol. i, p. 2.

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### **"A spirit of benevolence" dangerous**

Philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skillful method of . . . overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as war, **the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst.** . . . He who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigor in its application. The former then dictates the law to the latter. . . .

**To introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity.**

Clausewitz, *ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 2, 3.

### **Errors of the seventeenth century**

Plundering and devastating the enemy's country, which play such an important part with Tartars, with ancient nations, and even in the Middle Ages, were no longer in accordance with the spirit of the age [of Louis XIV]. They were justly looked upon as unnecessary barbarity, which might easily induce reprisals, which did more injury to the enemy's subjects than to the enemy's Government and which therefore produced no effect beyond throwing the nation back many stages in all that relates to peaceful arts and civilization. War, therefore, confined itself more and more, both as regards means and end, to the army itself. . . .



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Although there lay in this an error . . . still, upon the whole, this change had a beneficial effect for the people; only it is not to be denied that it had a tendency to make war still more an affair of the State, and to separate it still more from the interests of the people.

Clausewitz, *ibid.*, vol. iii, pp. 98, 99.

### Reversion of war toward "its absolute perfection"

Since the time of Buonaparte, war, through being first on one side, then again on the other, an affair of the whole nation, has assumed quite a new nature, or rather it has approached much nearer to its real nature, to its absolute perfection. . . . The object of its action was the downfall of the foe; and not until the enemy lay powerless on the ground was it supposed to be possible to stop or to come to any understanding with respect to the mutual objects of the contest.

Thus, therefore, the element of war, freed from all conventional restrictions, broke loose, with all its natural force.

Clausewitz, *ibid.*, vol. iii, pp. 102, 103.

### Military necessity versus the laws of war

Military action must be determined solely in accordance with those conditions which usually prevail in war; in this sense its procedure is completely ruthless. For the individual soldier murder and ill-treatment, robbery and pillage are crimes and offenses whether committed in war or

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in peace. It goes without saying that, in actual warfare, it is hardly ever possible to draw a sharp line between these two courses of action on the part of the fighting forces.

When war supplants peace, **force and passion** make their entry upon the great stage of history, **push aside the artificial structure of peace with its inherited and documented law . . . and become absolutely dominant. . . .**

The effect which any military action may have in overcoming the enemy is of decisive significance in determining its moral value. Here it is quite immaterial whether the anticipated effect can actually be attained; the question is only whether the person responsible for the action was entitled to expect a successful result. Suffering and injury inflicted upon the enemy are the indispensable methods of bending and breaking his will. . . . Military action can be regarded as barbarous and worthy of condemnation only when it is taken without any such purpose or when it is out of all proportion to the purpose to be achieved. **What seems harshness and rigor is really the opposite, if it is adopted to force the adversary to sue for peace. Forbearance and mildness have the effect of cruelty, if they disregard the object of war and delay the conclusion of peace. . . .**

Rights which the war power has to respect can exist only in so far as they are expressly conceded, recognized or maintained by that power. . . . If the war power admits duties, it imposes them upon itself by virtue of its own supremacy; it does

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not regard them as imposed upon itself by any external authority.

It must, of course, be conceded that States may impose upon their war power obligations which limit its action permanently or in particular cases. . . . In this matter, however, States cannot permit themselves to be guided by general principles of law. They must necessarily omit from any rules that they adopt everything that may possibly check or impair the freedom and effectiveness of military action. . . .

Unconditioned freedom of military action in war is an indispensable condition of military success. This is the principle which must be invoked from a military point of view against every effort to fetter action by an international law of war.

Gen. Julius von Hartmann, "Militärische Notwendigkeit und Humanität," in the "Deutsche Rundschau," vol. xiii (1877), pp. 116-117, 122-124, vol. xiv (1878), p. 89.

### War must be conducted more ruthlessly

It would be yielding to voluntary self-deception not to recognize that at the present time war must be conducted much more ruthlessly and much more violently, and that it must come much nearer to affecting the entire population, than has previously been the case. . . .

Utterances of approved legal authorities and precedents found in international settlements can hardly claim full authority in the law of war . . . because military situations necessarily vary and military problems are therefore subjected to per-

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sonal judgment, which can recognize no other law than that of military necessity.

Hartmann, *ibid.*, vol. xiv, pp. 90, 91.

### A wide field for "arbitrary judgment"

A war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against the combatants of the enemy State and the positions they occupy, but it will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total spiritual and material resources of the latter. . . .

Consequently the "argument of war" permits every belligerent State to have recourse to all means which enable it to attain the object of the war. Practice, indeed, has taught the advisability of allowing in one's own interest the introduction of a limitation in the use of certain methods of war and a total renunciation of the use of others. . . . But since the tendency of thought of the last century was dominated essentially by humanitarian considerations which not infrequently degenerated into sentimentality and flabby emotionalism, there have not been wanting attempts to influence the development of the usages of war in a way which was in fundamental contradiction with the nature of war and its object.

By steeping himself in military history an officer will be able to guard himself against excessive humanitarian notions. It will teach him that certain severities are indispensable to war, nay more, that the only true humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them.

What is permissible includes every means of war

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without which the object of the war cannot be obtained; what is reprehensible on the other hand includes every act of violence and destruction which is not demanded by the object of the war.

It follows from these universally valid principles that wide limits are given to the subjective freedom and arbitrary judgment of the commanding officer.

"Kriegsgebrauch," published under the auspices of the German General Staff; translation, "The German War Book," by J. H. Morgan (1915), pp. 52, 54, 55, 64.

### **"Grow hard, warriors!"**

War is not a work of charity, and in the soldier's heart there is no compassion.

The soldier must be hard. Grow hard, warriors!

It is better to let a hundred women and children belonging to the enemy die of hunger than to let a single German soldier suffer.

Gen. von der Goltz, "The Ten Iron Commandments of the German Soldiers"; cited in "Jugés par eux-mêmes," p. 74.

### **Application of the theory**

The country suffers. Lodz is starving. It is deplorable, but it is for the best. War is not carried on sentimentally. The more merciless, the kinder it really is; because it will end so much the quicker. Those war methods which bring peace most promptly are and will always remain the most merciful ones.

Gen. von Hindenburg, cited in "Jugés par eux-mêmes," p. 86.

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## III. CONDUCT OF WAR

### Right and duty of aggression

. . . Under certain circumstances, it is not only the right, but also the moral and political duty of the statesman to bring about a war. . . .

The lessons of history . . . confirm the view that wars which have been deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest results. . . .

**A surprise attack, in order to be justified, must be made in the first place only on the armed forces of the hostile State, not on peaceful inhabitants. A further necessary preliminary condition is that the tension of the political situation brings the possibility or probability of a war clearly before the eyes of both parties, so that an expectation of, and preparations for, war can be assumed. Otherwise the attack becomes a treacherous crime. . . .**

Of course, it can be urged that an attack is just what would produce an unfavorable position for us, since it creates the conditions on which the Franco-Russian alliance would be brought into activity. . . . Let it then be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle the cards that we may be attacked. . . . This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must not hope to bring about this attack by waiting passively. Neither France nor Russia nor England need to attack in order to further their interests.

Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War," pp. 35, 39, 179-180, 244, 290.



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The commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor must be disregarded. . . . We must forestall our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances in ten that we are going to have war.

General von Moltke, Chief of Staff at the outbreak of the World War; Report of Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin (May 6, 1913). "French Yellow Book," doc. no. 3.

We Pan-Germanists are often and easily accused of inciting to war, and we old generals who are represented in the Pan-Germanist Association are especially charged with loving war for its own sake. This is not in the least the case. We do not love war for its own sake. . . . Not in order to test in serious battle the effect of rapid-fire cannon and machine guns . . . have we desired this war, but because we regard it as necessary in view of the wrong line of development which our nation threatened to take, and because we were conscious that the more resolutely and promptly a people which in any event is to be forced to fight for its existence chooses a favorable moment for drawing the sword, the more easily will the war be conducted and the lighter will be the sacrifices. . . .

Gen. Baron von Gebstattel, in "Der Panther," no. 10 (Oct., 1915), pp. 1178-1179.

### Objects of invasion

. . . Invasion . . . is the occupation of the enemy's territory, not with a view to keeping it, but



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in order to levy contributions upon it or to devastate it.

The immediate object here is neither the conquest of the enemy's territory nor the defeat of his armed force, but merely to do him damage in a general way.

Clausewitz, "On War," vol. i, p. 33.

### Terrorizing occupied territories

. . . Terror seems relatively the milder method of holding in subjection masses of people who have been thrown out of the normal and regular conditions of peace. . . . The mass of the people, if in their passionate excitement they oppose force with force, can be restrained from excesses only by using drastic methods of combating any such paroxysm. If individuals suffer for the sake of a warning example, their fate is deeply to be lamented; but for the whole body of people the severity exercised against these individuals operates wholesomely and is a benefit. Wherever popular war breaks out, terrorism becomes a military necessity.

Bluntschli, Jacquemyns and others . . . object to imposing upon towns in which offenses have been committed fines which exceed the amount of damage that has been done; they condemn the burning of villages from which civilians have attacked troops; they refuse their assent to the taking of hostages, whose arrest is to prevent illegal acts on the part of the population. . . . Military

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realism, in listening to such utterances, silently shrugs its shoulders.

Hartmann, in the "Deutsche Rundschau," vol. 13, p. 462.

### Living on the country

The due execution of . . . requisitions is enforced by detachments placed under the orders of the official functionaries, but still more by the fear of responsibility, punishment, and ill-treatment which, in such cases, presses on the whole population like a general weight.

This resource has no limits except those of the exhaustion, impoverishment and devastation of the country; . . . at the same time, even an invader, when his stay is prolonged in his enemy's country, is not usually so barbarous and reckless as to lay upon that country the entire burden of his support. . . . But here naturally arises the question: Shall the war prescribe the system of subsistence, or shall the latter dictate the nature of the war? To this we answer: The system of subsistence will control the war, as far as the other conditions on which it depends permit; but when the latter are encroached upon, the war will react on the subsistence system, and in such case determine the same.

Whatever method of providing subsistence may be chosen, it is but natural that it would be more easily carried out in rich and well-peopled countries, than in the midst of a poor and scanty popu-

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lation. . . . There is infinitely less difficulty in supporting an army in Flanders than in Poland.

Clausewitz, "On War," vol. ii, pp. 97-98, 101, 103.

### Military requisitions: theory versus practice

The system of requisitions goes far beyond the taking of means of subsistence from the country in which war is being conducted; it includes **the entire exploitation of that country** in every way, according to the needs of the operating army as regards facilitating and furthering its action and as regards the permanence and security of its position. . . . This implies that **military necessity can make no distinction between public and private property**, that it is entitled to take what it needs wherever and however it can. . . .

It will be said that the modern law of war does not prohibit requisitions, that it recognizes their legitimacy and demands only that they shall be made in an orderly and regular manner and that, in so far as private rights are violated, compensation shall in principle be accorded to the persons injured. . . . Here again, however, the fundamental principle of all warfare must not be ignored; **the hostile State is not to be spared the suffering and privations of warfare; these are particularly adapted to break its energy and to coerce its will.** . . . The State at war must spare its own means for conducting war and must injure and destroy those of the enemy.

Hartmann, in the "Deutsche Rundschau," vol. xiii, p. 459.

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Article 40 of the Declaration of Brussels requires that the requisitions (being written out) shall bear a direct relation to the capacity and resources of a country, and, indeed, the justification for this condition would be willingly recognized by everyone in theory, but it will scarcely ever be observed in practice. In cases of necessity the needs of the army will alone decide. . . .

“The German War Book,” p. 134.

### Drastic methods of obtaining services

When the law of peace is supplanted by the law of war, imposed upon occupied territory by the war power of the occupying army, it does not abandon its claim to continued authority. All paragraphs of the domestic code threatening punishment for treason remain in force; only extreme duress imposed by the invader can protect the inhabitants, in case these render services to the invading army, against subsequent accountability to their own courts in case of a change in the fortunes of war or after the conclusion of peace. Here the one threat of punishment has to overbid the other; the invading army cannot dispense with the services of the inhabitants; it is obliged to demand them; it needs them at every step. These services can be assured only through fear of severer and more certain punishment than that threatened by the domestic law. In such cases interest and fear must silence patriotism and the sense of right in the hostile population. This is certainly far from

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moral, but it is a military necessity and the inevitable result of military invasion.

Hartmann, in the "Deutsche Rundschau," vol. xiii, p. 464.

The summoning of the inhabitants to supply vehicles and perform works has also been stigmatized as an unjustifiable compulsion upon the inhabitants to participate in "military operations." But it is clear that an officer can never allow such a far-reaching extension of this conception. . . . The argument of war must decide.

Therefore the conduct of the German civil commissioner, Count Renard—so strongly condemned by . . . jurists with French sympathies—who, in order to compel labor for the necessary repair of a bridge, threatened . . . to punish the workers by shooting some of them, was in accordance with the actual laws of war. . . .

"The German War Book," pp. 118-119.

### Civilian "hostages"

A new application of "hostage-right" was practiced by the German Staff in the War of 1870, when it compelled leading citizens from French towns and villages to accompany trains and locomotives, in order to protect the railway communications which were threatened by the people. Since the lives of peaceable inhabitants were, without any fault on their part, thereby exposed to grave danger, every writer outside Germany has stigmatized this measure as contrary to the law of nations and as unjustified toward the inhabitants of the country.

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As against this unfavorable criticism it must be pointed out that this measure, which was also **recognized on the German side as harsh and cruel**, was only resorted to after declarations and instructions of the occupying authorities had proved ineffective, and that in the particular circumstance it was the only method which promised to be effective against the doubtless unauthorized, indeed the criminal, behavior of a fanatical population.

"The German War Book," pp. 119-120.

### Devastation of abandoned enemy territory

The army in retreat has the means of collecting provisions everywhere. . . . All that the country yields will be taken for the benefit of the retreating army first, and will be mostly consumed. **Nothing remains but wasted villages and towns, fields from which the crops have been gathered or which are trampled down, empty wells and muddy brooks.**

Clausewitz, "On War," vol. ii, p. 326.

. . . The offensive of an invading army has failed; it is executing a rapid retreat in order to gain, in the rear, a new position, reënforcements and fresh military supplies. For this army it has become almost a question of life and death to retard the pursuit of the enemy. . . . In the territory abandoned the enemy must encounter obstacles that impede his movements; he must find it practically impossible to secure the necessary supplies for his troops. In such a case the destruction, indeed the devastation of the abandoned territory



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becomes a military duty of self-preservation. . . . To distinguish in such a case between public property and private property would be disastrous.

Hartmann, in the "Deutsche Rundschau," vol. xiii, p. 460.

### IV. WAR FOR CONQUEST

#### Justification of conquest

Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers. From a given moment they require a continual expansion of their frontiers, they require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population. Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must, as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors—that is to say, by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity. . . . In such cases might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. **Might is at once the supreme right**, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war.

Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War," pp. 14-15.

#### "World power or downfall"

It was war that laid the foundations of Prussia's power, that amassed a heritage of glory and honor that can never again be disputed. War forged that Prussia, hard as steel, on which the New Germany could grow up as a mighty European State and a World Power of the future. . . .

We fought the last great wars for our national



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union and our position among the Powers of Europe. . . .

Our next war will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. This will invest it with importance in the world's history. "World power or downfall!" will be our rallying cry. . . .

Bernhardi, *ibid.*, pp. 27, 101, 156.

### Need of strengthening Germany's European position

. . . The German nation, from the standpoint of its importance to civilization, is fully entitled not only to demand a place in the sun, as Prince Bülow used modestly to express it, but to aspire to an adequate share in the sovereignty of the world far beyond the limits of its present sphere of influence. But we can reach this goal only by so amply securing our position in Europe that it can never again be questioned. Then only we need no longer fear that we shall be opposed by stronger opponents whenever we take part in international politics.

Bernhardi, *ibid.*, p. 78.

We can increase our power by joining to Germany those middle European States which are at present independent, forming a Central European Union which . . . should have the purpose of defense and offense for promoting the interests of all its members. This object can in all probability be realized only after a victorious war.

Bernhardi, "Unsere Zukunft" (1912); translation by

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J. Ellis Barker, entitled "Britain as Germany's Vassal" (1914), pp. 207-208.

### **"France must be crushed"**

. . . Our political position would be considerably consolidated if we could finally get rid of the standing danger that France will attack us on a favorable occasion, so soon as we find ourselves involved in complications elsewhere. In one way or another we must square our account with France if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by force of arms. **France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path.**

Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War," pp. 78, 104.

### **A Colonial Empire**

In the most recent partition of the earth, that of Africa, victorious Germany came off badly. France, her defeated opponent, was able to found the second largest Colonial Empire in the world; England appropriated the most important portions; even small and neutral Belgium claimed a comparatively large and valuable share; Germany was forced to be content with some modest strips of territory. . . .

We shall soon, therefore, be faced by the question, whether we wish to surrender the coming generations to foreign countries, as formerly in

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the hour of our decline, or whether we wish to take steps to find them a home in our own German colonies, and so retain them for the Fatherland. There is no possible doubt how this question must be answered. . . .

In the future . . . the importance of Germany will depend on two points: First, how many millions of men in the world speak German? Second, how many of them are politically members of the German Empire?

Bernhardi, *ibid.*, pp. 62, 79, 80.

### Two Teutonic Empires

Two new political organizations should be formed: The Empire of Middle Europe, in connection with Germany, and the Empire of Southeastern Europe in connection with Austria-Hungary. Their external boundaries will be determined by the progress of military events. It may in general be expected that **all districts now occupied by the Central Powers will be incorporated** in these new political organizations. There is really no occasion for restoring countries won by the sword to States that were too weak to be able to protect them.

"Warum war der Weltkrieg eine Notwendigkeit," by "An Officer of Curassiers" (1915), p. 14.

### Annexations in the West

In order to free our western flank permanently from political and military pressure, it would have been quite sufficient if [in 1871] we had created

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conditions which would have made any later attack on the part of France, if not an impossibility, at least an act of suicide, and which would have made defense on the German side mere child's play. . . . Had the crest of the Vosges with the glacis at their feet and the neighboring chain of fortresses come into our hands, had we also drawn the frontier in such a way . . . that it reached the coast of the Channel somewhere south of Boonen (Boulogne)—perhaps following the Somme—then the trump cards of strategic attack would have passed out of the hands of the French into our hands, we should have been something like 100 kilometers nearer Paris on the northeast, and we should have held in pincers, as it were, the whole of eastern and central France. Belgium would also have been protected from any danger of French invasion, and at the same time our industries would have been in possession of important coal and iron districts which in 1871 partially escaped the glance of the scientific experts who were then called into council. . . .

. . . In view of the hostility of England . . . it is indispensable to take away from the English the Belgian glacis and to bring firmly into our control the entire coast with its corresponding hinterland. . . .

Gebsattel, in "Der Panther," no. 10 (Oct., 1915), pp. 1183-1186.

### Annexations in the East

The stiff neck of the Russians must be turned to the East, even if a couple of cervical vertebrae

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should be dislocated in the process. The barrier of alien subjects must be torn out of Russian hands and turned into a rampart of protection for Europe. . . . In carrying out this plan, history would be revised backward for something like 200 years, the Russian Colossus would be thrown back behind the pre-Petrine boundaries, and the Russian political system would receive that imprint and those tasks that really belong to it as a semi-Asiatic State. . . .

Gebattel, *ibid.*, p. 1187.

### Transfer of populations

The seed that was sown after the capture of Lodz will ripen to harvest when peace is made. The power of Middle Europe will be strengthened, that of the Great Russians will be pushed back to the East, whence they came not so very long ago. . . .

Lieut.-Gen. Ludendorff, in the "Deutsche Lodzer Zeitung," Feb. 9, 1916.

The objection will, of course, be raised that any such eastern annexations in connection with the necessary changes in our western boundary would bring into the German Empire millions of people of alien stock. . . . The character of the German Empire as a national state must of course be secured beyond all doubt and against every peril. . . . The way in which this object can be attained is fortunately indicated by a series of historic examples. It is well known that the Romans, the greatest colonizers in the ancient world, resorted

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by preference in difficult cases to transfers of entire populations. A similar procedure was successfully adopted by Charlemagne, and it has been applied in the Balkans and, during the present war, by the Hungarians, who have transplanted tens of thousands of Serbs from Syrmia to more trustworthy parts of the country. . . .

Gebsattel, *loc. cit.*, pp. 1194-1195.

### Militarist propaganda for annexations, 1917

Copenhagen, June 9.—An energetic complaint is addressed by the Socialist newspaper, "Vorwärts" of Berlin, to General von Ludendorff, Lieutenant-General von Stein, the Prussian War Minister, and others in high official places who are facilitating the circulation among the troops, in hospitals, in schools and elsewhere of a Pan-German brochure entitled "Germany's Position Under Good and Bad Peace." The brochure, which belongs among the most extreme outbursts of the annexationist literary fancies, is directed particularly against peace along the lines suggested by Philipp Scheidemann and other Socialists. It contains graphic representations of Germany bowed down under a weight of debt in consequence of a peace without indemnity, and striding forward with renewed vigor and a huge bag of gold in the event of a Pan-German peace.

Among the most striking features of the brochure are maps showing Germany covering or dominating three-quarters of Europe. Not only are the usual sweeping demands for annexations made, but the articles rise to the heights of suggesting the incorporation of France as a federated State of Germany, or, alternatively, the annexation of a corridor connecting Germany with the Mediterranean. Other features in the program thus put

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forward are the expulsion of Great Britain from the Mediterranean, the entry of the Scandinavian countries into a German customs union, extension of the German sphere of influence in Persia and Afghanistan, hoisting the German flag over the Azores, Cape Verde and other islands, and the reduction of Poland, Courland, the Baltic provinces, Finland and the bulk of European Russia to the status of protectorates or annexed territories of Germany.

"Vorwärts" has obtained a publisher's circular disclosing that German Great Headquarters and the War Ministry purchased a large number of these brochures, and that General von Ludendorff and General von Stein distributed 15,000 free copies among the troops.

Dispatch published in the "New York Times," June 10, 1917.



## CHAPTER IX

### UTTERANCES OF COMMANDERS AND SOLDIERS IN THE FIELD

#### I. MILITARY PROCLAMATIONS

##### **Terrorism by indiscriminate punishment\***

In case any of the inhabitants fire upon soldiers of the German army, one-third of the male population will be shot.

Notice posted up in Hasselt, Belgium, Aug. 17, 1914; "Jugés par eux-mêmes," p. 84.

The population of Andenne, after making a display of peaceful intentions toward our troops, attacked them in the most treacherous manner. With my authorization, the General commanding these troops has reduced the town to ashes and has had 110 persons shot.

I bring this fact to the knowledge of the people of Liège in order that they may know what fate to expect should they adopt a similar attitude.

Order to the people of Liège, Belgium, issued Aug. 22, 1914, by Gen. von Bülow; "Scraps of Paper: German Proclamations in Belgium and France" (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1916), pp. 6-7. All the proclamations in-

\*See Appendix, pp. 252-254, arts. 23 (g), 50.

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cluded in this collection are reproduced in photographic facsimiles.

The German Armies have made their entry into France.

Although we will respect the liberty of non-combatants, we have at the same time decided to repress with the greatest energy and without mercy any act of hostility committed against German troops.

**The following will be immediately shot:**

All persons guilty of any act of hostility against a member of the German Army;

All the inhabitants and proprietors of houses in which Frenchmen belonging to the Army, or persons firing on our troops, may be found, unless these facts, or the presence of suspected persons, have been announced to the local Command immediately after the entry of our troops;

Any persons who try to help or who have helped the enemy's forces, or who try to harm or have harmed our Armies in any way whatever, especially by cutting the telephone and telegraph wires;

Anyone who tears down these notices.

**The following will be held responsible for acts of hostility by the population:** The Curé, the Mayor, the Mayor's Assessor, and the Schoolmasters.

All buildings will be burnt in which or from which acts of hostility have been committed. In case of repetition the whole town will be destroyed and burnt.

Proclamation by Gen. Knoerzer to the inhabitants of

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St. Dié, Vosges, France, Aug. 27, 1914; "Scraps of Paper," pp. 16-17.

If . . . the population should dare to take part in any way whatever, openly or secretly, in hostilities against our troops, the most severe punishments will be inflicted on the guilty. . . .

**Any towns or villages**, the inhabitants of which may take part in the fighting against our troops, fire at our baggage or at our supply columns, or lay an ambush for German soldiers, will be set on fire and the guilty persons immediately shot.

**The Civil Authorities alone** are in a position to save the inhabitants from the terrors and scourges of war.

**It is they who will be responsible** for the unavoidable consequences of disregarding this Proclamation.

Proclamation issued by Gen. von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff, at Epernay, Marne, France, Sept. 4, 1914; "Scraps of Paper," pp. 20-21.

### Constructive "espionage"

The persons mentioned below were **condemned by the Tribunal of the Council of War and shot** this same day at the Citadel, namely:

Eugène Jacuet,	Wholesale Wine Merchant,
Ernest Deconinck,	Sub-Lieutenant,
Georges Maertens,	Tradesman,
Sylvère Verhulst,	Workman.

(1) For having concealed the English aviator who alighted at Wattignies on the 11th of last

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March, for having given him shelter and facilitated his passage to France, so that he was able to return to the enemy's lines;

(2) For having maintained and assisted members of the enemy army who, after discarding their uniforms, remained in Lille and its suburbs, and for having enabled them to escape into France.

By proclamation of the Governor, of April 7, 1915, these two cases, **being considered as espionage**, are brought to the knowledge of the public in order that they may serve as a warning.

Notice posted up in Lille, Nord, France, Sept. 22, 1915; "Scraps of Paper," pp. 26-27.

The Tribunal of the Imperial German Council of War sitting in Brussels has pronounced the following sentences:

**Condemned to death for conspiring together to commit treason:**

Edith Cavell,	Teacher, of Brussels.
Philippe Bancq,	Architect, of Brussels.
Jeanne de Belleville,	of Montignies.
Louise Thuiliez,	Professor at Lille.
Louis Severin,	Chemist, of Brussels.
Albert Libiez,	Lawyer, of Mons.

**For the same offense the following have been condemned to fifteen years' hard labor:**

Hermann Capiau,	Engineer, of Wasmes.
Ada Bodart,	of Brussels.
Georges Derveau,	Chemist, of Pâturages.
Mary de Croy,	of Bellignies.

At the same sitting, the War Council condemned seventeen others charged with treason against the

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Imperial Armies to sentences of hard labor and imprisonment varying from two to eight years.

The sentences passed on Bancq and Edith Cavell have already been fully executed.

The Governor-General of Brussels brings these facts to the knowledge of the public that they may serve as a warning.

Proclamation of General von Bissing, Brussels, Oct. 12, 1915; "Scraps of Paper," pp. 30-31. The offenses here described as "treason" were of the same character as those characterized in the preceding Lille notice as "espionage."

### Collection of contributions and indemnities\*

The town of Wavre will be set on fire and destroyed if payment of a contribution of three million francs is not made within a reasonable time, no matter who may be injured; the innocent will suffer with the guilty.

Notice from Gen. von Vieber to the Mayor of Wavre, Belgium, Aug. 2, 1914; "Jugés par eux-mêmes," p. 83.

On account of acts of hostility an indemnity of 650,000 francs is imposed on the Commune of Lunéville. The Mayor is ordered to pay over this sum on September 6th, 1914, at 9 o'clock in the morning, to the representative of the German military authorities. Fifty thousand francs of the payment must be made in specie. All appeals will be considered null and void. No postponement will be granted.

If the Commune does not punctually execute the

\*See Appendix, pp. 252-254, arts. 23 (g), 46, 47, 50, 53, 56.

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order to pay this sum of 650,000 francs, all goods that can be distrained upon will be seized.

In case of non-payment, house-to-house visits will be made and all the inhabitants will be searched. Any person who has deliberately concealed money or tried to withhold goods from seizure by the military authorities, or who attempts to leave the town, will be shot.

The Mayor and the hostages taken by the military authorities will be made responsible for the exact execution of the above orders. The Mayor is ordered to publish these directions to the Commune immediately.

Notice from Gen. von Fasbender, dated Hénaménil, Meurthe et Moselle, France, Sept. 3, 1914; "Scraps of Paper," pp. 10-11.

### Maintaining "tranquillity." Hostages \*

. . . Every street will be occupied by a German patrol who will take ten hostages for the street. If an assault takes place in a street, the ten hostages will be shot.

Proclamation of Gen. von Bülow, Namur, Belgium, Aug. 25, 1914; "Jugés par eux-mêmes," p. 83.

Inhabitants of either sex are strictly forbidden to leave their houses, so far as this is not absolutely necessary for making short rounds, in order to buy provisions or water their cattle. They are absolutely forbidden to leave their houses at night under any circumstances whatever.

\*See Appendix, p. 254, art. 50. See also Gen. von Hartmann and "German War Book," above, pp. 162-163, 166-167.

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Whoever attempts to leave the place, by night or day, upon any pretext whatever, will be shot.

Potatoes can be dug only with the Commandant's consent and under military supervision.

The German troops have orders to carry out these directions strictly, by sentinels and patrols, who are authorized to fire on anyone departing from these directions.

Proclamation issued by the General in command at Lunéville, Meurthe et Moselle, France, end of August, 1914; "Scraps of Paper," pp. 12-13.

The Mayor of the town of Lunéville officially requests the inhabitants, under the sanction of the most severe penalties, to abstain from making any signals to aëroplanes or other details of the French Army.

It would be very imprudent, even out of simple curiosity, to follow too attentively the maneuvers of the aircraft that fly over Lunéville, or to try to communicate with the French outposts.

The immediate steps to enforce this, which would be taken by Colonel Lidl, Commandant of the Communications Dépôt, would consist in the seizure of a considerable number of hostages from the working class as well as from the middle class.

Notice posted up at Lunéville, end of August, 1914. Lunéville was held by the Germans only until Sept. 11, 1914. "Scraps of Paper," pp. 14-15.

In order sufficiently to insure the safety of our troops and the tranquillity of the population of Rheims, the persons mentioned have been seized



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as hostages by the Commander of the German Army. **These hostages will be shot if there is the least disorder.**

Notice to the people of Rheims, by the General in command, Sept. 12, 1914; "Scraps of Paper," pp. 24-25.

On the evening of September 25th, railroad tracks and telegraph wires were destroyed between Lovenjoul and Vertryck. On the morning of September 30th, both the localities designated were held to account for this action and were forced to give up hostages.

In future the inhabitants of places situated near railways and telegraph lines which have been destroyed **will be punished without mercy, whether they are guilty of this destruction or not.** For this purpose, hostages have been taken in all places in the vicinity of railways in danger of similar attacks; and at the first attempt to destroy any railway, telegraph, or telephone line, they will be shot immediately.

Proclamation by Field Marshal von der Goltz, Governor-General of Belgium, dated Brussels, Oct. 5, 1914; "Jugés par eux-mêmes," p. 84; "Scraps of Paper," pp. 28-29. It is stated by the editor of the latter collection that the acts recited by the Governor were not done by Belgian civilians but by Belgian soldiers raiding through the German lines.

By higher order of the supreme command of the army, the names of the persons who will answer with their lives for the safety of the railways in the district of Noyon are herewith published:

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M. Félix,	Mayor.
M. Jouve,	Assistant of the Mayor.
M. Cozette,	Veterinary Surgeon.
M. Brière,	Banker
M. Nancel,	Tradesman.

Order posted at Noyon, France, Oct. 8, 1915, by the Commandant of the town; published in photographic facsimile in the "New York Times," July 22, 1917.

### Instruction in deportment

The population is reminded that, by higher order, all the inhabitants of the male sex, not under twelve years of age, are to salute politely, by uncovering their heads, all officers of the German army, and also all functionaries having the rank of officer.

The Commandant of the town has ascertained that, in spite of these instructions, many men, and chiefly young men, do not salute or do so only in an unsuitable manner.

Consequently, to avoid annoyance (*ennui*) to themselves, the people are requested to conform strictly to the orders of which they are reminded above.

Notice posted at Noyon, May 12, 1916; "New York Times," July 22, 1917.

### Deportation orders

In reading the following orders, it should be remembered that the inhabitants of the portions of France occupied by the German forces were being fed by American relief agents at the cost of the French Government.

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The attitude of England makes the provisioning of the population more and more difficult.

To reduce the misery, the German authorities have recently asked for volunteers to go to work in the country. This offer has not had the success that was expected.

In consequence of this, the inhabitants will be deported by order and removed into the country. Persons deported will be sent to the interior of the occupied territory in France, far behind the front, where they will be employed in agricultural labor, and not in any military work whatever. By this measure they will be given the opportunity of providing better for their subsistence. . . .

I order, therefore, that no one may, until further order, change his place of residence. No one may absent himself from his legally declared residence from 9 p. m. to 6 a. m. (German time), unless he is in possession of a permit in due form.

Inasmuch as this is an irrevocable measure, it is in the interest of the population itself to remain calm and obedient.

Proclamation of the Military Commander, Lille, Nord, France, April, 1916; "Scraps of Paper," pp. 32-33.

All the inhabitants of the house, with the exception of children under fourteen and their mothers, and also of old people, must prepare themselves for transportation in an hour-and-a-half's time.

An officer will definitely decide which persons will be taken to the concentration camps. For this purpose all the inhabitants of the house must as-

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semble in front of it. In case of bad weather, they may remain in the passage. The door of the house must remain open. All appeals will be useless. No inmate of the house, even those who are not to be transported, may leave the house before 8 a. m. (German time).

Each person will have a right to 30 kilograms of luggage; if anyone's luggage exceeds that weight, it will all be rejected without further consideration. Packages must be separately made up for each person and must bear an address legibly written and firmly fixed on. This address must include the surname and the Christian name, and the number of the identity card.

It is absolutely necessary that people should provide themselves in their own interest with eating and drinking utensils, as well as with a woolen blanket, strong shoes and linen. Everyone must carry his identity card on his person. Anyone attempting to evade transportation will be punished without pity.

Notice from the commanding officer of the Communications Dépôt, Lille, April, 1916; "Scraps of Paper," pp. 34-35.

### Order to kill prisoners

Beginning with today, no more prisoners are to be taken. All prisoners are to be put to death. The wounded, whether armed or not, are to be put to death. Prisoners, even where they are organized in large units, are to be put to death. No living man is to remain behind us.

Order of the day, issued by Gen. Stenger, commander

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of the 58th brigade, August 26, 1914; "Jugés par eux-mêmes," p. 85. The editor of this compilation adds: "This order was carried out. Examination of German prisoners belonging to this brigade showed that many wounded Frenchmen had been clubbed to death with rifle-butts."

## II. SOLDIERS' DIARIES AND LETTERS

### Slaughterings and burnings

The inhabitants had fled into the village. It was a fearful sight. Blood sticking on all the buildings; and what faces one saw! all looking hideous. All the dead, sixty in all, were buried at once. Many old women, fathers of families, and one woman about to be delivered—all horrible to behold. Three children had thrown their arms about one another and were dead. Altar thrown down and ceilings fallen in. All because of telephone connections with the enemy. And this morning, September 2, all the inhabitants were driven out; I saw four boys carrying a cradle on two sticks, with a baby five or six months old. Terrible to watch all this. Shot on shot, thunder on thunder! Everything looted. . . . Mother with her two children; one of them had a big gash on his head and an eye out. . . .

Paul Spielman, First Infantry Brigade of the Prussian Guards, Reserve Battalion, First Company; Sept. 1, 1914, in a village near Blamont, Meurthe et Moselle, France. See Joseph Bédier, "Les crimes allemands d'après des temoignages allemands" (1915), pp. 7, 8. In this pamphlet and in a second collection edited by Bédier,

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"Comment l'Allemagne essaie de justifier ses crimes," the original German texts are given, with photographic facsimiles.

September 3. Creil [Oise, France]. Iron bridge blown up. For this, streets set on fire, civilians shot.

Unsigned notebook of a soldier of the 32d Reserve Infantry, Fourth Reserve Corps; Bédier, *ibid.*, p. 9.

Sept. 3, 1914. Frightful carnage (*Blutbad*); village burned down, the French thrown into the burning houses, civilians, everything burned together. Hassemer, Eighth Corps, at Sommepey (Marne, France); Bédier, *ibid.*, p. 10.

Last night, at 10 o'clock, the First Battalion of the 178th entered the burned village north of Dinant [Belgium]. A sad and yet beautiful sight that made one shiver. Right at the entrance lay about fifty citizens, shot for having fired from ambush upon our troops. In the course of the night many more were shot, so that we could count more than two hundred. Women and children, with lamps in their hands, were forced to witness the horrible spectacle. We then ate our rice among the corpses; we had eaten nothing since morning.

Philipp (Kamenz, Saxony), 178th Regiment, First Battalion, First Company; Bédier, *ibid.*, p. 12.

Langeviller [August] 22. Village destroyed by the 11th Pioneers. Three women hanged to trees. [A week later.] So we have destroyed eight houses



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with their inmates. Out of one house alone, two men with their wives and an eighteen-year-old girl were bayoneted. The girl made me feel badly, she gave such an innocent look; but nothing could be done against the excited crowd, for at such times they are not men but beasts.

Unsigned notebook of a soldier, pp. 1, 10; Bédier, *ibid.*, pp. 15, 17.

Orchies [Nord, France.] All the civilians were arrested. A woman was shot because she did not stop at the cry "Halt!" but tried to run away. After this, burning of the whole village.

Unsigned notebook of a soldier; Bédier, *ibid.*, p. 18.

Aug. 25 [in Belgium]. From the town 300 were shot. Those who survived the volley were forced to act as grave-diggers. The women were a sight; but there is no other way. In our march of pursuit to Wilot things went better; the inhabitants who wished to leave were permitted to go where they pleased. But those who fired were shot. As we marched out of Owele there were rifle shots; and then there was fire—women and everything.

Reservist Schlauter, Third Battery, Fourth Field Artillery of the Guard; Bédier, *ibid.*, p. 19.

Parie\* the first village burned; then there was no stopping (*dann ging's los*); one village after the other in flames. We rode on our wheels . . . till we reached a ditch . . . where we ate cherries.

Sebastian Reissaupt, Third Bavarian Infantry, First Bavarian Corps; Bédier, *ibid.*, p. 22.

\*Parux, Meurthe et Moselle, France.



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(Incendiary) bombs thrown into the houses. In the evening military chorus: "*Nun danket alle Gott!*"

Moritz Grosse, 177th Infantry, describing the sacking of Dinant, Belgium; Bédier, *ibid.*, p. 26.

### Civilians as fire screens

We have arrested three more civilians, and a good idea occurs to me. They are set on chairs and made to understand that they are to sit in the middle of the street. Wringing of hands and supplications on the one side, a few blows with rifle-butts on the other. Little by little one becomes frightfully hardened. Finally they are seated outside, in the street. How many prayers they ejaculated, I do not know; but all the time their hands were folded convulsively. However sorry I am for them, the device helps us, and at once. The firing on our flank from the houses ceases instantly; we can now occupy the opposite houses and are thus masters of the main street. Now, whoever shows himself in the main street is shot down. Meanwhile, the artillery has also worked briskly, and when, towards seven in the evening, the brigade advances to storm the city and rescue us, I am able to report: "St. Dié is clear of enemies."

As I heard later, the regiment of reserves which forced its way into St.-Dié further north had quite similar experiences. Their four civilians, whom they had likewise made to sit in the street, were, however, shot by the French. I myself saw them lying in the middle of the street, near the hospital.

A. Eberlein, Bavarian first lieutenant in "Münchener

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Neueste Nachrichten," Oct. 7, 1914; Bédier, *ibid.*, pp. 20, 21.

### "A day of honor for our regiment"

Under this title appeared, in the "Jauersches Tageblatt" (Silesia), Oct. 18, 1914, an article contributed by Under-Officer Klemt, First Company, 154th Infantry Regiment. It tells of a fight in which his regiment took part, Sept. 24, 1914. After leaving Hannonville in the morning, supported in its advance by Austrian batteries, the regiment was suddenly met by artillery and infantry fire. It suffered heavy losses; but the enemy was invisible. At last, the writer says, it was seen that the bullets came from trees into which French soldiers had climbed.

. . . They are shot down from the trees like squirrels, and below they are warmly greeted with rifle-buttocks and side-arms; they need no surgeons; we are no longer fighting honorable enemies, but treacherous bandits. Through a clearing on the jump—there, see! they are hiding in the hedge; up and at them! **No quarter is given.** We shoot standing, with free hands; at the most a few fire kneeling; there is no thought of cover. We come to a hollow where dead and wounded red-breeches are lying about in heaps; **the wounded are hammered or stabbed**, because we know that these scoundrels will shoot us from behind as soon as we pass them. There lies stretched out, face to the ground, a Frenchman, but he is only shamming dead. The kick of a sturdy musketeer tells him that we are there. Turning over, he calls for quarter, but he is told that he needs a dose of French medicine and is pinned

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to the earth. A weird noise near me comes from blows that a soldier of the 154th is raining upon the bald head of a Frenchman with a clubbed rifle. Very wisely he has appropriated for this piece of work the Frenchman's gun, for fear of breaking his own. **Very soft-hearted men put the French wounded out of their misery with bullets; the others hew and stab whenever they can.** Our opponents fought bravely; we had choice troops before us; they let us come within thirty, within ten yards—but then of course it was too late. Quantities of abandoned knapsacks and weapons give proof of their desire to flee; but at the sight of the field-gray “monsters” terror lamed their feet and in the middle of the narrow footway the German bullets called a halt. At the entrance of their leafy shelter huts they lie, whining for mercy; but whether they are slightly or mortally wounded, our brave musketeers save the Fatherland the costly care of numerous enemies. . . .

The writer then reports that his Royal Highness Prince Oscar of Prussia, learning of the feats performed by the 154th and the regiment of grenadiers brigaded with it, declared them to be worthy of the name of “King's Brigade.” The narrative of the fight ends with these words:

With a thankful prayer on our lips, we fell asleep, awaiting the coming day.

Having added a few verses entitled “Heimkehr vom Kampf,” Under Officer Klemt obtains the following attestation: “Above statements confirmed. De Niem, Lieutenant in command of the company.” Bédier, *ibid.*, pp. 31 *et seq.*

## UTTERANCES OF SOLDIERS

### "Something in what is said about German barbarians"

Courcy, north of Rheims, Oct. 22. We are lying here on the lawn, in the garden of the owner of the glass-factory, whose house, at present, harbors our regimental staff in its cellar. The village and the workingmen's houses here are thoroughly looted and ruined. Atrocious! After all, there is something in what is said about German barbarians.

Z—, 78th Infantry Regiment (East Frisian), Tenth Corps; Bédier, "Comment l'Allemagne essaie de justifier ses crimes," p. 25.

### More slaughters and burnings

(Spontin, Belgium, Aug. 23.) A company from the 107th and one from the 133d were ordered back to search the village, to arrest the inhabitants and to burn the houses. On the right-hand side of the entrance to the village lay two young girls, one dead, one seriously wounded. The priest also had been shot in front of the railroad station. Thirty men were shot according to martial law, and fifty others taken prisoners.

Max Thomas, 107th (Eighth Saxon) Infantry Regiment, 19th Army Corps; Bédier, *ibid.*, p. 35.

(August 12; in Belgium.) One gets some idea of the fury of the soldiers, when one sees the destroyed villages. Not a single house left whole! Everything eatable requisitioned by individual soldiers. Many heaps of human beings to be seen,

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executed by martial law! Little pigs were running around looking for their mothers. Dogs lay chained, and had nothing to eat or drink, and over them the houses were burning.

Hand in hand with the just wrath of our soldiers goes also pure vandalism. In wholly deserted villages they set the red cock on the roofs without rhyme or reason. I pity the inhabitants. Even if they use unfair weapons, after all they are only defending their country. . . .

Paul Glode, Ninth Pioneer Battalion, Ninth Corps; Bédier, *ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

### No quarter to Turcos nor to English

No quarter is to be given to wounded Turcos.

Vice-Feldwebel Bruchmann, 144th Infantry Regiment, 16th corps; Bédier, *ibid.*, p. 44.

The captain called us about him and said: "In the fort that is to be taken there are, in all probability, Englishmen. I do not wish to see a single English prisoner in the hands of the company."

A general shout of assent was the response.

Under-Officer Götsche, 85th Infantry Regiment, Ninth Army Corps; Bédier, *ibid.*, p. 44.

### Orders to kill wounded enemies

There they were lying in heaps, eight or ten wounded or dead, one on top of the other. Those who were able to walk were made prisoners and taken along; those who were seriously wounded, who had a shot in the head or in the lungs, etc. . . .

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and were not able to get up, received more bullets to finish them. These were our orders.

Reservist Fahlenstein, 34th Fusileers, Second Army Corps; Bédier, *ibid.*, p. 45.

### Priests and women

It is for me a mad joy when we can revenge ourselves on these rascally Belgian and French priests!

Reservist Richard Gerhold; cited by T. de Wyzewa in "Revue des deux Mondes," May 3, 1915.

I am sending you a bracelet made out of a piece of a shell. This will be a fine souvenir of a German warrior, who has gone through the whole campaign and has killed heaps of Frenchmen. I have also bayoneted a good number of women. During the battle of Budonwiller, I did away with four women and seven young girls in five minutes. The captain had told me to shoot these French sows, but I preferred to run my bayonet through them.

Letter dated Peronne, March 16, 1915, from a Bavarian soldier, Johann Wenger, to his betrothed; cited by T. de Wyzewa, *ibid.*

### Devastation

To give you a picture of our situation I will go back in my mind a few days to Trescault. It is 8 p. m. Our company has just returned from trench digging. A beautiful scene is presented to our eyes. A little later there suddenly arise flames and Trescault is doomed to destruction. Every-

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where explosions are heard and the terrific heat reaches us. Then we, too, are seized with the madness of destruction and set fire to everything. All Trescault is in flames, and a marvelous spectacle, one which I shall never forget, meets the eye.

On a little hill stands a wonderful castle, spared by us till the last moment because we are quartered there. But the castle must go, too, and quickly the flames envelop it. Where before were peaceful people and a flourishing village is now a heap of ruins. Far indeed did the destructive fury of the 230th extend, and **we can scarcely be looked upon as soldiers.** When we are up at the front, it is as if **we were the greatest criminals.** Thus it is we do our work of destruction in France. Picture to yourself how we live now, not like men, but like beasts. Far and wide there are no trenches, only bare fields and stumps of trees growing where once man plowed his field and worked for wife and child. That is our retirement and our part in it. My mind cannot dispel the thought that I shall not return.

Extract from a letter found on a captured German soldier, cited by Philip Gibbs in a dispatch published in the "New York Times," April 18, 1917.



## CHAPTER X

### UTTERANCES REGARDING AMERICA

#### I. LATIN AMERICA

##### **German emigrants and German exports**

What the United States intends to prevent—and what perhaps it will hinder even by the use of force, up to a certain point—is the acquisition of territory in America by a European Power, were it only in the southern half of the hemisphere. For that very reason it will be much more difficult for the United States to prevent the establishment between South America and Germany of peaceful economic relations, entirely divested of any political character.

In order to demonstrate how we shall be able to undertake an enterprise worth while, despite our inability to found colonies by immigration, let us stress a fact unshakable in theory and in practice. Such territories, whether they belong to us politically or are foreign soil, can be financially valuable to us only if they are inhabited by a population able and willing to buy from us. In other words, everything depends upon whether the country itself has the ability to produce, and to produce to an extent worth while. So much postulated, the

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subsequent progress of the development which we have in mind to create in South America is not difficult to outline. We must entirely sever political connection between our emigrants in Brazil and in the neighboring southern countries and the German Empire. From the instant they set foot upon the soil of the New World, it is absolutely necessary that they should feel, without reservation, as Brazilians, Argentinians, etc. . . .

. . . The object toward which our efforts must tend is to establish particularly close economic relations between the Fatherland and our emigrants in the New World—relations of such sort that the markets of the metropolis shall receive preference in the exports of its expatriated citizens, while they provide themselves with all necessities from the manufactured goods of the Fatherland. Naturally, relations of this nature can have solidarity and permanence and be really profitable to both parties only if sentiment is eliminated from such reciprocal relations, and if on both sides the economic advantage becomes essentially the preponderant point of view. We should not expect to buy goods from German Brazilians and from German Americans, any more than they should expect to buy from us, solely on the ground that a national affinity exists between us, and that this entails a semblance of moral obligation; for this national relationship will furnish only a material and positive basis for the establishment of practical relations, such as exist in economic matters between England and her self-governing colonies. Because these emigrants are Germans who speak German, who will have Ger-

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man tastes and economic needs, because the basis of their character is German, trade with us will naturally possess an attraction for them, despite the attempts which the English and the Americans may make to win it. We shall have to commit on our side grave faults indeed, if this natural advantage does not directly transform itself into an economic superiority as compared with non-German efforts. Today, however (1911), our activity is far from adequate for developing trade with the German colonies which exist in South America. . . .

What can and what should we do to spread germs of economic development so full of promise and to render them as useful to the Fatherland as to the Germans of Brazil? The first condition we have already indicated: **foster German emigration to southern Brazil.** Every German emigrant, whether born in the country or in the city, whether an artisan or of any other class, who succeeds in obtaining across the seas ownership of a piece of land and in clearing the soil, represents after a certain number of years a capacity for absorbing goods that is vastly greater than he ever possessed in the home country, where he led a relatively simple life in a very restricted environment. This manifold increase of his opportunities for consumption and of his capacity for the absorption of the products of European manufacture can and should be utilized for the economic life of Germany. . . .

Beyond doubt this demands collaboration on a wide and methodical scale between the Empire, the German States, public opinion and the emigration

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societies. We must not lose sight of the fact that despite all our sincerity and loyalty—which we are disposed to maintain and which, from the point of view of foreign politics, we must not fail to observe—the distrust and dislike which appear, consciously or unconsciously, in particular among the North Americans and the English, will sow difficulties in the way of the realization of such a scheme. But difficulties must not cause German policy to recoil in fright, but to surge forward and surmount them.

Paul Rohrbach, "Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern" (1911), pp. 394-396, 400-401.

### How to extend German influence in Brazil

I suggest the following program of action for the immediate development of German interests in Brazil. So far as northern Brazil is concerned, the extension of German steamship traffic on the Amazon, with home ports at Para and Manaos, and the creation of branch German banks at Para. For central Brazil, the gradual building of steamships sufficiently large and swift to play a more considerable part in the passenger traffic between Europe and Brazil, and a still more considerable participation of German capital in industrial enterprises and in the construction of railroads. Above all, representation of Germany in a syndicate which is to take control of the administration of the central railroads. For southern Brazil, the support of the enterprises of the Hanseatic Colonial Society

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as well as of the Colonial Society of the Northwest District of Rio Grande.

Richard Krauel, "Deutsche Interessen in Brasilien" (1907), p. 30.

### German penetration of Rio Grande do Sul

Rio Grande do Sul (the German section of southern Brazil) is today perhaps the best administered State in South America. **It is no comic-opera State governed by brigands;** it is a country where the development of economic life and civilization is, to be sure, only in its beginnings, but it will make unexpected progress so soon as European capital, instead of lingering fearfully on the sill, shall enter in at the door with the consciousness of a definite object to attain. Certainly the moment will come. That is why we must understand what we must do, not only to maintain our position in the Rio Grande but also to extend it. That is possible only by the importation of capital and labor. . . . Rio Grande do Sul must become a domain for German capital and German emigrants. We have the historical right as well as the power, and no one can suspect us of ulterior motives in this State so long as we do not allow ourselves to entertain political aspirations.

Alfred Funke, "Die Besiedlung des östlichen Süd-Amerika" (1903), p. 64.

### German culture in Latin America

"What is to be done?" said Jupiter. "The world is already staked out," repeats the short-sighted

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German Philistine even today; but he who has seen with his own eyes what German skill, German perseverance and the spirit of German enterprise have done in **an almost abandoned corner of the world**, feels his heart beat at the thought that this work of colonization may be lost to our nationality after a lapse of fifty years, that this island of German culture, like many another, may be submerged by the waves of a foreign nationality. . . .

These considerations and reflections throw into perspective the lofty and splendid mission of German culture in Spanish and Portuguese America, the grandiose moral conquests which the Germans are about to make in these splendid countries, if they will only comprehend their mission. While the English and the Yankees, because of their cold and reserved character, are in general unsympathetic with the natives, while the French even in the 70's were the guides and undoubted models of these peoples in the path which led toward superior culture—a position which, by the way, they have in the main lost because of their lack of numerical strength and the general corruption into which they have repeatedly fallen—the **Germans have been called, by reason of their natural qualities and their achievements, to become the preceptors and guides of these nations in intellectual, economic and political affairs.**

The sad political and financial conditions which have brought such extremely rich countries to ruin and misery, through revolution, through incompetent economic methods, through villainy and corruption, proclaim imperiously the need of a remedy



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in the honesty and intelligence of the Germans, which must make itself felt first of all in the administration of the cities, then in that of the provinces, and lastly in the State at large. In the domain of education and of science the Germans can play through their professors and scientists, as in Chili, an extraordinary and suggestive part, and contribute a very large share to the progress, quiet, assured and permanent, which these people will make. . . .

If the Germans do not succeed in this mission, financial and political bankruptcy will sooner or later cause the countries of Spanish and Portuguese America to be entirely exploited and dominated by the United States. Since the seizure of Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines, the fear of such an eventuality has penetrated all these countries and renders them less and less likely to object to a moral conquest by the Germans.

Johannes Unold, "Das Deutschtum in Chili," pp. 4, 67, *et seq.*

### Bright German spots in a dark picture

The German settlements in southern Brazil and in Uruguay are the only bright spots in the dark picture of South American civilization. Five hundred thousand Germans live in these regions; and it is to be hoped that, in the reorganization of South American relations, when the Indian-Latin half-breeds have completely ruined themselves, the immense basin of La Plata, with its adjoining western, eastern and southern coasts, will fall into the



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hands of the German people. The Germans who have settled in the forests of southern Brazil all have, like the Boers of South Africa, from twelve to fifteen children on the average, so that the country's safety is assured by this natural increase. It is really marvelous that the German nation should not long ago have decided to take possession of this territory.

Otto Richard Tannenberg, "Grossdeutschland" (1911), pp. 228-229.

### German rule will be a blessing

. . . For the people of the Republics that have divided the Spanish and Portuguese inheritance it will be a blessing to come under German authority.

They will soon become reconciled to German rule, and will be glad to share in the glory of the German name throughout the world.

Tannenberg, *ibid.*, p. 230.

### Initial control through treaties

A foresighted policy alone can, through the unscrupulous exertion of every means at its command, conclude treaties with the foreign States which need the influx of our emigrants, and which will consequently end by yielding to the conditions our Government may judge necessary to impose upon them. The Republics of Argentine and Brazil and, indeed, probably every one of the tatterdemalion Republics of South America, would listen



**Map of Latin America, 1950**

Tannenberg, "Grossdeutschland" (1911), p. 255. It will be noted that the United States holds all Central America and the northern part of South America. Great Britain holds the valley of the Amazon and all the central districts from ocean to ocean. The Pan-Germanists are content to take those regions only that lie within the temperate climatic zone, in the southern third of South America.

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to reason and give way, willingly or unwillingly.

Lange, "Reines Deutschtum," p. 208.

### Teutonization of Latin America

Not only North America, but all America must be a bulwark of Teutonic culture, perhaps the mightiest bulwark of the Teutonic races. South America must also and may easily become a home of new, free Teutonic-Teutonoid races. Teutonic States! **Resettlement of the territory by people of Teutonic stock; removal of the non-Teutonic inhabitants to reservations, or, best, of all, to Africa.** . . . Retention of Teutonoid-Latins in South America, in so far as they are physically, mentally and morally sound, and are declared available by a commission of anthropologists, physicians, artists and teachers.

Klaus Wagner, "Krieg," pp. 165-166.

### Germans take the Monroe Doctrine too seriously

This and the two following extracts, as will be noted, are utterances subsequent to the outbreak of the World War.

A portion of our public opinion is much too cowardly as regards America. **The fact that the United States asserts the Monroe Doctrine and practically warns us Europeans out of America does not mean that we must submit to this doctrine.** If for the most part we do so, this is due to European disunity, which makes it possible for the United States to fish in muddy water. . . . As I have explained

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before, there can be no question for us of political conquests in America, but there certainly is a question of economic and cultural activity.

Alfred Hettner, "Die Ziele unserer Weltpolitik," in series entitled "Der deutsche Krieg," no. 64 (1915), p. 25.

### A disclaimer and a confession

The war is not yet decided, but we know that it must end with our victory. . . . We also know, however, that the number of our enemies is great enough, and will remain great enough even after the war, to induce us to avoid everything that would unnecessarily arouse new enemies against us. And no necessity forces us to direct our purposes of conquest toward America, either toward the North or toward the South. . . .

. . . We have not the least sympathy with political Utopias, the worst of which would be the notion of an expedition of conquest against South and North America. In order to remove from the start any question as to the credibility of our assurances, we admit that at times in our country nationalistic covetousness has extended itself to South America. . . .

Karl Mehrmann, "Grossdeutschland" (1915), p. 7.

### Hopes deferred, not abandoned

It is difficult to judge the future. Undoubtedly the time for exclusive German colonization in South

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America has gone by, for most of the States now follow the North American plan of endeavoring to assimilate immigrants as quickly as possible with the generalized national type and to induce them to abandon their original language and characteristics.

The writer goes on to urge that no obstacle be opposed to emigration from Germany to South America and that political as well as economic support be given to the Germans already there. He still believes that Latin America offers great opportunities to German enterprise.

South America . . . much more than North America, will be for us in the twentieth century the land of economic future and unlimited possibilities.

Dr. Siegfried Benignus, cited in cable dispatch from Berlin via London to the "New York Times," dated June 8, 1917.

## II. THE UNITED STATES

### The outlook for American civilization

It is hardly conceivable that in the former British colonies in America any civilization can be produced that will stand morally [*sic!*] on the same plane with the old civilization of Europe. Up to the present time this hope of Washington has remained unfulfilled.

Treitschke, "Politik," vol. i, p. 121.

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### Irish rabbits

The English, who are an aristocratic race, increase indeed with some rapidity, but much more slowly than the Irish. When in the middle of the nineteenth century two million people emigrated from Ireland, the situation was improved for a short time only; the Irish increased again like rabbits and after a few years had reached again their former numerical strength. In North America, too, there is an immense increase of the Irish element. A less noble race, forcing its way into a finer civilization and constantly gaining more ground by mere physical power—this is an uncanny phenomenon.

Treitschke, *ibid.*, vol. i, p. 229.

### Lost Germans

The assertion that the emigration of Germans to America is an advantage for us is simple folly. What has Germany gained by the fact that thousands of its best sons who were unable to gain their living at home have turned their backs upon the Fatherland? For it they are lost forever. If perhaps an emigrant himself remains attached to his old home by some natural ties, his children as a rule cease to be Germans; at all events, this is true of his grandchildren; for the German learns all too easily to deny his Fatherland. . . . Almost one-third of the population of North America is of German origin [*sic!*]. What precious forces we have lost and are daily losing through this emi-

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gration, without receiving the slightest compensation.

Treitschke, *ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 123-124.

### Uses of the German and Irish elements

The further duty of supporting the Germans in foreign countries in their struggle for existence, and of thus keeping them loyal to their nationality, is one from which, in our direct interests, we cannot withdraw. The isolated groups of Germans abroad greatly benefit our trade, since by preference they obtain their goods from Germany; but they may also be useful to us politically, as we discover in America. The American-Germans have formed a political alliance with the Irish, and thus united, constitute a power in the State, with which the Government must reckon. . . .

For a time it seemed as if the Anglo-American negotiations about arbitration courts would definitely end in an alliance against Germany. There has, at any rate, been a great and widespread agitation against us in the United States. The Americans of German and Irish stock resolutely opposed it, and it is reasonable to assume that the anti-German movement in the United States was a passing phase, with no real foundation in the nature of things.

Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War," pp. 75, 98.

### A plan to invade the United States (1901)

Of late years we Germans have had cause for political irritation with the United States, due large-



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ly to commercial reasons. Up to now differences have been for the most part settled through our giving way. But a policy of surrender must have its limits.

The question for us to consider is what plans must eventually be developed to put a stop to the overreachings by the United States which are detrimental to our interests. **It is by armed action that we must ultimately enforce our will upon that country.**

To achieve that purpose, our prime instrument in this case is our Navy. The German Fleet would have every prospect of victoriously encountering the naval forces of the United States, as those forces are divided into two sections separated by two oceans (Atlantic and Pacific), which are a great distance apart. But the defeat of her fleet would not compel the United States to sue for immediate peace, because of the vastness of her territory and the immensity of her resources. Indeed, even further successes at sea would not force America to yield, partly because her commercial ports are so well fortified that we could not capture them without heavy losses, and partly because it would be impossible for our naval forces to blockade them all simultaneously.

We have to reckon on the possibility that the American fleet would not at first risk a battle, but would conceal itself in fortified ports and wait there for some favorable opportunity to snatch a partial success.

It is evident, therefore, that naval operations alone would not suffice to bring about the result

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which we desire. What is needed is combined action by sea and land. Owing to the vast area of the United States it would be out of the question for an army to invade the interior with a view to the conquest of the country. But there is good reason to expect that military operations on the Atlantic coast would prove to be a victorious enterprise. Moreover, the cutting off of the main arteries through which exports from the entire country pass would create such a depressed state of affairs that the Government would be willing to offer us fair conditions of peace.

If a German squadron were accompanied by a fleet of transports it may be presumed that, once a landing had begun, it would only take four weeks for a German army to begin their campaign on American soil. Within such a short period of time there is no doubt that the United States would be unable to place in the field forces as large as our invading army.

At the present time (1901) the regular American Army numbers 65,000 men, of whom not more than 30,000 would be actually available for home defense. Again, of these troops at least 10,000 would be required to defend the Indian territories and garrison the forts on the coast. So there would remain but 20,000 regular troops to take the field against the invaders.

In addition to the regular forces, there are about 100,000 militia, but the greater part of them declined to obey the call to arms in the last war. Further, this militia is badly armed. A proportion of them still carry muzzle-loaders, and as for drill-

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ing, that is even worse than their lack of proper equipment.

Even if the possibility of a surprise invasion is excluded from consideration, owing to the length of time which the transport of an invading army would take, stress must be laid on various sources of American unpreparedness. One is the absence of regular preparation in peace time for mobilization; another is the inexperience of the American General Staff; a third is the weakness of the Regular Army. These factors in the situation would necessarily accelerate German victory.

The invading army would have to be of considerable size, as it would be necessary to provide for the lengthy occupation of a large area of American territory, to defend our lines of communication, and to engage in a successful offensive against all the forces which the Americans could bring up against us. Moreover, such operations might be of a protracted nature.

Such a campaign would be the more difficult to conduct owing to the long double journey which our fleet of transports would have to make in order to convey to America the requisite number of troops from so far away a base as Germany.

Indeed it is questionable whether it would be wise to occupy for any prolonged period any large portion of American territory. The mere fact of one or two of their States being invaded would not induce the Americans to ask for peace. They would, however, find themselves obliged to do so owing to the enormous material loss which would be inflicted upon the entire country by our capturing

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several of the large Atlantic seaport towns, at which converge the threads of the whole wealth of the nation.

In these circumstances, our plan would be to effect a series of landings of troops in close co-operation with our Navy. We should, within a short space of time, be in a position to seize several wealthy cities. Such towns would suffer heavily through the cutting off of their sources of supply, by the destruction of all buildings used for the service of the State or for the purposes of defense or commerce. We should capture all war and transportation material found in them, and **they would, in addition, be penalized by our levying upon them heavy war contributions.**

Against such operations on our part the Americans would find defense a difficult task, notwithstanding that their splendid railway system would enable them rapidly to concentrate troops at specific points on the coast. We, however, could count on the success of our invading army, because we should engage in landing feints to deceive the Americans and waste their time on defending such points till at last they managed to discover our actual points of disembarkation. Our troops, on landing, could either take the offensive against the enemy, or avoid being attacked by returning to the ships with a view to effecting a landing elsewhere on the coast.

Stress should be laid on the fact that Germany is the only Great Power which single-handed would be able to attack the United States. It is true that

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England could successfully land an invading army, but she would not be in a position to defend Canada, which would accordingly bear the brunt of American revenge for failure in resisting the British at sea. But apart from England no Great Power except Germany has at her disposal a sufficiently large number of transports to render possible the invasion of the United States.

Baron Franz von Edelsheim, of the Second Uhlan Regiment of the Prussian Guard, "Oversea Operations: A Study" (Berlin, 1901). This pamphlet was published to promote military study in the Army and Navy Club of Berlin. The foregoing translation is taken from the London "Times" (February 5, 1917).

### A claim for indemnity (1915)

. . . Naturally the war hits our oversea export hardest. As long as the war lasts, this export is almost entirely suspended. Even after the war it will suffer serious depression. In the countries of South and Central America particularly we shall have to reckon . . . upon a decrease, partly because of the diminished purchasing power of these countries and partly because of the more active Pan-American efforts of the United States; and by the right of victory and on grounds of justice we have a claim for indemnity (*Entschädigung*) at the cost of England and of the United States.

. . . The longer the war lasts, the more it increases our own war costs and diminishes the solvency of our enemies—the less hopeful becomes our

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prospect of obtaining full compensation for all the damages we have suffered. . . . Differential customs rates, which we as victors can put into force on the new territorial frontiers won from our enemies, give us the possibility of obtaining at least partial compensation.

Prof. Hermann Schumacher, "Meistbegünstigungen und Zollunterscheidung" (1915), pp. 43, 45.

### Proposed coalition against the United States

On the 1st of February we intend to begin unrestricted submarine warfare. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep the United States of America neutral.

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance with Mexico on the following basis: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above, in the greatest confidence, as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and to suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan. At the same time he should offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine

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warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.

Zimmermann, German Imperial Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Dispatch to the German Minister in Mexico, January 19, 1917.



## CHAPTER XI

### REACTIONS AND PROTESTS

#### I. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PROTESTS AND WARNINGS

##### **Danger in victory**

. . . Defeat in war is rather advantageous than disadvantageous to a people in our unfree condition. Victories make a government that stands opposed to a people arrogant and exacting. Defeats compel them to approach the people and to win their sympathy. This is taught in the case of Prussia by the war of 1806-07, in the case of Austria by the war of 1866, in the case of France by the war of 1870, and by the defeat of Russia in the war with Japan in 1904.

. . . If Prussia had been defeated in 1866, Bismarck's ministry and the rule of the aristocracy, which weighs like a nightmare upon Germany to this day, would have been swept away.

August Bebel, "Memoirs" (1910), vol. i, p. 160; cited by W. E. Walling, in the New York "Tribune," May 17, 1917.

##### **"This is not a defensive war"**

At the outbreak of the War, on August 4, 1914, the majority of the German Socialists in the Reichstag ac-

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cepted the theory of the Government that the conflict had been forced upon Germany. Fourteen representatives of the Socialist party, however, rejected this view and voted against the war credits demanded by the Government. On December 2, the number of dissenting Socialists had increased to seventeen; but on this occasion Karl Liebknecht alone voted against additional credits. He filed a formal written protest; the President of the Reichstag refused to permit it to be read; and it was not published in any German newspaper except "Vorwärts," and even there only in abbreviated form. A translation of the "Vorwärts" text is to be found in Walling, "The Socialists and the War" (Henry Holt and Co., 1915). That text contains the sentence: "This is not a defensive war." The opening and closing paragraphs of the protest, cited below, are given in "Jugés par eux-mêmes," pp. 50-51, citing the Swiss "Berner Tagwacht." The closing paragraph is cited, the original text, in Grumbach, "Das annexionistische Deutschland," p. 432.

This war, which none of the peoples affected wanted, was not declared in the interests of the Germans or of any other people. It is an imperialist war, a war for the political domination of important territories in which industrial and banking capital may be placed and made productive. From the viewpoint of the race of armaments, it is a preventive war, provoked conjointly by the war parties of Germany and Austria in the obscurity of semi-absolutism and of secret diplomacy. . . .

I agree to the credits in so far as they are asked for undertakings tending to relieve the existing suffering, even though I regard them as notoriously inadequate. I agree in like manner to everything that is done to lessen the hard lot of our brothers

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on the battlefield, to relieve the wounded and sick for whom I feel the most ardent sympathy. Nothing that can be asked for along these lines will seem too much to me.

Protesting against the war, against those who are responsible for and those who promoted it, against the capitalistic policy that conjured it up and against the capitalistic ends which it is pursuing, against the plans of annexation, against the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and of Luxemburg, against military dictatorship, against the complete forgetfulness of social and political duties of which the Government and the ruling classes are still guilty—I oppose the grant of the credits asked for.

### A war for world dominion

The longer the war lasts, the more completely its aims are unmasked. It appears naked, in all its ugliness, as a war for capitalistic conquest and world dominion.

Klara Zetkin in "Die Gleichheit," Nov. 27, 1914. This issue was seized by the police.

### "An imperialistic war of conquest"

It has become increasingly clear that the war is not one for the defense of our national integrity. More and more distinctly is revealed its character as an imperialist war of conquest. More and more unequivocally are policies of annexation professed. . . . In the session of the Reichstag on May 28 (1915) the Imperial Chancellor undis-

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guisedly proclaimed a war of conquest; and in the program of this war, as our party knew, was included the open annexation of Russian and French territories and the concealed annexation of Belgium under the label of compulsory economic association. . . .

Open letter, signed by several hundred Social Democratic leaders and sent June 9, 1915, to the President of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and to the President of the Social Democratic faction in the Reichstag. This open letter was secretly distributed all over Germany, in spite of the stringent measures taken by the police to prevent its circulation. See Grumbach, pp. 443-444.

### Obligations of honor as regards Belgium

While . . . any forcible annexation of Belgian territory and any attack upon the independence of Belgium by any State whatever is to be resolutely resisted, in the case of Germany there are additional considerations, in that our country, without any occasion being afforded by any act of Belgium, and in violation, as the Imperial Chancellor himself confessed, of the international guaranties of Belgian neutrality, forced her way into Belgium for her own purposes, overthrew the army that attempted resistance and took forcible possession of Belgium. It is therefore an obligation of honor for Germany to vacate Belgium without delay after the conclusion of peace—in accordance with the solemn assurance which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, von Jagow, caused to be given, August 4, 1914, through the German Ambassador,

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Prince Lichnowsky, to the English Secretary of State, Sir Edward Grey \*—and to compensate the Belgian people in full measure for the damage inflicted upon them. . . .

Speech delivered by Eduard Bernstein, at a meeting of Social Democratic leaders held Aug. 14-16, 1915. It was excluded from the German press by the censorship. A translation was published in the Paris "Humanité," Sept. 28, 1915, and the above and other extracts are to be found, in the original text, Grumbach, pp. 448-449.

### Protest against the annexationist propaganda

. . . In view of the efforts that are becoming more and more manifest to give to the war the character of a war of conquest, we regard it as our duty to recall what we said in the session of August 4, 1914, at the beginning of the war: "We desire a peace which makes friendship with neighboring nations possible." . . . **The propagation of plans of conquest is already spurring the adversaries of Germany to continue the struggle and is contributing in a disastrous way to prolong the war. . . . Every forcible assault upon the freedom and independence of a nation contains the germ of new war-like complications, and involves the prospect of a coalition of enemies perilous to the German Empire. . . . The assertion, that the German Empire needs**

\* The telegram in question read: "Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretense whatever, annex Belgian territory. . . ." See "British Blue Book," doc. no. 157.

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for its economic existence acquisitions of territory in the East and in the West is disproved by the brilliant economic progress which we have witnessed within the previous boundaries of the Empire. With Belgium especially our economic relations were, before the outbreak of the war, most intimate. No impediments of any kind were interposed to check the activity and the enterprising spirit of our nationals. . . .

In advocating under all circumstances the freedom and independence of all nations, in protesting against every policy of annexation, we are convinced that we are rendering the greatest service to our own people.

Memorial presented to the Imperial Chancellor, dated June 25, 1915, signed by Fr. Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann, representing respectively the Social Democratic party of Germany and the Social Democratic members of the Reichstag.

### Annexionist agitation officially promoted

On Dec. 21, 1915, when further war credits were demanded, the majority fraction of the Social Democrats repeated their protest against "all plans of conquest," but voted for the credits. A minority declaration was made on behalf of twenty members of the Reichstag by Herr Geyer, who said (in part):

. . . While we resist with all our power plans of conquest framed by Governments and parties in other countries, we take an equally determined stand against the disastrous agitation of annexionist politicians in our own country. . . . This perilous policy the Imperial Chancellor has not dis-



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avowed . . . he has rather promoted it. . . . We cannot reconcile our desire for peace and our antagonism to plans of conquest with a vote in favor of the war credits. We therefore reject the credits.

### **The Chancellor's military aims**

The Imperial Chancellor yesterday raised at least a corner of the curtain that conceals his military aims. Never before has he expressed himself so clearly. **Germany, he says, will not voluntarily deliver the Poles, the Balts, the Letts, the Lithuanians to reactionary Russia. . . .** If, however, it is a question of making the people of Poland independent, they must themselves decide what political form they will adopt. A further question arises: What is to be done with the Balts, the Lithuanians, the Letts? Are they to be incorporated in any State, and in which? Up to the outbreak of this war, the people of this region had no desire to be connected with the German Empire. . . .

Against the remarks made by the Imperial Chancellor regarding Belgium we must interpose the sharpest protest. Assuredly Belgium is not to become an Anglo-French vassal State, but neither is she to become a German vassal State. . . . **From the utterances of the Imperial Chancellor, Deputy Spahn has drawn the conclusion that Belgium must come under our control in political, economical and military matters.** [Cries of "Quite right!" on the Right and in the Center.] For a free nation that has been constituted as an independent State, this form of an-



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nexation would be much worse than the cession of a narrow strip of territory. Its sovereignty would be destroyed. . . .

The Imperial Chancellor denies that desire for territory plays any rôle among us. Is he not aware that in the literature of the war the demand is constantly made that we should gain new territories for our surplus population? ["Quite right!" on the Right, in the Center and among the National Liberals.] . . . I comprehend your view; but how, holding such views, you can work yourself into indignation about the intention of other nations to annihilate us, that I certainly do not understand.

Hugo Haase, Leader of the Social Democratic Labor fraction (numbering nineteen members in the Reichstag), Speech in the Reichstag, April 6, 1916.

### "A gang of robbers"

We adhere to the . . . point of view contained in the demand of August 4, 1914—the territorial integrity of Germany and her economic independence and development—but today we still refuse to oppress foreign peoples. . . .

The supporters of conquest shout for increase of power, increase of territory, money and raw material. That can be wanted only by a nationally organized gang of robbers.

Philipp Scheidemann, Leader of the Social Democratic majority, Speech in the Reichstag, May 15, 1917. As late as 1916, Scheidemann's attitude toward annexations was somewhat equivocal; see above, p. 149.

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### Why Socialist journals rarely protest

Attacks upon those wide circles in the nation that deem the connection of Belgium with the German Empire to be necessary, in the interest of the Fatherland, have already been strictly prohibited in a notice to you referring to your article on "The Future of Belgium" in your issue of March 26, 1915. Since your attitude gives me no assurance for the future against offenses of the kind censured, I impose upon your journal the requirement of preliminary approval.

Gen. Baron von Gayl, notification sent April 24, 1915, to the editors and publishers of the "Dortmunder Arbeiterzeitung" (Social Democratic).

In your issue of April 23, 1915, under the heading, "More About the Aims of the War," you again discuss this subject in defiance of my definite prohibition. In the article cited, you describe certain remarks of Deputy Paasche, concerning the possible acquisition of European and colonial territories, as "phantasies" and on the other hand you reproduce with approval an essay of Professor Brentano, which in a discussion of the aims of peace contains serious breaches of the party truce (*Burgfriede*). . . . Since your attitude gives me no assurance for the future against offenses of the kind censured, I impose upon your journal the requirement of preliminary approval.

Gen. Baron von Gayl, notification sent April 25, 1915, to the "Niederrheinische Arbeiterzeitung" (Social Democratic).

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## II. PROTESTS OF ASSOCIATIONS

### Petition of the "New Fatherland Alliance"

The "Bund Neues Vaterland" was founded in November, 1914, by Baron von Tepper-Laski, a man sixty years old, one of the best known of Prussian sportsmen. His democratic views brought him into opposition against the Government from the outbreak of the war. The Bund included men from many circles: politicians, savants, manufacturers, financiers and former diplomatists. At the outset it was not discouraged by the Government; it was deemed useful as a make-weight against the extreme annexationists. In the latter part of the year 1915, chiefly in consequence of pressure exerted by the military authorities, who regarded the Bund as a dangerous organization, the attitude of the Government changed, and all meetings of the Bund were placed under police supervision. Early in April, 1916, the general secretary of the Bund, Frl. Jannasch, was arrested, without any public statement of the charges against her. Some weeks later she was set at liberty. Grumbach, p. 409.

Six great economic associations . . . have sent to the Chancellor a Memorial, dated May 20.\* . . . We feel it our duty to express most emphatically our opposition to the demands set forth in this Memorial; and to petition the Imperial Chancellor to take the measures needed to check this agitation and, above all things, to make it clear, beyond a doubt, that the Imperial Government is not in accord with the aims of the war set forth in the said Memorial.

\*See above, pp. 123-125.

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The insane idea of securing peace by annihilating our enemies.—We need not insist that a ruthless victor would conjure up against himself the hostility of the whole world and would necessarily succumb to the alliance of all the Powers. We wish only to inquire whether in our case it is possible so to weaken our enemies that they shall for a long period be powerless. We have against us, not one single Power, but four European Great Powers. The notion of so weakening our chief antagonists, England and Russia, as to reduce them to long continued impotence, or of “annihilating” them, as the “Wehrverein” demanded, Christmas, 1914, is too naïve for serious discussion. . . .

To secure peace “permanently” or within the reach of human foresight by this method of “bleeding white” is quite impossible. To determine to fight for such an unattainable military purpose is stark madness.

The diffusion of this mad idea is dangerous, since it increases the difficulty of our attaining such a peace as we need, as we may perhaps secure in a not too distant future, and as would really promise to be permanent. . . .

**Annexations demanded.**—The Memorial demands that extensive regions in the West and in the East shall be incorporated in the Empire.

In the West, Belgium is to be annexed, in effect if not formally—a country covering almost 30,000 square kilometers, with a population of about 7,500,000. In France (if the most modest interpretation is placed upon the statements made in the Memorial) . . . fully 20,000 square kilometers are

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to be annexed with more than 3,500,000 inhabitants.

In the East the demands contained in the Memorial are even more indefinite. We shall again attempt to interpret them as modestly as possible. . . . They would amount altogether to annexations of 80,000 square kilometers with more than 5,000,000 inhabitants. In the West and the East together, accordingly, about 130,000 square kilometers\* are to be annexed, with more than 16,000,000 inhabitants. . . .

How great a task would be imposed upon Germany, even in times of peace, if . . . more than 16,000,000 inhabitants, almost all of them animated by the bitterest hostility against everything German, were to be loaded upon the Empire, with its population of 67,000,000, what perils would be involved in times of peace, to say nothing of times of war—these questions have not wholly escaped the attention of the authors of the Memorial. This explains the fact that they advance a further demand. . . . In the annexed countries government and administration are to be so conducted that “the inhabitants shall obtain no influence upon the political destinies of the German Empire.”

In other words, the population is to be ruled by the German Empire without being able to exercise any political rights in the German Empire. . . . This system is to be imposed, not only in the East, upon Russian subjects, but also in the West, on Belgian and French citizens, accustomed to the fullest liberty and to democratic constitutions.

\*Nearly 51,000 square miles—somewhat more than the area of New York State.

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. . . To the monstrous proposal of converting 16,000,000 foreign and hostile human beings into compulsory members of the German Empire there is thus added a second monstrosity. . . . No sane person will believe that any such forcible subjugation could be permanent. It would rather be avenged fearfully upon the German nation.

In carrying out the annexations, the Memorial demands not only measures in the field of public law but also far-reaching attacks upon the right of private property. All possessions that carry with them strong economic and social influence—in the West particularly the possession of all great industrial plants, in the East especially the large and medium agricultural holdings—are to pass into German hands.

This would be a revolution in the economic situation of individuals in the annexed countries such as no modern annexation has carried with it. It recalls—and the comparison is not on the whole favorable to the modern plan—the times of the great migrations of the nations. In those times the Roman citizen holding land in a Roman province conquered by the Teutons was obliged to cede, in one form or another, a part of his possessions to a Teuton conqueror. . . .

**Thus one monstrosity begets another. . . .**

Among Germany's enemies there is a considerable conflict of interests, which must come into play again after the conclusion of peace. . . . After the conclusion of peace it should be one of the most important tasks of German policy to see that a coalition such as now exists should not again be



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formed against us. . . . The annexation plans of the Memorial tend to bring about the direct opposite of what prudence demands. Instead of dividing our enemies, such annexations would weld them together. . . .

What a pitiable palterer was Bismarck, who in 1866 let Austria escape without cessions of territory, and who in 1871 concluded a premature peace, without fully exploiting the favorable military situation and taking from the French Verdun and Belfort! . . .

Belgium.—Our experiences tell us, without qualification, that the violation of Belgian neutrality has almost everywhere made a disastrous and altogether lamentable impression on the feelings of neutrals; that this impression, despite the lapse of ten months, is in nowise effaced; that on the contrary it has in many cases been regrettably intensified. . . .

Members of our Alliance know, from personal impressions, how strong has been the effect of the violation of Belgian neutrality upon the great majority of Americans, even upon those who were friendly to Germany. . . . It has been particularly difficult to make our appeal to a "state of necessity" intelligible to Americans. . . .

The annexation of Belgium would be viewed in all countries as the forcible subjugation of a maltreated free nation, completely free from responsibility for her sad fate. With the strong prejudice already existing against us in many nations, it would have a fearful and long-enduring effect. . . .

Should we insist on satisfying demands for an-



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nexation which would make any conclusion of peace impossible within any calculable period, we should do our utmost to drive the neutrals into the camp of our enemies; we should turn against us first their sympathies and then perhaps their armies. And in the meantime there would be an uninterrupted senseless and useless sacrifice of billions of national property and of hundreds of thousands of precious human lives. . . .

This petition was sent to the Imperial Chancellor at the beginning of June, 1915. Copies were sent to all members of the Reichstag. All copies offered for sale were promptly seized by the police. In September, 1915, a complete translation was published in the Paris "Humanité." The full text of the petition is to be found, in the original German, in Grumbach, and the foregoing extracts will be found at pp. 375-384, 400, 402, 403.

### Protest of the German Peace Society

. . . The renunciation [of annexations] is demanded in the peculiar interest of Germany herself; because the compulsory introduction of alien and hostile masses into our political system and our national life could work only to our harm. It is demanded by the urgent need of all nations, including the German nation, to gain the greatest possible security for an enduring peace; because annexations which subjugate a foreign nationality must lead with absolute necessity to a war of retribution. It is demanded by the necessity of building up anew after the war a peaceful—cultural, legal and political—community of the civilized nations; because a Germany burdened with conquests

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would be excluded from such a community. It is demanded by the general principles of respect for the freedom and independence of all nations; because these principles are entitled to respect on their own account and their disregard would necessarily bring vengeance upon us.

Memorial of the German Peace Society, submitted to the German Reichstag, Dec. 1, 1915. It was signed in behalf of the Society by Prof. Quidde, member of the Bavarian Diet, and by O. Umfried, a clergyman. The publication of this memorial was prohibited. In the typewritten copies sent to members of the Society they were warned that the memorial must not be given to the press. Grumbach, pp. 411-413.

### III. INDIVIDUAL PROTESTS AND REACTIONS

#### **Imperialism akin to megalomania**

"The idea of World rule, Imperialism in the proper sense of the word, did not spring up on German soil; it was imported from abroad. Seriously to support it is to commit treason against the innermost essence of the German spirit."—Franz von Liszt.

When this war broke out, we were prepared for dreadful things—unprecedented squandering of human life, fearful misery, famine, disease. **What we were not prepared for is this shocking reversion toward moral savagery. . . .**

I am not sufficiently optimistic to believe that this war will be followed by a long peace. The hatred necessarily engendered by this war and by **the still hardly conceivable way in which it is being waged**—this hatred alone promises a series of wars. This

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assumption is unfortunately supported by the still unbroken power of Imperialism. . . .

What is "the German Idea"? Rohrbach\* nowhere puts it into plain words. Was he restrained from defining it by something like unconscious shyness? What it means to him is, however, quite clear. It is a completely materialistic notion. Rohrbach wishes the German to rule, to stretch himself, to enrich himself, to permit nothing to be done in the world without his coöperation. "The German Idea" . . . is only a euphemism for Imperialism. That is his declared and exclusive aim. That explains his boundless admiration for England, in spite of all his anatagonism to England. . . .

It is not true that all Englishmen are scoundrels. It is not true that only shopkeeping souls dwell in England. . . .

Are we then to feel no hate?

Oh, certainly—we are to hate the English Idea and to pluck it out of our own country, root and branch.

I admit that I am so utter a simpleton as to be unable to perceive the nobility concealed under hideous facts. . . . I see [in Imperialism] only a pride of power, akin to megalomania; with the best will in the world, I can see in it no moral idea. When it is appreciated . . . that the true interests of nations are not antagonistic, then at last it will be understood that even in politics there is such a thing as immorality, and that it is immoral to base our own prosperity on the misery of alien peoples. . . .

\*In work cited above, p. 110.

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A culture that deserves the name does not consist in clever technical inventions, nor even in flourishing arts and sciences, but in the fostering of justice.

Ernst Müller-Holm, "Der englische Gedanke in Deutschland: Zur Abwehr des Imperialismus" (Munich, 1915), pp. 5, 7, 8, 72-73, 82, 99-100.

### Pan-Germanist responsibility

Did this war really arise without any fault on our part? Is Germany really such a lamb as our press asserts? . . . The hatred which almost all neutrals exhibit toward us must give us pause. Our universal unpopularity is fully to be explained neither by certain unamiable Prussian-German traits . . . nor by the French and English underground propaganda. . . .

What handle have we given [to the French and English press]? It is simply our world-trade policy. . . . And what has caused us to be completely detested by civilized nations is this insufferable attitude of the Pan-Germanists. "Pan-Germanists" is their name in politics; in science they are called "Race Theorists." Do you wish to know what Race Theory is? It is a so-called science, of which the purpose is to prove that the Germans stand first among all nations of the world, that all the achievements of civilization since the beginning of history have proceeded from them, and that the rule of the world fitly and rightly belongs to them. . . . What an impression of Germany's politicians, of the aims of German patriots, must a foreigner derive from

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these products of national megalomania? One writer expects a "Pan-Germanic Empire," embracing "the present Empire; the other Germanic territories in Europe, Scandinavia and the Netherlands, as equal partners in the Empire; further, the territories of the Latins in the West and in the Southwest and of Austria's western and southern Slavs, as dependent colonial territories, besides all America south of the Amazon." Another writer calmly launches the assertion that the cultural value of a nation depends on its percentage of "the blond race"; and on this basis he undertakes to prove, in each individual case, that all the great men of the non-German nations were of German blood. A third declares that the command to love your neighbor, given us by the "Aryan" Jesus, of course extends only to Aryans. . . .

**The views of these dangerous fanatics quite dominate public opinion;** they contrive to smuggle their cuckoo-eggs into most journals and newspapers. The harm done by such books as Houston Stewart Chamberlain's "Foundations of the Nineteenth Century," and by the essays in the "Political-Anthropological Review" is inconceivable. Generations must pass away before the bad impression made upon foreign nations disappears.

Müller-Holm, *ibid.*, pp. 131-134.

### Germany's future

Germany's future does not lie on the water, but within her own nobly endowed land. All geographical considerations, the nature of the country,

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the character of its coasts, its position in the middle of Europe, indicate that it is destined to be a continental State. That, of course, does not mean that navigation is to be abandoned . . . but it cannot be our chief object. That is forbidden by military considerations, by our extended frontiers on land. At sea, we must confine ourselves substantially to defense.

It is time to return to Bismarck's policies. After 1871 he lost no opportunity to declare that Germany was "saturated." I am no unconditional panegyrist of Bismarck, not even of his foreign policy. I regret above all that after 1871 he did not attempt, perhaps did not even desire, to establish tolerable relations with France. But his policy had one great merit: it was never adventurous.

Müller-Holm, *ibid.*, p. 140.

### Germany must not follow the Napoleonic road

Full assurance that a conquered enemy will not seize a favorable opportunity to renew the contest can be obtained only by his permanent subjugation. This was the Roman practice, and in this way they gradually built up their World Empire. Luckily for the human race, such a World Empire is today impossible. An intermediate course is to secure extensive cessions of territory, to maintain possession of dominant strongholds, and to exploit the enemy financially. This course was followed by Napoleon, particularly in 1807 as regarded Prussia. . . . This method has not proved satisfactory.



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. . . God forbid that the German Empire, after the victory we expect, should follow the road of Napoleonic policy! The result would be a series of wars, of which the end could not be foreseen. Whatever fetters we might impose upon the nations, they could not be reduced to complete immobility; and on one point Europe is of one mind—never to accept the domination of a single State. . . . Our aim must be: The maintenance of the existing political equilibrium on land and the conquest of an equilibrium on the sea.

Prof. Hans Delbrück, in "Preussische Jahrbücher," vol. 158 (October, 1914). This article was violently attacked in the Conservative press; see Grumbach, p. 424.

### Annexations would ruin the nation

The demand that the outcome of the war for Germany—in compensation for its sacrifices and in order to secure future peace—should consist in extensive additions of territory, threatens increasingly to dominate public opinion. . . . The worst enemy of Germany could devise no more devilish means of ruining the Empire and the nation. . . .

Most widely diffused in Germany, beyond a doubt, is the idea of annexing Belgium. And it is just this idea that is the most dangerous of all. . . . The demand for a secure and enduring peace and the demand for an annexation of Belgium are irreconcilable antitheses.

Prof. Quidde, "Reale Garantien für einen dauernden Frieden" (1915), pp. 4, 5, 11, 18. Printed as manuscript. Copies mailed were confiscated. See Grumbach, p. 420.



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### The indictment against Germany

No book that has appeared during the War has attracted more attention than the volume entitled "J'accuse; von einem Deutschen" (Lausanne, 1915). The German Government forbade its circulation in Germany and endeavored to secure its suppression in Switzerland. From its tone and method of treatment it is clearly the work of a German lawyer. The following extracts are taken from the translation by Alexander Gray (New York, George H. Doran Co., 1915).

1. Germany gave Austria a free hand against Serbia, although she was well aware that a European conflict must arise out of that between Serbia and Austria.

2. She allowed Austria to address to Serbia an ultimatum with exorbitant demands and, notwithstanding an almost complete compliance with these demands, she allowed her to recall her Ambassador and to declare war.

3. By suggesting a localization of the war, she sought to create the appearance of mediating in the interests of peace; but that this proposal had no prospect of success must have been known to her from the history of diplomacy and from the recent evidence of the Balkan crisis; that as a matter of fact it was known to her is clear from the confessions contained in the White Book.

4. She declined the proposal for a conference of the four Powers.

5. She herself then advanced the proposal for direct discussions between Vienna and Petrograd, but at the same time she suffered Austria to de-

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cline to take part in these discussions, and instead to declare war against Serbia.

6. She left unanswered the frequently repeated request of the other Powers that she should herself propose an alternative method of mediation in place of the proposal of a conference which she had declined.

7. She left unanswered and undiscussed the various formulæ for agreement proposed by Grey.

8. In part she refused and in part she left unanswered the formulæ of agreement proposed by Sazonoff.

9. In spite of all inquiries, she never said what Austria wanted, but constantly restricted herself to saying what Austria did *not* want.

10. She made to England a bid for neutrality, and thus announced her intention of making war, at a time when the Entente Powers were still zealously laboring in the interests of peace.

11. When at last negotiations on the Serbian Note were opened, with a prospect of success, in Petrograd between Austria and Russia, she upset these negotiations by her ultimata to France and to Russia, and made war inevitable.

12. In the ultimatum to Russia she demanded that demobilization should also be carried out as against Austria, although Austria herself had mobilized the whole of her forces.

13. In place of the counter-mobilization which she had threatened to carry out, she at once declared war, without any ground, first on Russia and then on France.

14. As an afterthought she based these declara-

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tions of war on the fact that the Powers opposed to her had begun the war, whereas, on the contrary, the first acts of war were committed by Germany.

15. She violated the neutrality of Belgium, and thus in addition brought about war with England.

These points in the indictment are proved, and justify the judgment: **Germany is guilty, along with Austria, of having brought about the European war.**

"J'accuse," pp. 243-245.

### Responsibility of the German Government

It is to you, Herr von Bethmann, that we owe all this. . . . Go to the battlefields, go to the hospitals; see the wounded, the dead and the dying; go into the wasted cities and pray before the ruined altars, entreating your Saviour for forgiveness, that you, in place of the words, "Peace on earth, goodwill to men," have brought about "Murder on earth, and for men fire and destruction." Then beat your breast and confess aloud and in public, so that all the world may hear it: "I am the guilty one, I alone!" This would not bring you righteousness, but it would be the first step toward it—the penitence which in itself is half-atonement. . . .

The German nation has been corrupted and blinded, that it might be driven into a war which it has never foreseen, never intended, and never desired. In order that it might be "liberated," it has been put in chains. . . .

History, which weighs guilt and innocence in its iron scales, will, I am firmly convinced, confirm the

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judgment which, with pain and shame, I as a German have been compelled to pass on Germans, in honor of truth and for the well-being of the German people. History also with letters of flame will inscribe the verdict: **Weighed in the balance and found wanting.**

"J'accuse," pp. 375, 421, 423.

### Testimony in favor of the Belgians

The following letter from a German priest, dated Aix-la-Chapelle, Nov. 26, 1914, was sent to the "Kölnische Zeitung." It is cited in "Jugés par eux-mêmes," pp. 87-88.

One of the most thankless tasks of the present time is to assert the truth against the absurd rumors circulating through the country. The "Volkszeitung," Cologne, has already published, September 30, 1914, a letter from me, in which I stated that after investigation I had not found in the thirty-five hospitals of Aix-la-Chapelle a single German soldier whose eyes had been put out.

You have informed me, since, that my letter has not stopped this rumor-mongering. To show this, you have sent me an article published in the "Kölnische Zeitung," October 31, which is quite adapted to revive belief in these fantastic stories. It is stated, in this "Kölnische Zeitung" article, that a physician named Sæthre had visited the Cologne hospitals. In the translation of his report is to be found the following passage:

"There can be no doubt concerning the atrocities committed by the franc-tireurs. I myself have seen, in Aix-la-Chapelle, a Red Cross nurse, one of

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whose breasts had been cut off by the franc-tireurs, and a squadron commander whose eyes had been put out while he was lying on the battlefield."

You have asked me to write you what I thought of this report. Accordingly, I addressed inquiries to the proper authorities in order to find out whether the statements made by Dr. Sæthre were accurate. On November 25th, the director of the hospital wrote me as follows:

"The atrocities you mention have not been committed, at least, not so far as is known in Aix-la-Chapelle. We have not seen the Red Cross nurse in question, any more than the squadron commander."

I do not know where the physician mentioned in the "Kölnische Zeitung" got his information. I believe it necessary to state here, for the second time, that the hospitals of Aix-la-Chapelle shelter no wounded men whose eyes have been put out nor any Red Cross nurse mutilated in the above-mentioned manner.

Fr. Kaufmann.

### A discouraged Dernburg

Germany has few friends in the world. The sentiment in South America is divided, and the actual neutrality of North America is doubtful. . . . We have not understood the psychology of the South Americans—and not of the South Americans alone. . . . It is a mistake to say that merely envy and ill-will are to blame for this, for we ourselves

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have frequently insulted this psychology by our methods.

Former Colonial Secretary Dernburg. Address delivered at the organization meeting of the German Economic Union for South and Central America; reported in the "Berliner Tageblatt" (Sept. 3, 1915); cited in the "New York Times" (Sept. 24, 1915).

We have with particular self-contentment troubled ourselves little as to what foreign countries thought of us. When we did what we thought right, then we were satisfied. What others thought of it left us indifferent. We have delighted ourselves in standing on guard in shining armor in Central Europe, and we have in a fateful hour set ourselves against the general tendencies of a world that desired peace. . . .

Dernburg, Speech at Breslau, April 29, 1917; cited in the "New York Times" (May 1, 1917).

### "A softened Harden"\*

Put the German house in such order that tomorrow it will be habitable and not an eyesore to the world. . . .

Democracy is the word of the hour. A league of nations is on the way. Shall Germany freeze without, and in the era of coming peace shall militarism remain the root and branch of German political life?

Maximilian Harden, in the "Zukunft," cited in the "New York Times" (May 1, 1917). In consequence of further criticisms of German governmental policy, the "Zukunft" was suppressed, in July, 1917, and Harden was drafted

\*See above, pp. 79-80, 83-85.

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into governmental service as a military clerk; see "New York Times" (July 12, 1917).

### Germany an obstacle to freedom

The world has become quite another place through Russia's going over to democracy and the entry of the United States into the lists against us. Germany now stands against an alliance of world democracy, and the people of the world are persuaded, and are daily becoming more convinced, that the triumph of freedom in the world is impossible as long as Germany remains what she is.

The Munich "Post," cited by Wm. E. Walling in the New York "Tribune" (May 17, 1917).





## APPENDIX

### "SCRAPS OF PAPER"

#### I. TREATIES BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES

##### Treaty of 1785

ART. XII.—If one of the contracting parties should be engaged in war with any other Power, the free intercourse and commerce of the subjects or citizens of the party remaining neuter with the belligerent Powers shall not be interrupted. On the contrary, in that case, as in full peace, the vessels of the neutral party may navigate freely to and from the ports and on the coasts of the belligerent parties, free vessels making free goods, inasmuch that all things shall be adjudged free which shall be on board any vessel belonging to the neutral party, although such things belong to an enemy of the other. . . .

##### Treaty of 1799

ART. XIII.—And in the same case of one of the contracting parties being engaged in war with any other Power, to prevent all the difficulties and misunderstandings that usually arise respecting merchandise of contraband, such as arms, ammunition,

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and military stores of every kind, no such articles carried in the vessels, or by the subjects or citizens of either part, to the enemies of the other, shall be deemed contraband, so as to induce confiscation or condemnation and a loss of property to individuals. Nevertheless, it shall be lawful to stop such vessels and articles, and to detain them for such length of time as the captors may think necessary to prevent the inconvenience or damage that might ensue from their proceeding, paying, however, a reasonable compensation for the loss such arrest shall occasion to the proprietors; and it shall further be allowed to use in the service of the captors the whole or any part of the military stores so detained, paying the owners the full value of the same, to be ascertained by the current price at the place of its destination. But in the case supposed of a vessel stopped for articles of contraband, if the master of the vessel stopped will deliver out the goods supposed to be of contraband nature, he shall be admitted to do it, and the vessel shall not in that case be carried into any port, nor further detained, but shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage. . . .

### Treaty of 1828

ART. XII.—The twelfth article of the treaty of amity and commerce, concluded between the parties in 1785, and the articles from the thirteenth to the twenty-fourth, inclusive, of that which was concluded at Berlin in 1799 . . . are hereby revived with the same force and virtue as if they made part of the context of the present treaty. . . .

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### II. TREATIES NEUTRALIZING BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG

#### Treaty of London, November 15, 1831

ART. VII.—Belgium, within the limits indicated in Articles I and II, Sec. 4, will form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It will be required to observe this same neutrality toward all other States.

ART. XXV.—The Courts of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia guarantee to his Majesty the King of the Belgians the execution of all the preceding articles.

The engagements contained in this treaty were renewed by that of 1839, which definitely established the status of Belgium and recognized that all the articles of the treaty of 1831 were placed under the guaranty of the five Powers.

#### Treaty of London, May 11, 1867

ART. II.—The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the limits determined by the act annexed to the treaty of April 19, 1839, under the guaranty of the courts of France, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, will henceforth form a perpetually neutral State. It will be required to observe this same neutrality toward all other States. The high contracting parties bind themselves to respect the principle of neutrality stipulated by the present article. The latter is and continues to be placed under the sanction of the collective guaranty of the Powers

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who are signatories to the present treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral State.

### III. CONVENTIONS RESPECTING WAR ON LAND

#### **The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 \***

His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia (etc.):

Seeing that, while seeking means to preserve peace and prevent armed conflicts between nations, it is likewise necessary to bear in mind the case where the appeal to arms has been brought about by events which their care was unable to avert;

Animated by the desire to serve, even in this extreme case, the interests of humanity and the ever progressive needs of civilization;

Thinking it important, with this object, to revise the general laws and customs of war, either with a view to defining them with greater precision or to confining them within such limits as would mitigate their severity as far as possible;

Have deemed it necessary to complete and explain in certain particulars the work of the First Peace Conference, which, following on the Brussels Conference of 1874, and inspired by the ideas dictated by a wise and generous forethought, adopted provisions intended to define and govern the usages of war on land. . . .

ART. I.—The contracting Powers shall issue instructions to their armed land forces, which shall

\* Except where otherwise indicated, the text cited is that of 1907.

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be in conformity with the Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land annexed to the present Convention.

ART. III.—A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation.

It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.

### Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land

ART. I.—The laws, rights and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps, fulfilling the following conditions:

1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;

3. To carry arms openly; and

4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included under the denomination “army.”

ART. 2.—The inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having time to organize themselves in accordance with Article I, shall be regarded as belligerents if they carry arms openly and if they respect the laws and customs of war.

ART. 3.—The armed forces of the belligerent par-

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ties may consist of combatants and non-combatants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both have a right to be treated as prisoners of war.

ART. 4.—Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the individuals or corps who capture them.

They must be humanely treated.

All their personal belongings, except arms, horses, and military papers, remain their property.

ART. 7.—The Government into whose hands prisoners of war have fallen is charged with their maintenance.

In the absence of a special agreement between the belligerents, prisoners of war shall be treated as regards board, lodging, and clothing on the same footing as the troops of the Government who captured them.

ART. 22.—The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.

ART. 23.—In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden:

*a.* To employ poison or poisoned weapons;

*c.* To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defense, has surrendered at discretion;

*d.* To declare that no quarter will be given;

*e.* To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;

*f.* To make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention.

*g.* To destroy or seize the enemy's property, un-



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less such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.

*h.* A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before the commencement of the war.

ART. 25.—The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.

ART. 26.—The officer in command of an attacking force must, before commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his power to warn the authorities.

ART. 27.—In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the same time for military purposes. . . .

ART. 28.—The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited.

ART. 44.—Any compulsion of the population of occupied territory to take part in military operations against its own country is prohibited.\*

ART. 45.—It is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile Power.

ART. 46.—Family honor and rights, the lives of

\* Text of 1899. Germany refused to ratify a modified text adopted in 1907.

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persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected.

Private property cannot be confiscated.

ART. 47.—Pillage is formally forbidden.

ART. 50.—No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible.

ART. 52.—Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country.

Such requisitions and services shall only be demanded on the authority of the commander in the locality occupied.

Contributions in kind shall, as far as possible, be paid for in cash; if not, a receipt shall be given and the payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible.

ART. 53.—An army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the State, depôts of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable property belonging to the State which may be used for military operations.

ART. 56.—The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, to the arts and sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as private property.

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All seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions of this character, historical monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings.

(1)











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